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Abstract 
 
The ability to maintain a coherent and continuous ‘sense of self’ is a fundamental component 
of being human, enabling us to interact and function successfully in everyday life. While a 
sense of self is commonly accepted to involve both ‘extended’ (i.e., memories) and 
‘interpersonal’ (i.e., social) elements, the precise cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying 
these aspects of the self remain poorly understood. This thesis draws upon theory and 
methods from contemporary cognitive neuroscience to examine the neurocognitive 
underpinnings of the extended and interpersonal self in Alzheimer’s disease (AD), semantic 
dementia (SD), and the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD): 
neurodegenerative disorders involving progressive cognitive and behavioural change as the 
result of degeneration to distinct brain networks.  
 
Employing a novel experimental method (the ‘NExt’ taxonomy), Part 1 of the thesis (Chapters 
3 and 4) reveals how a full spectrum of episodic and semantic memory representations may 
be drawn upon to support one’s past and future life stories, giving rise to a sense of continuity 
of the extended self. Part 2 (Chapters 5 and 6) illustrates how the complex social interactions 
that comprise the interpersonal self may be deconstructed into several distinct, yet 
interacting, psychological components. Furthermore, neuroimaging analyses uncover 
widespread neural regions to be associated with both the extended and interpersonal aspects 
of the self, incorporating brain networks beyond those typically implicated in self-related 
processing. The improved neurocognitive characterisation of the self provided by this thesis 
highlights the complex, multifaceted nature of this construct. Moreover, from a clinical 
perspective, distinct profiles of the self unveiled across AD, SD, and bvFTD reveal how 
ultimately, ‘all is not lost’ in neurodegeneration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This chapter contains material from the following two published manuscripts: 
Strikwerda-Brown, C., Grilli, M. D., Andrews-Hanna, J. R., Irish, M. (2019). “All is not lost” – 
Rethinking the nature of memory and the self in dementia. Ageing Research Reviews, 54, 
100932. 
Strikwerda-Brown, C., Ramanan, S., Irish, M. (2019). Neurocognitive mechanisms of theory of 
mind impairments in neurodegeneration: A transdiagnostic approach. Neuropsychiatric 
Disease and Treatment, 15, 557-573.  
 
One of the fundamental qualities of the human experience is the ability to maintain a 
coherent and continuous ‘sense of self’ (Mauss, 1985). This feeling that we exist as a distinct 
and unique person (Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013) enables us to interact and function 
successfully in everyday life (Clare et al., 2013; Rathbone, Holmes, Murphy, & Ellis, 2015; 
Vanderveren, Bijttebier, & Hermans, 2017). For over two thousand years, the ‘self’ has been 
the subject of keen interest and in-depth inquiry by philosophers, psychologists, and 
neuroscientists alike. While various theoretical models have been proposed, it is generally 
accepted that a sense of self comprises both ‘extended’ (i.e., memories and life stories) and 
‘interpersonal’ (i.e., personality traits, social interactions) elements (S. Gallagher, 2013; Harré, 
1991; Neisser, 1988). Despite substantial progress in defining and conceptualising the 
construct, however, the precise cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying a sense of self 
remain poorly understood. This is likely attributable, at least in part, to the disconnect 
between the empirical investigation of the self and the latest conceptual and methodological 
developments in cognitive neuroscience. While these theoretical and technological advances 
have the potential to significantly improve the characterisation of the self, studies marrying 
these two separate lines of research remain scarce. 
 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD), semantic dementia, (SD), and the behavioural variant of 
frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) are three distinct neurodegenerative disorders of the 
brain, involving progressive cognitive and behavioural change as a result of the selective and 
systematic degeneration of large-scale neural networks (Seeley, Crawford, Zhou, Miller, & 
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Greicius, 2009). While AD and SD are characterised by impairments in episodic and semantic 
memory, respectively (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011; McKhann et al., 2011), bvFTD manifests as 
a disorder of social interaction, comprising striking changes in personality and behaviour 
(Piguet, Hornberger, Mioshi, & Hodges, 2011; Rascovsky et al., 2011). Accordingly, these 
syndromes offer a unique opportunity to inform understanding of the neurocognitive 
architecture of the extended and interpersonal aspects of the self. 
 
This thesis draws upon contemporary cognitive neuroscientific methods and theory to 
investigate the cognitive and neural mechanisms of the extended self in AD and SD (Part 1), 
and the interpersonal self in bvFTD (Part 2), with the overall aim of improving characterisation 
of the self. Chapter 1 provides an overview of theoretical models of the self; current cognitive 
neuroscience understanding of the extended and interpersonal self; the AD, SD, and bvFTD 
syndromes; and research to date investigating the extended and interpersonal self in these 
disorders. In Section 1.1., theoretical models of the self are reviewed, with particular focus 
on the Neisser framework. Section 1.2. outlines Part 1 of the thesis, by providing an overview 
of the cognitive neuroscience literature on the extended self. The clinical syndromes of AD 
and SD are described, followed by a review of the studies on the extended self in AD and SD. 
The aims and structure of Part 1 of the thesis are then presented. Next, Section 1.3. outlines 
Part 2 of the thesis, reviewing the interpersonal self from a cognitive neuroscience 
perspective, the syndrome of bvFTD, and the current knowledge about the interpersonal self 
in bvFTD. The aims and structure of Part 2 of the thesis are then provided. Finally, the overall 
justification and aims of the thesis are presented in Section 1.4.  
 
1.1. Theoretical models of the self 
Since the 19th century, numerous philosophical and psychological models of the self have 
been proposed. A common thread underlying many of these theories is the notion that the 
self is not a unitary construct, but instead comprises multiple distinct components. Early 
models (James, Burkhardt, Bowers, & Skrupskelis, 1890; Mead, 1934), influenced by the 
ancient Greek philosophy of Socrates and Plato, distinguished between the self as the 
experiencer, or subject, of ongoing consciousness (the ‘I’ self) and the self as the object of this 
awareness (the ‘me’ self). This distinction has remained dominant in theoretical 
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conceptualisations of the self, as well as forming the launchpad for several extensions 
(reviewed by Morin, 2006). Such elaborations of the model propose several additional aspects 
of the self, based on the type and complexity of self-referential information (Neisser, 1988; 
Newen & Vogeley, 2003), and its temporal nature (i.e., in the present moment versus 
extended across time; S. Gallagher, 2000; Neisser, 1988; Prebble et al., 2013). The Neisser 
(1988) model, which proposes five kinds of self-knowledge, has been particularly dominant 
(see section 1.1.1.). In addition to incorporating many of the elements proposed by other 
influential models (i.e., consciousness, self-awareness, temporal dimension), the components 
of the Neisser (1988) model are tangible and as such, objectively measurable. Accordingly, 
this theoretical framework is suited to form the basis of empirical research, and is particularly 
recommended for studies of the self in dementia syndromes (Caddell & Clare, 2013).  
 
1.1.1. Neisser model  
Neisser (1988) proposes that the self comprises five aspects, so distinct from one another 
that each represents a different ‘self’. These components vary in terms of their 
developmental histories, contribution to human interaction and functioning, and 
susceptibility to pathology. Neisser’s (1988) five selves include: the ecological self, the 
interpersonal self, the extended self, the private self, and the conceptual self. While the 
ecological self refers to the self as perceived with respect to the physical environment, the 
interpersonal self is the self engaged in social interaction. The extended self is based on 
memories of the past and anticipations of the future, the private self refers to experiences 
not shared with other people, and the conceptual self regards the knowledge we hold about 
ourselves. While each of these five selves may be affected to varying degrees in 
neurodegeneration (Seeley & Miller, 2005), the extended and interpersonal aspects are those 
most prominently impacted in the syndromes of AD, SD, and bvFTD. Furthermore, these two 
components are recognised across multiple theoretical frameworks of the self (e.g., S. 
Gallagher, 2013; Harré, 1991), and therefore will form the focus of this thesis.  
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1.2. Part 1: The extended self 
 
“Memory alone… ‘tis to be considered… as the source of personal identity” 
Hume (1739) 
Scottish Enlightenment Philosopher 
 
The extended self is defined by Neisser (1988) as the self experienced over time, based on 
our memories of the past and anticipations of the future. This provides a sense of continuity 
of the self across time1, enabling both stability and growth in who one is as a person (Conway, 
2005; Locke, 1690; Ricoeur, 2010). The extended self first emerges early in childhood (by age 
three), corresponding to the development of memory for past events (Todd & Perlmutter, 
1980) and routines (Nelson, 1986). 
 
1.2.1. Cognitive neuroscience of the extended self  
Contributions of episodic and semantic memory 
While the importance of memory for the extended self is well-recognised (James et al., 1890; 
Locke, 1690; Neisser, 1988; Squire & Kandel, 2009), less attention has been paid to the 
relative contributions of different forms of memory in supporting a sense of self-continuity. 
Traditionally, the extended self was understood with reference to episodic memory (i.e., 
memory for events from one's past) (Neisser, 1988), though contemporary theoretical 
refinements also recognise the contribution of semantic memory (i.e., conceptual knowledge) 
in supporting self-continuity over past, present, and future (Addis & Tippett, 2008; Haslam, 
Jetten, Haslam, Pugliese, & Tonks, 2011; Prebble et al., 2013). These two forms of memory 
were initially proposed to be interdependent (Tulving, 1972), however, a tendency to 
consider episodic and semantic memory as representing distinct systems, with dissociable 
contributions to the extended self, has since pervaded the literature (see Conway, 2005; 
Renoult & Rugg, 2019). Nonetheless, more recently, the interactions and overlap between 
episodic and semantic memory have returned to the spotlight (Burianová & Grady, 2007; 
Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Renoult, Irish, Moscovitch, & Rugg, 2019), for recollecting one’s 
past, as well as imagining the personal future (Irish, 2016; Irish & Piguet, 2013). As such, both 
 
1 ‘In this thesis, ‘self-continuity’ will be used interchangeably with the ‘extended self’. 
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episodic and semantic memory are proposed to support the extended self across temporal 
contexts, in ways that are both distinct and overlapping (Figure 1.1.; Prebble et al., 2013). 
Episodic memory is proposed to provide a sense of subjective continuity of the self, that is, 
the ability to mentally project to the past or future to re-experience (or ‘pre-experience’) 
episodes, otherwise known as autonoetic consciousness (Tulving, 1972; Wheeler, Stuss, & 
Tulving, 1997). This gives rise to a feeling that the present self is an extension of who one was 
(or will be) at the time of the event, allowing a sense of agency (Metcalfe, Snellenberg, 
DeRosse, Balsam, & Malhotra, 2012), aiding in future decision making (Hershfield, 2011), 
contributing to growth of the self over time (D'Argembeau, Lardi, & Van der Linden, 2012), 
and benefiting social relationships (Alea & Bluck, 2003). On the other hand, semantic memory 
is thought to underlie the objective, narrative continuity of the self, experienced via ‘noetic’ 
(i.e., ‘knowing’) consciousness (Tulving, 1972). This allows for the creation of a meaningful life 
story connecting past, present, and future selves. Personal facts and experiences may be 
weaved together via common themes, providing a narrative which one can retell, update, and 
create new meaning from (McAdams, 2001). Both forms of self-continuity, therefore, crucially 
contribute to an individual’s functioning and wellbeing (Rathbone et al., 2015; Vanderveren 
et al., 2017).  
 
Empirical studies of the contribution of episodic and semantic memory to continuity of the 
extended self have thus far been scarce (see Prebble et al., 2013). Of the limited studies to 
date, one approach has involved measurement of the self independently from episodic 
and/or semantic memory, with the relationship between the two subsequently explored (e.g., 
Addis & Tippett, 2004; Naylor & Clare, 2008). Reliable assessment of the abstract construct 
of the ‘self’, however, is inherently challenging (Caddell & Clare, 2010), and existing measures 
do not necessarily fit within proposed theoretical frameworks of the self, including the 
Neisser (1988) model (see Caddell & Clare, 2013). Substantial insights into the processes 
underlying subjective and narrative continuity may nonetheless be gleaned from studies of 
episodic and semantic memory on their own. In the following sections, the utility of 
contemporary memory measures for informing the characterisation of the extended self will 
be explored, including metrics of event specificity, contextual detail, the subjective 
phenomenological experience of remembering, and knowledge of autobiographical facts.  
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Figure 1.1. Theoretical model of the relationship between episodic and semantic memory and 
subjective and narrative continuity, as proposed by Addis and Tippett (2008); Haslam et al. 
(2011); Prebble et al. (2013). (A) Episodic re-experiencing of significant autobiographical 
events (e.g., first day at school, wedding day, a recent holiday) and pre-experiencing of 
potential self-relevant future occurrences (e.g., next family dinner) are proposed to give rise 
to a subjective sense of continuity of the extended self across time. (B) The weaving of 
personal facts from across the lifespan into a life story for one’s past (e.g., grew up in the UK, 
worked as a doctor, and have one grandchild) and imagined future (e.g., becoming a 
grandmother of two) is believed to provide a sense of narrative continuity of the extended 
self, spanning past, present, and future.  
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“I was” – remembering the personal past  
Autobiographical memory (ABM) is defined as the recollection of personally-relevant past 
memories (Conway & Rubin, 1993). ABM involves rich sensory-perceptual and emotional 
episodic information, such as the specific details of one’s wedding day, as well as abstracted 
semantic knowledge not specific to time or place, for example, the names of one’s children 
(Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Irish & Piguet, 2013; Renoult, 
Davidson, Palombo, Moscovitch, & Levine, 2012). To date, the majority of studies of ABM 
have focused on the episodic component, in recognition of its proposed importance for 
subjective self-continuity (Prebble et al., 2013). Traditionally, episodic ABM has been 
quantified by the specificity of a recollected past, personal event (i.e., whether it occurred at 
a specific time and place; e.g., the Autobiographical Memory Interview, AMI, Kopelman, 
Wilson, & Baddeley, 1989; TEMPau, Piolino, Desgranges, & Eustache, 2000). Scores on these 
tasks, however, are constrained by the limited range of the scoring systems, which are unable 
to distinguish between highly detailed, vivid episodic memories, versus those that are less 
detailed, but nonetheless specific (Barnabe, Whitehead, Pilon, Arsenault-Lapierre, & 
Chertkow, 2012). Furthermore, healthy participants often score at ceiling on the AMI (see 
Dritschel, Williams, Baddeley, & Nimmo-Smith, 1992), which may confound the results of 
patient-control comparison studies. Accordingly, more recent studies of ABM draw upon 
uncapped scoring systems (e.g., the Autobiographical Interview, AI, Levine, Svoboda, Hay, 
Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002), which credit participants for the total number of episodic 
details generated, in acknowledgement of the central role of contextual details in vivid re-
experiencing, and consequently, subjective continuity of the self. Such tools have been 
immensely popular and useful in advancing the understanding of episodic ABM (Levine, 
2019). In addition to the amount of contextual details, however, insights into the subjective 
feeling of autonoetic reliving can also be gained from self-reports of the phenomenological 
experience of remembering (Irish, Lawlor, O'Mara, & Coen, 2008, 2011; Piolino, Desgranges, 
et al., 2003). As such, subjective reports of the degree of re-experiencing, the visual 
perspective of the memory (i.e., remembered through one’s own eyes or from an observer 
perspective), and the emotional valence of retrieved memories can be used alongside 
measures of event specificity and level of detail to comprehensively assess subjective self-
continuity.  
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While episodic expressions of ABM have received the most attention in relation to the 
extended self, the semantic component of ABM is also integral to self-continuity, by providing 
an ‘objective’ store of all that is known about the self (Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002). These 
semantic elements provide a sense of narrative self-continuity over time (Thomsen, 2009). 
Importantly, narrative self-continuity can be drawn upon to support the extended self even 
when its subjective counterpart is impoverished, for example in patients with amnesia (Grilli 
& Verfaellie, 2015; Ogden & Corkin, 1991; Rathbone, Moulin, & Conway, 2009). Accordingly, 
semantic memory can provide a sense of continuity of the extended self across time, without 
a need for autonoetic reliving, by creating a personal life story encompassing facts about 
oneself and abstractions of one’s experiences (Prebble et al., 2013; Tippett, Prebble, & Addis, 
2018).  For example, such a narrative could incorporate that one grew up in the UK, moved 
to Australia, has three children, and enjoys classical music. Recent theoretical updates, 
however, contend that semantic ABM is not necessarily a unitary entity, but rather comprises 
subcomponents that vary in their relative degree of ‘episodicity’ or ‘semanticity’. By this view, 
episodic and semantic memory lie at opposite ends of a continuum, with memories of 
repeated or extended episodes (‘general event’ memories), and highly abstracted knowledge 
regarding personal traits and facts about oneself (‘personal semantics’), falling in between 
these two extremes (Figure 1.2., Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Renoult et al., 2012) (see also 
Conway's 'self memory system' model, Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). General event 
memories refer to episodes that have been repeated a number of times (e.g., “I used to go 
dancing every Friday”) (also known as 'summarised events', Barsalou, 1988; or 'repisodes', 
Neisser, 1981), or span an extended time period (e.g., “I worked in the city for a few years”) 
(also known as 'lifetime periods', Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Both general events and 
personal semantics may draw upon either episodic or semantic memory for their retrieval 
(Grilli & Verfaellie, 2016), which may explain the relative ease of access to this form of 
autobiographical information (Conway, 1996). Importantly, each of the dimensional elements 
of semantic memory impart crucial contributions to narrative continuity of the extended self 
(Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Grilli & Verfaellie, 2015; Prebble et al., 2013).  
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Figure 1.2. The episodic-semantic-continuum of autobiographical memory (ABM), informed 
by Grilli and Verfaellie (2014); Renoult et al. (2012). General events (i.e., repeated or extended 
episodes) and personal semantics (i.e., trait knowledge and autobiographical facts) lie at the 
intersection of episodic and semantic ABM (represented by brackets), and may draw upon 
either, or both, forms of memory for their retrieval. 
 
Studies of general event memory typically examine the specificity of recollected personal 
episodes (e.g., on the AMI, Kopelman et al., 1989), with the provision of more general, 
abstract events (i.e., not occurring at a specific time or place) interpreted as reflecting spared 
general event ABM. Personal semantic memory, on the other hand, is usually measured via 
the direct probing of autobiographical facts or personal traits, for example, asking where one 
went to school (Kopelman et al., 1989), or whether they are a kind person (Wiggins, 1995). 
The intact recall of personal semantic facts or general events alone, however, is not sufficient 
to provide a sense of self-continuity, which also requires integration of this information into 
a coherent narrative (McAdams, 2001). Accordingly, ecologically valid measures, 
incorporating naturalistic autobiographical narratives, are likely to provide the most sensitive 
and comprehensive characterisation of narrative continuity of the extended self.  
 
“I will be” – imagining the personal future 
While Neisser’s (1988) original framework clearly articulates that the self extends into the 
future, the majority of empirical studies of the extended self exclusively focus on memory for 
the past. This is despite much of our waking life consisting of planning and imagining our 
personal future, simulating hypothetical situations, and foreseeing different outcomes 
(Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Huang, & Buckner, 2010). From an evolutionary perspective, the 
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ability to envisage personally-relevant future events is of great adaptive value (Suddendorf, 
Addis, & Corballis, 2009), and provides a sense of temporal persistence of the self that is 
integral for wellbeing (Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003). Furthermore, projecting 
oneself into the future via the simulation of self-relevant events can be used to define the 
extended self across time (D'Argembeau et al., 2012; Rathbone, Conway, & Moulin, 2011), 
with imagined future events considered even more important for fostering one’s sense of self 
than memories for past events (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010). Indeed, in the cognitive 
neuroscientific literature, the last decade has seen growing interest in the processes 
underlying the imagination of future events. The most popular tool for assessing episodic 
future thinking is the Past-Future task (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2008), which employs the 
Autobiographical Interview (AI, Levine et al., 2002) scoring method to examine the amount 
and type of detail provided across both remembered past and imagined future events. Studies 
employing this method have revealed striking parallels between episodic memory and 
episodic future thinking, including overlapping cognitive and neural mechanisms (Addis, 
Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & 
McDermott, 2007). Furthermore, patients with episodic memory impairments display 
significant difficulty with imagining future events, including amnesic patients with medial 
temporal lobe (MTL) damage (Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011), mild cognitive impairment 
(Gamboz et al., 2010), and Alzheimer’s disease (Addis, Sacchetti, Ally, Budson, & Schacter, 
2009; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012a, considered further in Section 1.2.3., below). 
Collectively, these findings reveal the crucial importance of episodic memory in the simulation 
of future events, leading to the proposal of the ‘constructive episodic simulation hypothesis’ 
(Schacter & Addis, 2007a, 2007b). By this view, imagining novel, self-relevant future events 
involves the flexible recombination of contextual details from previous experiences in order 
to create a new simulation.  
 
More recent findings, however, have also uncovered a pivotal role for semantic memory in 
supporting the capacity to envisage future events (reviewed by Irish & Piguet, 2013). 
Individuals with developmental amnesia have been demonstrated to retain the ability to 
imagine future events, notwithstanding profound deficits in episodic memory (Hurley, 
Maguire, & Vargha-Khadem, 2011; Maguire, Vargha-Khadem, & Hassabis, 2010). Even more 
strikingly, patients with semantic dementia, despite displaying preserved recall of recent 
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events, experience marked impairments in imagining future episodes on the Past-Future task 
(Duval, Desgranges, et al., 2012; Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 
2012b, described in detail in Section 1.2.3., below). These findings have led to the 
development of the ‘semantic scaffolding hypothesis’, which proposes that the imagination 
of personally-relevant future episodes draws upon semantic scripts, representations, and 
schemas (i.e., higher-order knowledge structures), which guide one along a prescribed path 
of typical life events (Irish, 2016; Irish & Piguet, 2013). In doing so, these semantic 
representations provide a scaffold for the generation of self-relevant future events that may 
plausibly occur. Accordingly, while there has been a tendency to view subjective self-
continuity for the past as predominantly reliant upon episodic memory, this line of research 
suggests that semantic representations may be equally important as their episodic 
counterpart for simulating future events, and perhaps, therefore, for subjectively 
experiencing the self in the future (see also Klein, 2013). Such a view challenges the episodic-
subjective/semantic-narrative dichotomy of self-continuity previously proposed (Addis & 
Tippett, 2008; Prebble et al., 2013). In comparison to studies of episodic future thinking, 
however, there has been less empirical investigation into the objective, narrative experience 
of the self in the future, that is, imagining one’s prospective life story (e.g., becoming a 
grandmother of two; Figure 1.1.). Moreover, the limited existing research on this topic has 
predominantly involved the direct probing of personal roles or traits that may emerge in the 
future, and associated potential future events (Chessell, Rathbone, Souchay, Charlesworth, & 
Moulin, 2014; Rathbone et al., 2011), rather than capturing the ability to weave facts about 
the self into a coherent future narrative. As such, developing and employing naturalistic 
measures of narrative self-continuity will be of utmost importance for improving the 
characterisation of the extended self, across both past and future. 
 
The neural signature of the extended self  
Traditionally, the endeavour of cognitive neuroscience was to localise psychological processes 
to specific brain regions (Downing, Jiang, Shuman, & Kanwisher, 2001; Kanwisher, 
McDermott, & Chun, 1997). This approach, incorporating both neuroimaging and patient 
lesion studies, has been extremely valuable in helping delineate the functions of discrete 
brain areas. For example, the famous case of H.M., in which surgical removal of the bilateral 
hippocampi rendered the patient amnesic (Scoville & Milner, 1957), was seminal in advancing 
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our understanding of the crucial role of the MTL in episodic memory. In more recent years, 
however, neuroscientific research has undergone a paradigmatic shift, away from examining 
the function of isolated brain areas, and toward investigating how the integrated activity of 
entire neural networks gives rise to complex psychological processes (Bressler & Menon, 
2010). One of the most well-known functional brain networks is the so-called ‘default mode 
network’ (DMN), which comprises frontal and parietal cortical midline regions, medial and 
lateral temporal lobes, and lateral parietal cortex (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 
2008; Buckner & DiNicola, 2019). The DMN was initially discovered by chance, via the 
observation of coherent and consistent patterns of brain activity during resting periods in 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) 
studies (Greicius, Krasnow, Reiss, & Menon, 2003; Raichle et al., 2001). Since this time, 
however, rigorous research efforts have focused on uncovering the function of the DMN, 
ultimately revealing its central role in self-related cognition (Andrews-Hanna, 2012). 
Neuroimaging studies reveal reliable activation of the DMN during tasks involving the 
processing of self-relevant information, including ABM and episodic future thinking, moral 
reasoning, and theory of mind (Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). Furthermore, activity of the DMN 
at rest has been demonstrated to scale with the degree to which one reports internally-
directed thoughts while lying in the scanner (Mason et al., 2007). Together, these findings 
point to an important contribution of the DMN to the representation of the self in the brain.  
 
Given the robust activation of the DMN during both episodic autobiographical retrieval and 
episodic future thinking (Spreng et al., 2009), this network may be assumed to support 
subjective continuity of the self. Indeed, this same set of brain regions has been previously 
described as the ‘autobiographical retrieval’ (Maguire, 2001) or ‘episodic recollection’ (Rugg 
& Vilberg, 2013) network. While some differences have been elicited in DMN activations 
during past retrieval versus future simulation, it is thought these are in fact attributable to 
differences in the amount and familiarity of details comprising the event, rather than its 
temporal orientation per se (Addis & Schacter, 2008; Addis, Wong, et al., 2007). Specific 
regions of the DMN have been ascribed unique functions in supporting both past and future 
thinking. The hippocampus has long been recognised as critical for supporting episodic 
memory (Scoville & Milner, 1957), and more recently, episodic future thinking (Hassabis et 
al., 2007). Its precise role in these endeavours, however, remains debated, with leading views 
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proposing the hippocampus may be involved in constructing a spatially-coherent scene in 
one’s mind’s eye (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007), and/or the flexible, relational processing of 
disparate information into event simulations (Schacter & Addis, 2007a). Cortical midline 
structures, namely medial prefrontal (mPFC) and posterior cingulate cortices (PCC) are argued 
to play a key role in self-referential processing in general, which also extends to episodic ABM 
and simulation (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, & Buckner, 2010; Northoff & 
Bermpohl, 2004). The anterolateral temporal cortex is believed to contribute the semantic 
component to episodic construction (Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a), while the angular gyrus may 
play a role in the contextual integration (Ramanan, Piguet, & Irish, 2018; Rugg & King, 2018) 
and/or controlled retrieval of the content of the simulation (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson, & 
Moscovitch, 2008).  
 
Emerging views, however, propose the parcellation of the DMN into two subsystems, which 
each play a distinct role in episodic ABM and future simulation (Ranganath & Ritchey, 2012; 
Robin & Moscovitch, 2017; Sheldon & Levine, 2016). This perspective is informed by the 
divergent profiles of structural and functional connectivity of the anterior versus posterior 
hippocampus (Adnan et al., 2016), together with the graded functional specialisation of this 
structure along its long axis (Poppenk, Evensmoen, Moscovitch, & Nadel, 2013). By this view, 
the anterior hippocampus, together with the anterior temporal lobes (ATLs) and mPFC, are 
thought to contribute coarse, global representations, such as the semantic and schematic 
elements of events (Mack, Love, & Preston, 2016; McCormick, St-Laurent, Ty, Valiante, & 
McAndrews, 2013). By contrast, the posterior hippocampus is tightly connected to posterior 
cortical regions associated with perceptual processing, such as medial and lateral parietal 
regions, including PCC, precuneus, and angular gyrus. Collectively, the posterior DMN is 
proposed to lend the fine-grained, sensory-perceptual episodic details during event retrieval 
or imagination (Adnan et al., 2016; McCormick et al., 2013). Such anterior-posterior 
distinctions form a useful heuristic, however the additional roles of these brain regions 
(described above) should also be considered when conceptualising the neurocognitive 
contributions to subjective continuity of the self.  
 
While the neural signature of episodic ABM and future simulation has been relatively well 
established, the brain regions supporting different forms of semantic ABM, and therefore 
Chapter 1 
 14 
narrative continuity of the self, have received comparatively less attention (reviewed by 
Renoult et al., 2012). Nonetheless, emerging evidence suggests autobiographical facts, self-
knowledge, and repeated events may all rely upon mPFC and lateral temporal lobes (Addis, 
McIntosh, Moscovitch, Crawley, & McAndrews, 2004; Addis, Moscovitch, Crawley, & 
McAndrews, 2004; Gilboa et al., 2005; Holland, Addis, & Kensinger, 2011; Levine et al., 2004; 
Maguire & Frith, 2003; Maguire & Mummery, 1999; Schroeter, Ettrich, Menz, & Zysset, 2010; 
Zysset, Huber, Samson, Ferstl, & von Cramon, 2003). This is consistent with the established 
role of the mPFC in self-referential processing (Northoff et al., 2006), and the importance of 
the ATLs for semantic memory (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009), along with the 
implication of both of these regions in the representation of schemas (Gilboa & Marlatte, 
2017). Along with the mPFC and ATLs, however, knowledge of personal traits is thought to 
also recruit the precuneus and lateral parietal lobes (Schroeter et al., 2010; Zysset et al., 
2003), while mPFC, ATL, medial temporal and lateral parietal regions are all involved in the 
retrieval of repeated events (Addis, McIntosh, et al., 2004; Addis, Moscovitch, et al., 2004; 
Holland et al., 2011; Levine et al., 2004). Of note, the regions implicated in different forms of 
personal semantic memory intersect with those associated with episodic ABM and future 
thinking (described above), further reinforcing the overlap and interplay between the 
episodic and semantic memory systems. 
 
1.2.2. Neurodegenerative lesion models of the extended self: Clinical and neuroimaging 
profiles 
 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and semantic dementia (SD) are contrasting disorders, characterised 
by stark impairments in episodic and semantic memory, respectively. As such, these 
syndromes permit the examination of how changes in these distinct forms of memory affect 
the extended self. The following section outlines the clinical, pathological, and neuroimaging 
characteristics of AD and SD. 
 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 
Clinical presentation 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the most common cause of dementia (Brown, Hansnata, & La, 
2016). While most patients with AD present with an amnestic syndrome, other, less common 
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non-amnestic variants of AD also exist, characterised by prominent deficits in language (i.e., 
logopenic progressive aphasia), visuospatial abilities (i.e., posterior cortical atrophy), or 
executive function (i.e., dysexecutive AD) (McKhann et al., 2011). In this thesis, however, only 
the amnestic form of AD will be considered further. Clinically, patients with typical AD present 
with pronounced deficits in episodic memory, involving an impaired ability to encode and 
store recently learnt information (Salmon & Bondi, 2009), along with varying degrees of 
semantic, visuospatial, and executive dysfunction (McKhann et al., 2011). By contrast, 
socioemotional functioning is generally preserved in the early stages of AD (F. Zhang, Ho, & 
Fung, 2015).  
 
Neuropathological and neuroimaging features 
Neuropathologically, AD is characterised by extracellular plaques and intracellular 
neurofibrillary tangles, caused by the abnormal accumulation of beta-amyloid and tau, 
respectively (Braak & Braak, 1991). The distribution and spread of these pathological 
abnormalities occurs in a coordinated manner, beginning in the MTLs (namely 
transentorhinal, entorhinal, and hippocampal areas), before reaching more widespread 
neocortical regions (Braak & Braak, 1991). Consistent with this pathological progression, 
structural neuroimaging reveals initial atrophy in AD in hippocampal and transentorhinal 
regions, which progresses to lateral temporal, medial and lateral parietal (i.e., PCC and 
precuneus), and frontal brain regions (Karas et al., 2004; Vemuri et al., 2008) (Figure 1.3.). By 
contrast, the earliest functional changes are apparent in inferior parietal lobule and 
precuneus, with hypometabolism in these regions observed using fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG)-
PET imaging  (Schroeter, Stein, Maslowski, & Neumann, 2009). Of note, many of the regions 
affected by AD form part of the DMN. Reduced resting-state functional connectivity has been 
found within this network in AD (Buckner et al., 2005; Zhou et al., 2010), particularly its 
posterior components (Jones et al., 2016). Importantly, the structural and functional changes 
that occur with the progression of AD map closely to the trajectory of cognitive decline 
(Buckner et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 2007). 
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Semantic dementia (SD) 
Clinical presentation 
Semantic dementia (SD), also known as the semantic-variant of primary progressive aphasia, 
falls under the umbrella of frontotemporal dementia (FTD), a collection of syndromes 
involving atrophy of the frontal and/or temporal lobes. SD is one of two language variants of 
FTD, and is characterised by a fluent aphasia, which reflects a progressive, amodal disruption 
of conceptual or semantic knowledge (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011). This presents as 
impairments in confrontation naming and single-word comprehension (Hodges & Patterson, 
2007). Episodic memory, by contrast, remains relatively intact in SD, specifically when non-
verbal stimuli are employed (Irish, Bunk, et al., 2016; Simons, Graham, & Hodges, 2002). 
Behavioural changes, such as interpersonal difficulties and rigidity, can arise in SD with 
disease progression (Snowden et al., 2001), particularly with progression of atrophy from the 
left to right hemispheres (see further below). 
 
Neuropathological and neuroimaging features 
From a neuropathological perspective, the majority of cases of SD are produced by the 
deposition of TAR DNA binding protein 43 (TDP-43) (Chare et al., 2014; Hodges et al., 2004). 
Brain atrophy and hypometabolism are asymmetric and primarily circumscribed to the ATLs, 
incorporating the temporal pole, fusiform gyrus, and perirhinal cortex, but also extend 
postero-medially into the insula, and MTLs, including anterior hippocampus and amygdala 
(Chapleau, Aldebert, Montembeault, & Brambati, 2016; Rosen et al., 2002) (Figure 1.3.). As 
such, SD predominantly affects anterior DMN regions, with the posterior subnetwork 
relatively spared. Most patients with SD present with disproportionate atrophy of the left 
hemisphere (Galton et al., 2001), which encroaches into the right hemisphere with disease 
progression (Kumfor, Landin-Romero, et al., 2016). A subset (~25%) of SD patients harbour 
predominantly right-sided atrophy early in the disease course (Hodges et al., 2009), though 
for the purposes of this thesis, only the canonical left-sided patients will be included.  
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Figure 1.3. Coronal magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans displaying typical patterns of 
atrophy, most pronounced in the bilateral medial temporal lobes in Alzheimer’s disease (AD; 
left) and left anterior temporal lobe in semantic dementia (SD; right). R = right; L = left. 
 
1.2.3. The extended self in Alzheimer’s disease and semantic dementia 
Studies examining ABM and episodic future thinking in AD and SD will now be reviewed. 
Particular consideration will be given to the potential of these findings to inform 
understanding of the contribution of episodic and semantic memory to subjective and 
narrative self-continuity, and the neural networks involved. Importantly, along with the 
memory metrics outlined in Section 1.2.1., convergent evidence regarding observable 
manifestations of the extended self (i.e., actions, preferences, and interactions) in AD and SD 
will also be drawn upon to support these claims.  
 
“I was” – remembering the past  
In addition to deficits in learning and recalling new information, patients with AD have well-
established difficulties with retrieving personally-relevant events from their past (i.e., 
episodic ABM). The precise nature of these impairments, however, has proven difficult to 
decipher, given discrepancies in the profiles of episodic ABM in AD, contingent upon the 
assessment method employed. When the AMI (Kopelman et al., 1989) is used, the majority 
of studies suggest a temporal gradient of event recall in AD, with impaired retrieval of recent 
events (i.e., in the past year), in the context of relatively intact remote recall (Barnabe et al., 
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2012; De Simone et al., 2016; Graham & Hodges, 1997; J. W. D. Greene, Hodges, & Baddeley, 
1995; Irish et al., 2006; Irish, Lawlor, et al., 2011; Kirk & Berntsen, 2018; Leyhe, Muller, Milian, 
Eschweiler, & Saur, 2009; Müller et al., 2013; Naylor & Clare, 2008; Piolino, Desgranges, et al., 
2003; Seidl, Lueken, Thomann, Geider, & Schroder, 2011). Such findings are in accordance 
with Ribot’s law, which suggests that in amnesia, recent memories are more likely to be lost 
than more remote ones (Ribot, 1881). Using the uncapped scoring system of the AI (Levine et 
al., 2002), by contrast, fails to produce this temporal gradient, with a relatively flat profile of 
episodic ABM impairment found across all lifetime periods in AD (Addis et al., 2009; Barnabe 
et al., 2012; Irish, Hornberger, et al., 2014; Irish, Hornberger, et al., 2011; Irish et al., 2018). 
As discussed in Section 1.2.2., this measure is likely to provide a more valid assessment of 
subjective self-continuity than the AMI, given its emphasis on the contextual details thought 
necessarily for vivid re-experiencing. Indeed, findings on the AI are consistent with the 
marked alterations in the phenomenological experience of remembering in AD, which are 
apparent for all lifetime periods. AD patients report no longer mentally reliving their past 
memories, instead stating that they simply “know” the events to have taken place (Piolino, 
Desgranges, et al., 2003). Other elements of autonoetic re-experiencing are also 
compromised in AD, including first-person self-referential imagery and emotional salience 
(Irish, Lawlor, et al., 2011). Accordingly, memories of pivotal experiences from across the 
lifespan, such as one’s wedding day, birth of a child, or death of a parent, become 
impoverished in detail, and lack a sense of having lived through the event. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that subjective self-continuity for the past may be impaired across all 
time periods in AD.  
 
Although SD primarily involves the progressive deterioration of the conceptual knowledge 
base, studying this group nonetheless provides insights into the relationship between 
episodic ABM and subjective continuity of the extended self. In contrast to AD, recent episodic 
retrieval is relatively intact in SD, with these patients typically displaying detailed recollection 
of recent episodes, regardless of the assessment method employed (i.e., AMI versus AI; 
Graham & Hodges, 1997; Hou, Miller, & Kramer, 2005; Irish, Hornberger, et al., 2011; Piolino, 
Desgranges, et al., 2003). Furthermore, SD patients report a preserved sense of mental 
reliving for these recent events (Piolino, Belliard, Desgranges, Perron, & Eustache, 2003; 
Piolino, Desgranges, et al., 2003). By contrast, memory for remote episodes is largely 
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impoverished in specificity and detail in SD (Graham & Hodges, 1997; Hou et al., 2005; Irish, 
Hornberger, et al., 2011), interpreted as reflecting the semanticisation of episodic 
experiences that can occur with the passage of time (Moscovitch, Nadel, Winocur, Gilboa, & 
Rosenbaum, 2006). While SD patients report autonoetically re-experiencing these remote 
events, the validity of such accounts is questionable given they are unable to provide 
sufficient contextual details to adequately justify this sense of remembering (Piolino, Belliard, 
et al., 2003; Piolino, Desgranges, et al., 2003). As such, a degree of subjective continuity of 
the extended self appears retained in SD, though this is likely limited to a narrow temporal 
window (i.e., the past year). Intriguingly, this temporal tapering of the subjective self in SD as 
uncovered by studies of ABM is also supported by behavioural observations in these patients. 
Individuals with SD are commonly reported to display rigid and stereotypical behaviours 
(Ahmed et al., 2014; Perry et al., 2001; Rosen et al., 2006), and often develop a strong 
preference for routine, such as wearing the same clothes, or insisting on attending the same 
café, and eating the same lunch, at the same time, every day. This over-reliance on recent 
events to guide behaviour in SD may stem from the ability to subjectively re-experience the 
self exclusively within the recent past. Together, the findings in SD suggest that episodic and 
semantic ABM may differentially contribute to subjective continuity of the self for the past, 
contingent upon the time period in question. While the subjective experience of the self in 
the recent past may predominantly draw upon episodic ABM, the additional contribution of 
semantic ABM may be particularly important for subjective self-continuity for the remote 
past. 
 
With regard to semantic ABM, direct probing of personal semantic information reveals 
impaired retrieval of autobiographical facts in AD (e.g., Barnabe et al., 2012; Graham & 
Hodges, 1997; Irish et al., 2006; Irish, Lawlor, et al., 2011), but relatively preserved knowledge 
of personal traits (Addis & Tippett, 2004; M. L. Eustache et al., 2013; Klein, Cosmides, & 
Costabile, 2003; Rankin, Baldwin, Pace-Savitsky, Kramer, & Miller, 2005; Ruby et al., 2009). 
Temporal gradients are evident for both types of personal semantics in AD, such that self-
knowledge about the recent past is particularly impaired, including being unable to recall 
recent facts about oneself (e.g., having new grandchildren; Kazui et al., 2000), or recent 
changes to one’s personality that have been reported by close others (e.g., becoming less 
self-assured; Hehman, German, & Klein, 2005; Klein et al., 2003). Nonetheless, knowledge 
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about the self from the distant past, such as the location of their childhood home, the 
university they attended, and their premorbid personality, remains relatively resilient in AD 
(Hou et al., 2005; Rankin, Baldwin, et al., 2005). General event memory is also typically found 
to be preserved in AD (Irish, Lawlor, et al., 2011; Philippi et al., 2015). For example, an 
individual with AD can recall that they went dancing every Friday during their twenties, 
despite being unable to provide a detailed description of one particular instance. Taken 
together, this literature suggests that AD patients retain some access to the semantic 
elements required to provide narrative continuity of the self, though this is predominantly 
limited to remote time periods, leading to an extended self that is largely anchored on the 
remote past (i.e., childhood & early adulthood periods, see Addis & Tippett, 2004; Tippett et 
al., 2018). Intriguingly, the relative preservation of remote personal semantics, coupled with 
the episodic encoding impairments in AD, results in a mismatch between the period of life 
they believe they are in, and objective reality. For example, AD patients may rate their current 
age as younger than they actually are (M. L. Eustache et al., 2013), and fail to recognise 
themselves in a mirror (Biringer & Anderson, 1992). Behavioural observations of patients 
returning to previous life roles (e.g., a former doctor continuing to write reports) or mistaking 
family members (e.g., looking for their young children, who are in fact now grown up) (B. E. 
Harrison, Therrien, & Giordani, 2005) provide convincing illustrations of how the extended 
self is not lost in AD per se. Rather, the individual may revert to an older iteration of the self 
that is incongruent with their present experience and surroundings. Together, the extant 
findings in AD suggest that, as for subjective self-continuity, the relative contribution of 
episodic and semantic memory to narrative self-continuity for the past may vary depending 
upon the particular epoch in question. Specifically, while narrative self-continuity for the 
remote past may predominantly rest upon semantic memory, episodic memory may be 
particularly important for narrative continuity for the recent past, in order to lay down new 
facts about oneself. When episodic memory is impaired, as is the case in AD, narrative 
continuity of the self for the recent period is subsequently disrupted. 
 
Unsurprisingly, the gross semantic impairments in SD extend to the retrieval of 
autobiographical facts (e.g., where they went to school), resulting in ‘step function’, such that 
recent facts are better preserved than those from the remote past (Graham & Hodges, 1997; 
Hou et al., 2005; Nestor, Graham, Bozeat, Simons, & Hodges, 2002). Although this evidence 
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suggests some preservation of ‘personal semantic’ memory in SD for the recent past, it has 
been proposed that these so called ‘facts’ may actually instead reflect the retrieval of recent 
experiences (e.g., remembering the conversation in which they were told a new grandchild’s 
name), and therefore draw upon predominantly episodic, rather than semantic, memory 
representations (Graham, Lambon Ralph, & Hodges, 1997; McKinnon, Black, Miller, 
Moscovitch, & Levine, 2006; Snowden, Griffiths, & Neary, 1994; Westmacott & Moscovitch, 
2003). Nonetheless, these memories likely touch on activities, people, or places that can 
provide a sense of continuity with the recent past, at a factual level. Preserved recent episodic 
ABM may therefore support a degree of narrative continuity in SD, though this is restricted 
to the recent period. These observations marry well with those in AD, suggesting an increased 
importance of episodic ABM for narrative continuity for the recent, but not remote, past. 
 
“I will be” – imagining the future 
Despite the established importance of imagining the future for maintaining a sense of self-
continuity (D'Argembeau et al., 2012), surprisingly little empirical research has been 
conducted on this topic in AD and SD. Of the limited studies to date, the deficits in episodic 
retrieval for the past in AD have been found to extend to the imagination of future events, in 
line with the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis (Addis et al., 2009; Irish, Addis, et 
al., 2012a). In the context of such striking alterations in the content of future simulations in 
AD, however, the phenomenological components of these events have proven more difficult 
to decipher. Interestingly, subjective quality ratings of vividness and level of detail for future 
events do not differ between AD and control participants (Addis et al., 2009; Irish, Addis, et 
al., 2012b). Nonetheless, the impoverished episodic content of future simulations implies a 
narrowing of the temporal window of subjective continuity of the extended self in AD. This 
assertion is supported by the impairments in prospective memory (Kamminga, O'Callaghan, 
Hodges, & Irish, 2014; van den Berg, Kant, & Postma, 2012), planning, and adaptive decision 
making (Gleichgerrcht, Ibanez, Roca, Torralva, & Manes, 2010) observed in AD. Collectively, 
the findings in AD further suggest an important role for episodic memory in subjective-self 
continuity for the future.  
 
Interestingly, however, despite preserved recall of recent episodes in SD, future thinking is 
compromised in these patients (Duval, Desgranges, et al., 2012) at a level comparable to that 
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seen in AD (Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a, 2012b). This reveals the central importance of semantic 
memory in imagining future episodes (Irish, 2016; Irish & Piguet, 2013), and therefore, 
subjectively experiencing the self in the future. As for AD, subjective quality ratings of 
simulated future events do not differ between SD and controls (Irish, Addis, et al., 2012b). 
When attempting to imagine the future, however, SD patients frequently ‘re-cast’ entire 
events from one’s past, that is, they describe exact events that they have already experienced 
(Irish, 2016; Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a, 2012b). Any apparent preservation of autonoetic 
continuity for future simulations in SD may therefore stem from having already experienced 
the event in the recent past. As such, while individuals with SD retain some sense of subjective 
self-continuity for the recent past, this heavily influences their experience of the self in the 
future. This meshes well with the aforementioned behavioural rigidity in this condition. 
Further supporting this notion, impaired prospection has been associated with increased 
stereotypical and repetitive behaviours in SD (Kamminga et al., 2014). Importantly, changes 
to subjective continuity of the future self may significantly impact mental wellbeing, 
potentially to an even greater degree than for the past. A pertinent case study by Hsiao, 
Kaiser, Fong, and Mendez (2013) describes a patient with SD who loses the ability to imagine 
his future self, leading to marked distress and suicidality as he questions, “What am I going to 
do for the rest of my life?” (p 3). Taken together, the evidence from AD and SD points to 
distinct mechanisms underlying the extended self for past versus future epochs (Figure 1.4.). 
Namely, while subjective self-continuity for the recent past may predominantly depend upon 
episodic memory, semantic representations may additionally be particularly important for 
remote past and future time periods. Moreover, narrative self-continuity for the remote past 
may largely require semantic memory, with episodic memory also especially important for 
the recent past. 
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Figure 1.4. Updated model of the relationship between episodic and semantic memory and 
a) subjective and b) narrative continuity of the extended self, based on the extant literature 
in Alzheimer’s Disease (AD) and semantic dementia (SD). a) While subjective continuity for 
the recent past may predominantly draw upon episodic memory, semantic representations 
may additionally be particularly important for this form of self-continuity for remote past and 
future time periods. b) Narrative continuity for the remote past is proposed to principally 
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require semantic memory, although episodic memory may also be especially involved for the 
recent past. Narrative self-continuity for the future remains to be examined.  
 
Neural correlates of the extended self in AD and SD 
In AD, impairments in episodic ABM have been associated with atrophy to the MTLs (Gilboa 
et al., 2005). Specifically, smaller hippocampal volumes correspond to worse episodic ABM in 
AD, for both recent and remote periods (Meulenbroek, Rijpkema, Kessels, Rikkert, & 
Fernandez, 2010; Philippi et al., 2012). In addition, atrophy to other nodes of the DMN, 
namely left lateral temporoparietal, and posterior cingulate cortices, along with extra-DMN 
regions such as bilateral frontal lobes, have been linked to impairments in recent episodic 
ABM in AD (Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a). A decline in both remote and recent episodic ABM over 
time in AD is also related to progressive cortical thinning in lateral temporal cortex (Irish et 
al., 2018), likely reflecting semanticisation of episodic ABMs in AD. In conjunction with these 
patterns of atrophy, increased recruitment of frontal regions is observed during 
autobiographical retrieval in AD, including mPFC and left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in an fMRI 
study (Meulenbroek et al., 2010), and bilateral lateral prefrontal cortices in a PET study (F. 
Eustache et al., 2004), potentially in attempt to compensate for degradation to other brain 
regions. By contrast, no studies to date have examined the neural correlates of semantic ABM 
in AD. Overall, the regions implicated in episodic ABM in AD span regions typically associated 
with both episodic and semantic memory, which underscores the coalescing of these 
elements in subjective continuity of the self for the past. On the other hand, in line with the 
proposed importance of episodic memory for the imagination of future events, deficits in 
episodic future thinking in AD are predominantly associated with atrophy to the DMN, namely 
medial temporal and posteromedial regions (Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a).  
 
In SD, impairments in remote episodic ABM are often attributed to progressive atrophy to the 
ATLs, reflective of the semanticisation of memories over time (Westmacott, Leach, Freedman, 
& Moscovitch, 2001), though this has not been directly examined. A single case study 
suggested that when episodic ABM is intact in SD, such as for recent memories, it is 
underpinned by a similar network to that employed by healthy controls (i.e., medial and 
lateral temporal, mFPC, posterior medial and lateral cortical regions) (Maguire, Kumaran, 
Hassabis, & Kopelman, 2010). Finally, in a group of SD, AD, and bvFTD patients combined, the 
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structural integrity of the ATLs was related to remote episodic ABM retrieval (Irish, 
Hornberger, et al., 2014). Taken together, albeit preliminary, this evidence suggests that the 
brain regions necessary for subjective continuity of the self may vary contingent upon the 
time period in question, with the ATLs likely more pertinent for the remote versus recent past. 
Similar to AD, the neural networks involved in semantic ABM in SD remain to be explored. 
With regard to future thinking, impairments in SD have been associated with atrophy to 
anterior and lateral temporal lobes in SD (Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a), consistent with the 
emerging importance of semantic memory for subjective continuity of the self in the future. 
Atrophy to the anterior hippocampus and bilateral superior medial frontal gyrus, and 
hyperactivation in frontal and occipital regions during fMRI, have also been related to episodic 
future thinking impairments in SD, though the task used in this study provided pre-
determined cues for each simulated event, generated by the patients’ informants (Viard et 
al., 2014). In doing so, this removed the requirement to invoke a semantic scaffold (Irish, 
2016), rendering it difficult to compare these findings to others using the traditional, un-cued 
future thinking task. Taken together, the neuroimaging findings in AD and SD support the 
behavioural findings reviewed above, by suggesting that the neural networks involved in 
subjective continuity of the self for the past and future incorporate brain regions typically 
implicated in both episodic and semantic memory, with particular support for involvement of 
semantic networks for the remote past and future.   
 
1.2.4. Summary and aims of Part 1 
The studies of AD and SD reviewed thus far emphasise the complex relationship between 
episodic and semantic memory and the subjective and narrative components of the extended 
self, which appears to vary across different lifetime periods. Based on this literature, an 
update to the Prebble et al. (2013) model is proposed in Figure 1.4. A number of outstanding 
theoretical and methodological issues, however, remain, which constrain current 
conceptualisations of the extended self. First, previous work on ABM and episodic future 
thinking, including in AD and SD, has typically dissected episodic from semantic elements, 
treating these constructs as dissociable entities. This tendency to fractionate episodic and 
semantic memory, however, overlooks the many ways in which the two memory systems 
interact during ABM retrieval and future thinking (Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Irish & 
Piguet, 2013; Renoult et al., 2019). Second, despite recent theoretical updates proposing a 
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continuum between episodic and semantic memory (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Renoult et al., 
2012), no single measure exists which enables empirical investigation of this framework. 
Third, while semantic ABM has often been assessed via the direct probing of personal facts, 
some integration of this information into a coherent life story is required to provide a sense 
of narrative self-continuity (McAdams, 2001). Finally, compared with its subjective 
counterpart, understanding of the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying narrative self-
continuity for both the past and future lags well behind, given the dearth of studies on the 
topic. Part 1 of this thesis, therefore, aims to address these limitations, drawing upon the 
syndromes of AD and SD to refine the understanding of the relationship between episodic 
and semantic memory and narrative continuity of the self, across past, present, and future. 
Accordingly, Chapter 3 presents the development of a new approach for examining narrative 
self-continuity, involving a novel method for scoring the full range of episodic to semantic 
information enmeshed within naturalistic autobiographical narratives. This scoring tool is 
then validated in AD and SD. In Chapter 4, the new scoring method is applied to narratives of 
imagined future events in AD and SD, and the neural correlates of narrative continuity 
explored. In doing so, Part 1 of this thesis aims to draw upon contemporary theory and 
methods in cognitive neuroscience to improve the characterisation of the extended self. 
 
1.3. Part 2: The interpersonal self 
 
“I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” 
Mbiti (1969) 
Kenyan Philosopher 
 
According to Neisser (1988), the interpersonal self refers to the self as engaged in social 
interaction (see also Mead, 1934). This aspect of the self first appears in early infancy, 
observable by the automatic co-ordination of actions with another person’s (e.g., becoming 
attuned to one’s mother’s affect) (Trevarthen, 1984). In early childhood (between two and 
four years of age), the interpersonal self further develops to incorporate the understanding 
of other people’s mental states (i.e., ‘theory of mind’) (Leslie, 1987), knowledge which 
facilitates social engagement with others.  
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1.3.1. Cognitive neuroscience of the interpersonal self 
The relatively newborn study of ‘social cognition’ has begun to enable the delineation of the 
neurocognitive processes underlying social interactions (Adolphs, 1999; Frith & Frith, 2007). 
Two of the crucial socio-cognitive functions that give rise to the interpersonal self are morality 
and perspective taking. An individual’s moral traits, or in other words their judgements of 
right and wrong, their kindness, and empathy, crucially affect their social interactions, and 
are considered some of the most defining characteristics of the self (Strohminger & Nichols, 
2014, 2015). Further, the ability to shift from one’s own perspective, to adopt that of an 
another, forms the foundation for successful interpersonal relations (Mead, 1934).  
 
Moral reasoning 
The cognitive and neuroscientific study of morality has primarily centered on moral 
reasoning, defined as the ability to evaluate social situations in terms of moral criteria 
(Pizarro, 2007). In turn, these judgements of right and wrong guide subsequent behaviour. 
Traditionally, the empirical analysis of moral reasoning was informed by the ideas of 18th 
century philosophers (Hume, 1751; Kant, 1785/2002), regarding the relative contributions of 
emotional versus rational processes to moral judgements. The earliest work in this area 
focused on the development of moral reasoning abilities in childhood, with multiple stages 
proposed (Kohlberg, 1963; Piaget, 1932). The understanding of moral rules is thought to come 
online between ages seven to 10, with the capacity to judge moral scenarios also developing 
around age 10 (Piaget, 1932). The reasoning behind moral judgements is another critical skill 
which develops in childhood (Kohlberg, 1963).   
 
While this seminal work by Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1963) set the stage for understanding 
moral development, arguably the most profound influence on the bourgeoning study of 
moral reasoning has been the introduction of the ‘trolley problem’ (Foot, 1967). This, and 
related moral dilemmas, have since been used extensively in experimental studies of moral 
reasoning. In the trolley problem, participants are presented with a scenario of a runaway 
train heading towards five railway workers. The five workers will be killed by the train, unless 
the participant decides to hit a switch directing the train onto another track, though this 
would instead kill another worker. A choice to hit the switch represents the ‘utilitarian’ 
decision, with the ultimate outcome providing benefit to ‘the greater good’. By contrast, 
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refusing to hit the switch reflects a ‘deontological’ decision, in that the action itself is believed 
to be wrong (i.e., ‘do no harm’). A variant of this dilemma, known as the ‘footbridge problem’, 
introduces a personal factor to the scenario. In this case, the five workers can only be saved 
if the participant chooses to physically push a bystander off a nearby footbridge onto the 
tracks, halting the train but killing the bystander  (Thomson, 1976). Unlike the trolley problem, 
however, in which most people state they would hit the switch, the majority of respondents 
refuse to push the bystander in the footbridge problem (80-90% versus 10-35% of utilitarian 
responses, respectively; J. D. Greene, 2014; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-Xing Jin, & 
Mikhail, 2007). As will be discussed in the following sections, this dissociation has been 
fundamental in advancing the understanding of the relative contribution of emotional versus 
rational processes to moral decision making.   
 
Neurocognitive mechanisms 
A pivotal study by J. D. Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and Cohen (2001) provided the 
first empirical cognitive neuroscience investigation of moral dilemmas. Based on a hypothesis 
that dilemmas like the footbridge problem engage more emotional processing than trolley-
type problems, due to their ‘personal’ nature (i.e., they require personally inflicting direct 
harm), the study employed fMRI to examine the neural correlates of ‘personal’ versus 
‘impersonal’ moral dilemmas. Compared with impersonal dilemmas, increased activation was 
observed during the personal moral dilemmas in regions typically associated with emotional 
processing, namely mPFC, PCC, and bilateral angular gyrus (Kosslyn et al., 1996; Maddock, 
1999; Reiman, 1997; Reiman et al., 1997). By contrast, impersonal moral dilemmas 
preferentially activated frontoparietal regions associated with controlled cognitive processing 
and working memory (Cohen et al., 1997; E. E. Smith & Jonides, 1997). The findings are 
interpreted as reflecting a dual-process account of moral reasoning, such that the emotional 
and rational subsystems compete during moral decision making, with emotional versus 
rational processes more commonly drawn upon for personal versus impersonal moral 
dilemmas, respectively. This view has been highly influential on subsequent cognitive 
neuroscientific research into moral reasoning.  
 
Ensuing research has supported the dual-process account, uncovering deficits specific to 
personal moral reasoning in clinical populations with impaired emotion processing and 
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lesions to brain regions integral for emotion (e.g., mPFC; Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Làdavas, & di 
Pellegrino, 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 2005). Namely, these 
patients provide an elevated amount of utilitarian responses to personal, but not impersonal, 
moral dilemmas, suggesting a suppression of the normal emotional response to moral conflict 
that tends to produce a deontological response to personal dilemmas in healthy individuals. 
Furthermore, manipulation of emotional state affects personal moral judgements in 
behavioural studies (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2006; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005), and a wealth of 
neuroimaging evidence from fMRI studies reveals activation of emotional regions during 
personal moral reasoning, including amygdala, hippocampus, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), and 
insula, in addition to mFPC, PCC, and angular gyrus/temporoparietal junction (TPJ; reviewed 
by Pascual, Rodrigues, & Gallardo-Pujol, 2013). Along with emotion, however, it is increasingly 
apparent that other neurocognitive processes are involved in personal moral decision making 
(Figure 1.5.). For example, in recognition of their overlap with the DMN (B. J. Harrison et al., 
2008; Spreng et al., 2009), the brain regions commonly associated with personal moral 
reasoning (i.e., mPFC, PCC, angular gyrus/TPJ, hippocampus) are not exclusively implicated in 
emotional responses, but also in theory of mind (Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007), 
self-referential processing (Northoff et al., 2006), and simulation of scenarios beyond the here 
and now (Buckner & Carroll, 2007). Specifically, mPFC and TPJ are thought to support personal 
moral reasoning via inferences about others’ mental states, in order to judge the social 
consequences of the moral decision (Roberts, Henry, & Molenberghs, 2019). Cortical midline 
regions (i.e., mPFC and PCC) are proposed to lend the self-reflective component of personal 
moral decisions (Reniers et al., 2012), while the hippocampus is suggested to support the 
construction of a mental scene of the hypothetical dilemma (Craver et al., 2016; McCormick, 
Rosenthal, Miller, & Maguire, 2016). In addition to these DMN regions, the anterior cingulate 
(ACC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices are postulated to play an integral role in resolving 
the cognitive conflict that arises between the emotional and rational responses toward 
personal moral dilemmas (J. D. Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Finally, the 
bilateral superior and anterior temporal lobes are speculated to process and represent social 
information during personal moral reasoning, including conceptual knowledge about social 
rules and norms (Allison, Puce, & McCarthy, 2000; J. Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-Souza, Krueger, 
& Grafman, 2005), though experimental evidence for this role remains lacking.  
 
Chapter 1 
 30 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Brain regions typically implicated in personal moral reasoning, and their purported 
roles. ACC = anterior cingulate cortex; ATL = anterior temporal lobe; mPFC = medial prefrontal 
cortex; OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; PCC = posterior cingulate cortex; TPJ = temporoparietal 
junction. 
 
Methodological issues 
One criticism of the original distinction between personal and impersonal moral dilemmas 
made by J. D. Greene et al. (2001) is the large variability in the scenarios considered as 
personal moral dilemmas. In fact, a subset of these dilemmas consistently elicit a 
deontological response in healthy individuals, while the remainder are more divisive, even in 
control participants. Accordingly, Koenigs et al. (2007) proposed a new categorisation of 
personal moral dilemmas into low- and high-conflict scenarios. While the low-conflict 
dilemmas involve rather inexcusable actions often rejected by healthy people (e.g., 
committing cannibalism to save oneself and others), the high-conflict scenarios (e.g., killing a 
fellow hostage so that oneself and others may escape from terrorists) involve competing 
considerations of inflicting direct personal harm versus benefiting the aggregate welfare, and 
produce varying responses in the general population. Separating scenarios in this manner has 
revealed that the abnormal response to personal moral dilemmas in patients with mPFC 
lesions is specific to the high-conflict scenarios (Koenigs et al., 2007). This improved sensitivity 
of the low-/high-conflict distinction in differentiating between patients and controls also 
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extends to other lesion populations, including amnesic individuals with MTL damage 
(McCormick et al., 2016). Not all research into moral dilemmas, however, has adopted this 
distinction (see Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015), leading to widespread 
methodological differences between studies (Christensen & Gomila, 2012). Another 
limitation of previous work is that the majority of evidence for the emotional contribution to 
personal moral decision making is inferred from neuroimaging and lesion studies that 
implicate emotional brain regions, rather than direct experimental manipulation. Taken 
together, the current literature review indicates that future studies employing the high- and 
low- conflict distinction, empirically examining the contribution of emotion and social 
conceptual knowledge to personal moral reasoning, and their corresponding neural 
correlates, are clearly warranted, in order to improve the characterisation of the cognitive 
and neural processes underpinning this aspect of the interpersonal self. 
 
Perspective taking 
Visual perspective taking (VPT) 
Visual perspective taking (VPT) is defined as the capacity to see the world from another 
person’s perspective (Flavell, 1977). As with moral reasoning, the earliest empirical work on 
perspective taking focused on the development of this ability across childhood, most notably 
by Piaget. In his theory of cognitive development, Piaget (1924) proposed that during the 
‘preoperational’ stage, between the ages of two and seven, children’s thoughts and 
communications are ‘egocentric’. That is, children are unable to see a situation from another 
person’s perspective. Experimentally, these difficulties with VPT have been revealed using the 
Three Mountains Task, with young children assuming that other people see the same view of 
the three mountains as they do (Piaget & Inhelder, 1956). While some studies have criticised 
the methodology of this task, a general consensus has been reached that VPT comes online 
around age three to four (Borke, 1975; Flavell, Flavell, Green, & Wilcox, 1980). Other 
evidence, however, supports the existence of two kinds of VPT, each with distinct 
developmental trajectories (Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981; Masangkay et al., 1974). 
Level 1 VPT refers to the understanding that someone else may see different things from 
yourself, for example that someone else’s view may be obstructed and thus they cannot see 
the horse you are looking at. This ability is thought to develop as early as 14 months of age 
(Sodian, Thoermer, & Metz, 2007; Sommer et al., 2010). Level 2 VPT, by contrast, is the 
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understanding that others may see the same things as yourself, but in a different way (Flavell, 
1992), for example, from the other person’s point of view, they can see the back of the horse, 
whereas you can only see the front. This ability is not believed to be fully developed until age 
four to four and-a-half years (H. Moll, Meltzoff, Merzsch, & Tomasello, 2013).  
 
Neurocognitive processes of VPT 
In addition to following different developmental trajectories, Level 1 and Level 2 VPT may also 
involve somewhat distinct neurocognitive processes. Namely, Level 2 VPT requires more 
complex spatial processing than its Level 1 counterpart, given its requirement of mentally 
rotating oneself to adopt the viewpoint of another person (Zacks & Tversky, 2005). This 
ability, however, has been dissociated from the capacity to mentally rotate an object relative 
to the self, as measured by classic mental rotations tasks (Inagaki et al., 2002; Wraga, Creem, 
& Proffitt, 2000; Zacks, 2008). In terms of their neural correlates, a meta-analysis of 
neuroimaging studies revealed both Level 1 and Level 2 VPT to activate TPJ, precuneus, and 
lateral prefrontal cortex (i.e., inferior frontal gyrus; IFG), though precuneal activations were 
stronger for Level 1 VPT tasks (Schurz, Aichhorn, Martin, & Perner, 2013). Each of these 
regions are proposed to play distinct roles in VPT (Figure 1.6.). While the TPJ is thought to 
represent the taking/adoption of different perspectives (McCleery, Surtees, Graham, 
Richards, & Apperly, 2011), the IFG is proposed to inhibit one’s own perspective (Ramsey, 
Hansen, Apperly, & Samson, 2013), consistent with its role in cognitive control. Finally the 
precuneus is responsible for representing visuospatial imagery in general (Fletcher et al., 
1995), although its specific role in VPT has not been explicitly discussed. 
 
Theory of mind (ToM) 
In addition to difficulties with imagining another person’s visual perspective, young children 
also assume others perceive, think, and feel exactly the same as themselves (Piaget, 1924). 
Around the age of four, children begin to be able to adopt another’s perspective at this 
conceptual level, via the development of ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
This ability, also known as mentalising, refers to the capacity to attribute and infer the mental 
states of oneself and others, and encompasses the understanding of feelings, thoughts, 
beliefs, and intentions (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). The original and 
most commonly used test of ToM is the false belief task, which requires the understanding 
Chapter 1 
 33 
that others may not possess the same knowledge as oneself, and can hold a belief that is 
different from reality (e.g., recognising that since a character in a story did not see their 
chocolate bar moved to another cupboard, they will search for it in its original location) 
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A variety of other experimental tasks have since been developed, 
in particular attempting to fractionate affective ToM (i.e., feelings and emotions) from its 
cognitive counterpart (i.e., thoughts, beliefs, and intentions) (see Poletti, Enrici, & Adenzato, 
2012). This distinction, however, is not necessarily clear-cut, given cognitive and affective 
ToM are themselves multifaceted constructs. Moreover, the conceptualisation of affective 
ToM overlaps with the related construct of empathy, which involves the basic recognition and 
understanding of another person’s affective state, in addition to the sharing of this emotional 
experience (Decety & Jackson, 2004). These definitional blurs reflect the inherent difficulty in 
attempting to parcellate complex social interactions into exclusive categories (McDonald, 
Flanagan, Rollins, & Kinch, 2003). As such, combining formal laboratory measures of ToM with 
observations of an individual’s social behaviour in daily life (e.g., Davis, 1983) is likely to 
provide the most thorough and ecologically valid representation of this ability.  
 
Neurocognitive processes of ToM 
The centrality of the mPFC for ToM has long been established (H. Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff, 
& Frith, 2002; McCabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001; Stuss, Gallup, & Alexander, 
2001). More recent research, however, has also revealed the importance of a more 
distributed neural network in supporting this ability, which partially overlaps with the DMN. 
In addition to medial prefrontal regions, this includes the bilateral posterior superior temporal 
sulcus (i.e., the TPJ), precuneus, and IFG (reviewed by Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & 
Perner, 2014). Each of these regions have been ascribed unique functions in the service of 
successful ToM performance (Figure 1.6.). The mPFC is thought to be responsible for the 
‘decoupling’ from current reality to imagine alternative circumstances (H. Gallagher & Frith, 
2003), as well as playing a general role in processing emotionally or socially relevant 
information about others (Saxe & Powell, 2006). In addition, this region is also strongly 
implicated in processing information about the self, with one view proposing that self-
reflecting upon one’s own mental state allows us to simulate and understand the minds of 
others (Frith & Frith, 2006). Two competing hypotheses have emerged to explain the 
consistent activation of the TPJ in ToM. While some authors argue the TPJ is involved in the 
Chapter 1 
 34 
orienting of attention to different mental states (Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010), others 
propose a more specific role in representing mental states and perspectives, irrespective of 
the particular task demands (Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006). The 
broad role of the precuneus in visual imagery is also presumed to extend to ToM, in the visual 
representation of another’s perspective in the absence of external stimuli (Cavanna & 
Trimble, 2006). Finally, via the mirror neuron system, the IFG appears to play a specific role 
in ToM in identifying the actions and emotional expressions of others (Keysers & Gazzola, 
2007).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6. Brain regions implicated in visual perspective taking and theory of mind, and their 
purported roles. IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; ToM = theory 
of mind; TPJ = temporoparietal junction; VPT = visual perspective taking. 
 
Are VPT and ToM related? 
While the study of VPT and ToM has largely proceeded in parallel (see Schurz et al., 2013), it 
is apparent that these two types of perspective taking share a number of similarities in their 
developmental trajectory, proposed cognitive mechanisms, and neural correlates. Namely, 
Level 2 VPT and ToM emerge at a similar age (i.e., four years of age; H. Moll et al., 2013; 
Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and ToM abilities in children predict their performance on Level 2 
VPT tasks (Hamilton, Brindley, & Frith, 2009). Furthermore, impairments in both Level 1 and 
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Level 2 VPT have been uncovered in neurodevelopmental conditions characterised by 
prominent deficits in ToM, such as autism (Hamilton et al., 2009; Schwarzkopf, Schilbach, 
Vogeley, & Timmermans, 2014; Yirmiya, Sigman, & Zacks, 1994), schizophrenia (Eack, 
Wojtalik, Keshavan, & Minshew, 2017; Langdon, Coltheart, Ward, & Catts, 2001), 
psychopathy (Drayton, Santos, & Baskin-Sommers, 2018), and specific language impairment 
(Farrant, Fletcher, & Maybery, 2006). Compellingly, VPT performance has been found to 
correlate with the ability to understand other’s thoughts and feelings in these syndromes 
(Farrant et al., 2006; Hamilton et al., 2009; Langdon et al., 2001). As such, it has been 
proposed that VPT impairment may underlie the deficits in ToM in these syndromes, via an 
inability to simulate alternative perspectives (Langdon & Coltheart, 2001).   
 
Overlap between ToM and VPT should not be surprising, given that both require an 
understanding of ‘perspective’ (i.e., that different people may hold different views/beliefs 
about the same situation), and as well as the deliberate switching to this other perspective. 
Furthermore, in addition to drawing upon spatial information (i.e., the position of the self, 
the other person, and the objects in relation to oneself and the other) (Kessler & Thomson, 
2010), VPT requires a level of social processing. Namely, successful VPT involves 
understanding that oneself and the other person have different perspectives, i.e., technically, 
it requires some degree of ‘theory of mind’ (Aichhorn, Perner, Kronbichler, Staffen, & 
Ladurner, 2006). This representation of different perspectives, that is common to both VPT 
and ToM, is proposed to be mediated by the TPJ (Aichhorn et al., 2006; Perner & Leekam, 
2008). In support of this notion, the TPJ emerged in a recent meta-analysis of functional 
neuroimaging studies as the primary site of activation overlap between VPT and ToM tasks 
(Schurz et al., 2013).  
 
Despite these apparent intersections, however, VPT and ToM do indeed diverge in a number 
of ways, with one view proposing they reflect entirely distinct abilities (Leslie, 1987). For 
example, unlike the majority of ToM tasks, VPT does not require the consideration of 
behavioural or emotional consequences, which is proposed to be driven by the mPFC 
(Aichhorn et al., 2006). In line with this theory, medial prefrontal activation does not 
consistently emerge in neuroimaging studies of VPT (Schurz et al., 2013). In addition, some 
studies have found entirely distinct patterns of brain activation for VPT versus ToM (David et 
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al., 2008). How the mechanisms underlying Level 1 and Level 2 VPT diverge, and relate to 
those supporting ToM, is also unclear, given these two types of VPT have different 
developmental trajectories, and sometimes dissociate from one another, or from ToM, in 
clinical populations (e.g., psychopathy, Drayton et al., 2018; and autism, Pearson, Ropar, & 
Hamilton, 2013). The exact nature of the relationship between Level 1 VPT, Level 2 VPT, and 
ToM, therefore, remains poorly defined, in particular whether the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underlying these aspects of the interpersonal self are distinct or overlapping. 
Additionally, the extant evidence for the neural mechanisms underlying VPT stems 
predominantly from neuroimaging studies of healthy individuals. As of yet, no lesion studies 
have been performed in populations with discrete brain damage, to determine which brain 
regions are not only involved, but necessary for these functions.   
 
1.3.2. A neurodegenerative disorder of the interpersonal self: Clinical and neuroimaging 
profile of the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia  
 
The behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is the prototypical disorder of 
the interpersonal self (Wong, Irish, & Hornberger, 2018). Characterised by profound 
alterations in social functioning and interpersonal relationships, this syndrome permits 
examination of how alterations in social cognition affect the interpersonal self. This section 
outlines the clinical, pathological, and neuroimaging characteristics of bvFTD. 
 
Behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) 
Clinical presentation 
Alongside semantic dementia (SD; described above), the behavioural variant of 
frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) is another subtype of FTD. bvFTD is characterised by 
striking changes in personality and behaviour. Namely, patients present with disinhibition, 
apathy, reduced empathy, stereotypical behaviour, a decline in personal hygiene, and eating 
changes, and notably, lack insight into the presence of these symptoms (Neary, Snowden, 
Northen, & Goulding, 1988; Piguet et al., 2011; Rascovsky et al., 2011). Personality is often 
starkly altered from early in the disease course, involving clear deviations from the 
individuals’ premorbid traits and interests (B. L. Miller et al., 2001). In terms of cognition, 
current diagnostic criteria incorporate a dysexecutive neuropsychological profile, with 
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relative sparing of episodic memory and visuospatial function (Rascovsky et al., 2011). Many 
patients, however, may actually perform normally on neuropsychological assessment (Mioshi 
et al., 2007), including on tests of executive function (Gregory, Serra-Mestres, & Hodges, 
1999), particularly in early stages of the disease (Ranasinghe et al., 2016). Moreover, episodic 
memory can indeed be impaired in early bvFTD (Hornberger & Piguet, 2012; Hornberger, 
Piguet, Graham, Nestor, & Hodges, 2010). Accordingly, increased emphasis is being placed on 
social cognitive, rather than neuropsychological, deficits in the differential diagnosis of bvFTD 
(Johnen & Bertoux, 2019).  
 
Neuropathological and neuroimaging features 
Unlike in AD and SD, the neuropathology of bvFTD is heterogeneous. Most cases of bvFTD are 
associated with either tau or TDP-43 protein depositions, with small subset of patients 
harbouring the RNA-binding protein fused in sarcoma (FUS) (Chare et al., 2014; Hodges et al., 
2004). The clinical features of bvFTD predominantly reflect atrophy to the frontal lobe, in 
particular orbitofrontal, medial prefrontal, and frontoinsular regions (Figure 1.7.; Seeley, 
2008). With disease progression, atrophy encroaches into dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
anterior and medial temporal lobes, and basal ganglia (Rabinovici et al., 2007; Rosen et al., 
2002). The white matter tracts connecting frontal to more posterior regions of the brain are 
also affected (Lam, Halliday, Irish, Hodges, & Piguet, 2014). Regarding functional networks, 
bvFTD has consistently been associated with reduced functional connectivity within the 
‘salience network’ (Day et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2010). This network incorporates anterior 
insula and ACC, along with striatum and amygdala, and is thought responsible for detecting 
behaviourally relevant internal and external stimuli, and mobilising the brain’s response to 
these stimuli (Uddin, 2015). Around 10-15% of FTD cases are caused by a genetic mutation, 
the most common of these being in the chromosome 9 open reading frame 72 (C9orf72), 
progranulin (GRN), and microtubule-associated protein tau (MAPT) genes (Greaves & Rohrer, 
2019). Indeed, the patterns of atrophy in these genetic variants do differ somewhat from the 
sporadic (i.e., non-genetic) cases. While all bvFTD patients display medial prefrontal atrophy, 
anterior temporal degeneration is more pronounced in MAPT, with GRN and c9orf72 also 
affecting posterior cortical regions including posterior cingulate and lateral parietal cortices 
(Whitwell et al., 2012).  
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Figure 1.7. Coronal MRI scan displaying the typical frontal lobe atrophy in the behavioural 
variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). 
 
1.3.3. The interpersonal self in the behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia  
Socially disruptive and inappropriate behaviours are often the first presenting symptom of 
bvFTD (Piguet, Kumfor, & Hodges, 2017), which represent a clear departure from the 
individuals’ premorbid tendencies. For example, previously law-abiding, socially conforming, 
affectionate individuals may begin behaving inappropriately (e.g., aggression, urinating in 
public), making rude comments to strangers (e.g., crass jokes, sexist remarks), and displaying 
a seeming lack of empathy for other people (e.g., indifference to death of a family member, 
disinterest in other’s concerns). Given the pervasive lack of insight in bvFTD, these reports 
will often come from family members and close others, who report the patient to lack warmth 
(Dermody et al., 2016), and show poor awareness of social norms, reduced tact, and an 
apparent disregard and disinterest in others (Barsuglia et al., 2014; Mendez et al., 2014). 
Importantly, bvFTD patients display a breakdown in the synchronous social interactions that 
characterise Neisser’s (1988) interpersonal self (Barsuglia et al., 2014), ultimately leading to 
deterioration in interpersonal relationships in these patients (Hsieh, Irish, Daveson, Hodges, 
& Piguet, 2013; Takeda et al., 2019). Given such behaviours in bvFTD represent striking 
transgressions from societal values about how its members should behave, they are often 
described as sociopathic, or ‘immoral’ (Mendez, Chen, Shapira, & Miller, 2005). In some cases, 
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the alterations in moral behaviour in bvFTD can even result in criminal offences. Estimates of 
criminality in bvFTD range from 37-54%, with crimes including theft, violence, hypersexuality, 
traffic violations, and even homicide reported in these patients (Liljegren et al., 2015). In fact, 
for some individuals, law-breaking represents the first-noticed symptom of the disease. These 
extreme moral transgressions in bvFTD place a significant burden on the patients, families, 
care facilities, as well as society more broadly (Liljegren et al., 2015).  
 
Of further significance for the interpersonal self, the bvFTD syndrome leads to alterations in 
many of the fundamental characteristics that define the person. For example, preferences, 
values, traits, and interests can markedly change in bvFTD, including style of dress, sense of 
humour, sexual preferences, and even political and religious ideologies (B. L. Miller et al., 
2001). Of note, the patients themselves typically display no concern regarding these major 
transformations of the self, in fact, they are often are unaware that any changes have 
occurred (Rankin, Baldwin, et al., 2005; Ruby et al., 2009). This is in contrast to the significant 
distress reported by family members, who perceive the individual with bvFTD as a 
‘fundamentally different person’ from who they were prior to illness onset, in some even 
cases describing them as a ‘stranger’ (Strohminger & Nichols, 2015). These perceptions are 
particularly responsible for the relationship breakdowns that ensue (Strohminger & Nichols, 
2015). 
 
As a result of these striking behavioural observations of changes to the interpersonal self in 
bvFTD, a wealth of studies have endeavoured to empirically examine social cognition in these 
patients (reviewed by Johnen & Bertoux, 2019). Using an array of experimental tasks, 
unsurprisingly, deficits have been revealed in bvFTD across all aspects of emotional and social 
processing, including perceiving, expressing, and responding to emotion; reward processing 
and affective decision making; knowledge of social norms and rules; moral reasoning 
(reviewed in detail in Chapter 5); and theory of mind (reviewed in detail in Chapter 6). Such 
global impairments in socio-affective processing in bvFTD are attributed to the breakdown in 
the ‘social brain’, the large-scale brain network thought to be specialised for social and 
emotional functioning (Dunbar, 2012; Seeley, Zhou, & Kim, 2012), which incorporates mPFC, 
insula, amygdala, and ATLs.  
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1.3.4. Summary and aims of Part 2  
Given the profound and characteristic alterations in social functioning in bvFTD, and 
concomitant degeneration to circumscribed neural networks, this syndrome provides the 
ideal test-bed upon which to refine our understanding of the neurocognitive underpinnings 
of the interpersonal self. In particular, while several studies of moral reasoning have been 
conducted in bvFTD (to be reviewed in detail in Chapter 5), the precise cognitive and neural 
mechanisms of this function are not yet fully understood. Chapter 5, therefore, employs up-
to-date, theoretically driven experimental methods (i.e., high- versus low-conflict personal 
moral dilemmas) to examine how emotional processing and conceptual knowledge 
contribute to personal moral reasoning in bvFTD, and the corresponding neural correlates. 
Furthermore, despite well-established deficits in ToM in bvFTD (to be reviewed in detail in 
Chapter 6), no study has examined VPT in this syndrome. Thus, Chapter 6 comprehensively 
explores the relationship between, and neural corelates of, several aspects of perspective 
taking in bvFTD (Level 1 and Level 2 VPT, ToM, as well as real-world, behavioural 
manifestations of these functions), to adjudicate between the accounts that these represent 
distinct versus overlapping processes. In sum, Part 2 of the thesis aims to draw upon the 
syndrome of bvFTD in order to improve the characterisation of the interpersonal self, from a 
neurocognitive perspective.  
 
1.4. Summary and overall thesis aims  
Bringing the two parts together, this thesis draws upon contemporary theoretical 
frameworks, methodological advances in cognitive neuroscience, and neurodegenerative 
patient models in order to inform our understanding of the extended and interpersonal self. 
Ultimately, by combining objective psychological tools with traditionally-philosophical 
constructs, this body of work aims to inform cross-disciplinary knowledge about the self, as 
well as extend the clinical profile of AD, SD, and bvFTD.  
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Chapter 2 
Experimental methods 
 
This chapter describes the methods shared by the four experimental chapters, including 
participant recruitment, ethics, neuropsychological and clinical assessment, and structural 
and diffusion-weighted MRI acquisition and pre-processing procedures.  
 
2.1. Participant recruitment 
Patients and healthy control participants were recruited through FRONTIER, the 
frontotemporal dementia research clinic at the University of Sydney, Australia. Healthy 
control participants were friends or family of the patient or volunteers from the community.  
 
Patient diagnosis was made by an experienced behavioural neurologist in consultation with a 
neuropsychologist and occupational therapist, based on clinical examination, 
neuropsychological assessment, and brain structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).  
 
2.1.1. Inclusion criteria 
All patients met current international consensus criteria for a diagnosis of AD (McKhann et 
al., 2011), SD (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011), or bvFTD (Rascovsky et al., 2011). These diagnostic 
criteria are provided in Appendix A.  
 
Briefly, AD patients met diagnostic criteria for probable, amnestic AD (McKhann et al., 2011), 
with deficits in episodic memory, including learning and recall of recently encountered 
information, and reductions in one or more of naming, visuospatial abilities, and executive 
function. Atrophy was typically present in the medial and lateral temporal and parietal lobes.  
 
Patients with SD were required to meet diagnostic criteria for primary progressive aphasia, 
as well as the subtype classification criteria for SD (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2011). SD patients 
presented with a primary language disturbance, characterised by a progressive loss of 
conceptual knowledge, manifesting as anomia and deficits in confrontation naming and 
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single-word comprehension. Only patients with left-side predominant ATL atrophy were 
included.  
 
Patients with bvFTD (possible or probable) typically presented with personality and/or 
behavioural changes including disinhibition, apathy, loss of empathy, perseverative 
behaviour, change in eating habits, and/or executive dysfunction. Those diagnosed with 
probable bvFTD additionally harboured atrophy in the frontal and anterior temporal lobes 
(Rascovsky et al., 2011).  
 
2.1.2. Exclusion criteria  
Exclusion criteria for all participants included a significant history of another psychiatric or 
neurological condition, significant vision or hearing loss, and alcohol or substance abuse. 
Participants were also required to have sufficient English proficiency to complete the 
neuropsychological and experimental tasks, and have attained a minimum of a primary school 
level of education (i.e., 6 years).  
 
Control participants were required to score within the cognitively normal range, i.e., 88/100 
or above, on a general cognitive screening measure, the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive 
Examination-Revised (ACE-R) (Mioshi, Dawson, Mitchell, Arnold, & Hodges, 2006), or the 
updated Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-III (ACE-III) (Hsieh, Schubert, Hoon, Mioshi, & 
Hodges, 2013) (see Section 2.3.). 
 
2.2. Ethics 
Ethics approval was obtained for the study from the University of New South Wales and South 
Eastern Sydney Health Service ethics committees (HREC 10/126 and HREC 13/177). Informed 
consent was obtained from all participants or their person responsible in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki. Participants volunteered their time and were reimbursed for their 
travel costs.  
 
2.3. Neuropsychological assessment  
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All participants underwent a comprehensive battery of standardised neuropsychological 
assessment tasks. This included a measure of global cognition, as well as more detailed 
examination of specific cognitive domains including processing speed, attention, language, 
visuospatial abilities, verbal and non-verbal episodic memory, and executive function.  
 
2.3.1. General cognitive screening 
Participants completed the Australian version of the ACE-R (Mioshi et al., 2006) or the 
updated ACE-III (Hsieh, Schubert, et al., 2013) as a measure of general cognitive functioning. 
This task is scored out of 100 and comprises five subscales, briefly sampling the cognitive 
domains of Attention/Orientation, Memory, Fluency, Language, and Visuospatial abilities. A 
cut-off score of 88/100 on both versions offers excellent sensitivity and specificity for 
discriminating patients with dementia from healthy controls (Hsieh, Schubert, et al., 2013; 
Mioshi et al., 2006; So et al., 2018). The ACE-III correlates strongly with the ACE-R (Hsieh, 
Schubert, et al., 2013; So et al., 2018) as well as with performance on standardised 
neuropsychological tasks (Hsieh, Schubert, et al., 2013). 
 
2.3.2. Processing speed 
Speed of processing was assessed using Part A of the Trail Making Test (TMT; Reitan, 1958). 
This paper and pencil task requires participants to connect numbers, in order, as quickly as 
possible. Performance is measured by completion time (seconds).  
 
2.3.3. Attention  
Attention was measured using the Digit Span Forwards subtest from the Weschler Memory 
Scale-Third Edition (WMS-III; Wechsler, 1997). In this task, participants are read a string of 
digits aloud, and asked to repeat back the same string of digits. String length begins at 2 digits, 
and progresses to 9 digits, with two trials for each string length. If the participant makes errors 
on both trials of a given length, the task is discontinued. The achieved score represents the 
maximum string length repeated by the participant without errors, with a maximum score of 
9. 
 
2.3.4. Language  
Chapter 2 
 44 
Language was assessed using the Naming and Comprehension subtests from the Sydney 
Language Battery (SYDBAT; Savage et al., 2013) and the ACE Fluency subscale (Mioshi et al., 
2006). 
 
SYDBAT Naming is a confrontation naming task involving 30 colour photographs. Participants 
are required to provide the name of the item shown in the photograph. Mispronunciations of 
the word due to phonemic, semantic, or phonological substitutions, as well as any omissions, 
are counted as errors. The maximum score is 30 points. 
 
The SYDBAT Comprehension subtest consists of 30 trials, each displaying an array of seven 
colour photographs. Participants are asked to point to the photograph that matches a word 
said by the experimenter. Maximum score on this test is 30 points.  
 
The ACE Fluency subscale comprises two subtests. The Letter Fluency subtest requires 
participants to generate as many words as possible starting with a given letter within the 
space of one minute. On the Semantic Fluency subtest, participants must generate as many 
animals as possible within one minute. For each of these subtests, correct words are counted 
to form a total score. Repeated words or those from an incorrect category are not counted 
toward this score. The total words are then converted to a score out of 7 (Figure 2.1.) for both 
Letter Fluency and Semantic Fluency. These are summed to form a total Fluency score, out of 
a maximum of 14 points. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Letters: 
≥18 7 
14-17 6 
11-13 5 
8-10 4 
6-7 3 
4-5 2 
2-3 1 
0-1 0 
Animals: 
≥22 7 
17-21 6 
14-16 5 
11-13 4 
9-10 3 
7-8 2 
5-6 1 
<5 0 
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Figure 2.1. Scoring procedure for the Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination (ACE) Letter and 
Semantic (i.e., animal) Fluency subtests. For each subtest, the right column displays the score 
out of 7 corresponding to the total number of correct words generated (left column). 
 
2.3.5. Visuospatial abilities 
Visuospatial skills were measured using the ACE Visuospatial subscale and the Rey Complex 
Figure (RCF; Rey, 1941).  
 
The ACE Visuospatial subscale contains four components, and is scored out of a total of 16 
points. First, participants are asked to copy a design of two intersecting infinity loops, scored 
out of a total of 3 points. Next, they are required to draw the face of a clock, including all of 
the numbers, and set the time to ten past five. A total of 5 points is possible, including 1 point 
for the circle, 2 for the numbers, and 2 for the hands. The third component involves the 
presentation of four squares, containing randomly arranged dots. Participants must count the 
number of dots in the boxes, without pointing. Each correct box scores 1 point. Finally, 
participants must identify aloud four visually degraded letters (K, M, A, T), with one point 
awarded for each correct letter. 
 
For the RCF, participants are presented with a complex geometric figure and required to copy 
it. One point is given for the accurate drawing, and one point for the correct placement, of 
each element, with a maximum score of 36. 
 
2.3.6. Verbal episodic memory 
Verbal episodic memory was assessed using the ACE Word Recall and Address Recall subtests 
from the ACE Memory subscale and the Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test (RAVLT; Schmidt, 
1996).  
 
The ACE Word Recall subtest requires participants to recall three words they previously heard 
and repeated (as part of the Attention subscale), after a 1-2 minute delay. One point is 
awarded for each correctly retrieved word. 
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On the ACE Address Recall, participants are asked after an approximate 10-15 minute delay 
to recall a name and address that they previously repeated three times. The total score is out 
of 7. 
 
The RAVLT requires participants to listen to a list of 15 words (List A) read aloud by an 
experimenter, and immediately recall as many words as possible. This process is repeated for 
5 trials. A second list of 15 words (List B) is then read aloud, and recall tested. Next, recall for 
List A is again tested. After a 30-minute delay, recall of List A is tested once more. The number 
of words recalled at this 30-minute delay provides a measure of Delayed Free Recall, which 
forms the index of interest here. 
 
2.3.7. Non-verbal episodic memory 
The RCF (described in Section 2.3.5.) was used to measure non-verbal memory. After 
participants initially copy the figure, there is a 3-minute delay, following which participants 
are asked to reproduce the figure from memory. One point is given for the accurate drawing, 
and one point for the correct placement, of each element, with a maximum score of 36. 
 
2.3.8. Executive functions  
To assess executive functions, participants completed Digit Span Backwards (Wechsler, 1997), 
Hayling Sentence Completion test (Burgess & Shallice, 1997) and Trail Making Test Part B 
(TMT; Reitan, 1958).  
 
Digit Span Backwards provides a measure of working memory. Similar to Digit Span Forwards, 
participants are read strings of numbers, of increasing length, and asked to recite the string 
in the reverse order to that said by the experimenter. The maximum possible span length is 
8. The procedure is otherwise identical to Digit Span Forwards (described in Section 2.3.3.).  
 
The Hayling Sentence Completion test is a measure of response inhibition. In Section 1 
participants are read sentences aloud, and asked to complete the sentence as quickly as 
possible (e.g., “It’s hard to admit when one is…”). In Section 2, participants must complete the 
sentence using a completely unrelated word, as quickly as possible (e.g., “The captain wanted 
to stay with the sinking…”). Related words (e.g., “ship”) and partly related words (e.g., 
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“aeroplane”) are counted as Category A and Category B errors, respectively. The total number 
of each of these error types is calculated, and each is then converted to a scaled score (Figure 
2.2.). These two scaled scores are then summed, forming a Total AB score, which is used as a 
measure of inhibition. Higher scores reflect greater disinhibition.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Scoring procedure for the Hayling test. The number of Category A (i.e., connected 
words) and Category B (i.e., partly connected words) errors (left column) are converted to A 
Scores and B scores respectively. These A and B scores are subsequently summed to form the 
Total AB score. 
 
Set-switching was measured using the TMT Part B. Like Part A (see Section 2.3.2), participants 
are required to draw a line to connect circles as quickly as possible. This time, however, they 
must switch between numbers and letters (i.e., 1-A-2-B-3-C … etc). Completion time is 
Category A errors 
Errors A score 
1 3 
2 6 
3 10 
4 14 
5 18 
6 24 
7 30 
8 36 
9 42 
10 48 
11 54 
12 60 
13 66 
14 72 
15 78 
Category B errors 
Errors B score 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 9 
6 14 
7 19 
8 24 
9 29 
10 34 
>10 50 
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recorded in seconds. The difference in time between Part B and Part A is used as a measure 
of executive function, accounting for baseline processing speed.  
 
2.4. Clinical assessment 
Measures of disease duration, severity, and behavioural change were also collected for all 
patients. 
 
2.4.1. Disease duration 
Disease duration, used as an indicator of disease stage, was calculated as the months elapsed 
between the onset of first symptoms (reported by a knowledgeable informant) and the date 
of assessment.  
 
2.4.2. Disease severity 
Disease severity was assessed using the Frontotemporal Dementia Functional Rating Scale 
(FTD-FRS; Mioshi, Hsieh, Savage, Hornberger, & Hodges, 2010). The FTD-FRS is a 30-item 
questionnaire completed by carers, which measures the day-to-day functioning of patients. 
Raw scores are converted into a Rasch score, with lower numbers denoting greater functional 
impairments (Bond & Fox, 2007).  
 
2.4.3. Behavioural change 
Behavioural change was measured using the Cambridge Behavioural Inventory (CBI; 
Wedderburn et al., 2008). This 45-item carer questionnaire assesses behavioural and 
psychiatric symptoms, in areas of memory and orientation, everyday skills, self-care, 
abnormal behaviour, mood, beliefs, eating habits, sleep, stereotypical behaviours, and 
motivation. The frequency of behaviours is rated on a scale of 0 to 4. A total score is calculated 
(maximum 180), with higher values representing increased frequency of the behaviours. 
Control participants also completed a self-rated version of the questionnaire.  
 
2.5. Statistical analysis 
Behavioural analyses were performed using SPSS Version 24 (IBM). The specific statistical 
tests employed by the individual studies are outlined in each chapter. 
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Unless otherwise specified, parametric analyses were used for all studies. The suitability of 
variables for parametric analysis were examined using Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests of 
normality. Logarithmic transformations were applied if variables were non-normally 
distributed in one or more of the patient groups (K-S test p < .05). All analyses were conducted 
and reported using the logarithmically transformed variables, where appropriate, but for ease 
of interpretation, figures display untransformed values. 
 
Statistical significance was set at p < .05 for all behavioural analyses, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2.6. Structural MRI acquisition and pre-processing 
Participants underwent structural MRI scans and voxel-based morphometry (VBM) was used 
to analyse the integrity of grey matter. 
 
2.6.1. Image acquisition 
Participants underwent T1-weighted structural neuroimaging using a 3Tesla MRI scanner with 
standard quadrature head coil (eight channels). The 3D T1-weighted images were acquired 
using the following sequences: coronal orientation, matrix 256 × 256, 200 slices, 1 × 1 mm in-
plane resolution, slice thickness = 1mm, echo time/repetition = 2.6/5.8 ms, flip angle α = 8°.  
 
2.6.2. Data pre-processing 
VBM analyses in Chapter 4 were conducted using SPM-VBM (Statistical Parametric Mapping 
12, Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). Given additional 
neuroimaging analyses were conducted in Chapter 5 (i.e., diffusion tensor imaging), a 
different software program was employed for the VBM analyses in this chapter, in order to 
ensure compatibility between structural and diffusion analyses. For Chapter 5, FSL-VBM 
(Functional MRI of the Brain (FMRIB) Software Library; Ashburner & Friston, 2000) was 
employed, using the toolbox from the FMRIB software package 
(http://www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl/fslvbm/index.html; S. Smith et al., 2004). To maintain 
consistency in Part 2 of the thesis, FSL-VBM was also used in Chapter 6.  
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For pre-processing in SPM, images were first segmented into six tissue probability maps in 
the native space. A DARTEL template was then computed from the grey matter, white matter, 
and cerebrospinal fluid probability maps of all participants. The grey matter probability maps 
of each participant were spatially normalised to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
space according to the transformation parameters from the DARTEL template. Images were 
modulated then smoothed with an 8mm full-width at half-maximum Gaussian filter.  
 
For pre-processing in FSL, images were extracted using the Brain Extraction Tool (BET; S. 
Smith, 2002), then tissue was segmented into grey and white matter and cerebrospinal fluid 
using FMRIB’s Automatic Segmentation Tool (FAST; Y. Zhang, Brady, & Smith, 2001). The 
resulting grey matter partial volume maps were aligned to the Montreal Neurological 
Institute standard space (MNI152) using the FMRIB Non-linear Image Registration Tool 
(FNIRT; Andersson, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2007) which uses a b-spline representation of the 
registration warp field (Rueckert et al., 1999). A study-specific template was then created 
from the resulting images, to which the native grey matter images were re-registered non-
linearly. Modulation of the registered partial volume maps was conducted by dividing them 
by the Jacobian of the warp field. Finally, the modulated, segmented images were smoothed 
with an isotropic Gaussian kernel with a sigma of 3mm. 
 
2.6.3. Voxel-based morphometry analyses 
In each of the studies, group contrasts were first conducted, identifying regions of differing 
grey matter intensity (i.e., a proxy measure of brain atrophy). Next, correlations were 
explored between grey matter intensity and performance on the behavioural variable of 
interest. This analysis allows for the characterisation of the brain regions that are associated 
with different aspects of the self. 
 
Details of the study-specific analyses are provided in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.  
 
2.7. Diffusion-weighted MRI acquisition and pre-processing 
Participants underwent diffusion-weighted MRI imaging and diffusion tensor imaging 
analyses were conducted to analyse white matter microstructure.  
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2.7.1. Image acquisition 
Diffusion-weighted MRI was conducted using a 3Tesla MRI Scanner with a standard 
quadrature head coil (eight channels). Whole-brain echo planar images with 64 noncollinear 
gradient directions were collected using the following sequences: matrix 96 x 96mm, 55 slices, 
voxel size = 2.5mm3 repetition time/echo time/inversion time: 8400/68/90msec, b-value = 
1000 sec/mm2, field of view = 240 x 240mm. 
 
2.7.2. Data pre-processing  
Tract-based Spatial Statistics (TBSS) in FSL were employed to perform a skeleton-based 
analysis of white matter fractional anisotropy (FA). Raw diffusion-weighted images for each 
participant were corrected for eddy-currents and co-registered using nonlinear registration 
to MNI standard space using their respective 3D T1-weighted structural MR image. Given the 
coarse resolution of diffusion tensor imaging data (i.e., 2.5mm3), this template was 
subsampled at 2mm3. Following image registration, a tensor model was fitted to the diffusion-
weighted image and FA maps generated for each participant. FA maps were then averaged to 
produce a group mean FA image. A skeletonised algorithm was applied to define a group 
template of the lines of maximum FA (S. Smith et al., 2006), corresponding to the centres of 
the white matter tracts. Finally, FA values for each participant were projected onto the group 
template skeleton. 
 
2.7.3. Diffusion tensor imaging analyses 
Group contrasts were first conducted, identifying regions of differing FA (i.e., a proxy measure 
of white matter integrity). Next, correlations were explored between FA and performance on 
the behavioural variable of interest.  
 
Details of the study-specific analyses are provided in Chapter 5. 
 
2.8. Summary 
The comprehensive clinical characterisation of dementia patients, including the neurological, 
neuropsychological, and MRI assessments described in this chapter, ensures their accurate 
diagnosis in line with current consensus criteria. This approach, combined with the novel 
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experimental measures and neuroimaging analyses to be described in upcoming chapters, 
enables the detailed neurocognitive characterisation of sense of self across AD, SD, and bvFTD 
syndromes.  
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Chapter 3 
NExt – A new approach to examining the extended self 
This chapter is a revised version of: 
Strikwerda-Brown, C., Mothakunnel, A., Hodges, J. R., Piguet, O., Irish, M. (2018). External 
details revisited – A new taxonomy for coding ‘non-episodic’ content during autobiographical 
memory retrieval. Journal of Neuropsychology, 13(3), 371-397. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, while autobiographical memory (ABM) encompasses both episodic 
and semantic elements, the majority of studies in this field have focused on clarifying the 
cognitive and neural substrates of the episodic component. While this emphasis has helped 
to advance the understanding of subjective continuity of the extended self, far less is known 
about semantic ABM, and its relevance for narrative continuity of the self. Indeed, it remains 
unclear whether strictly dissociating between event-based and conceptual information in 
ABM accurately captures the complexity of autobiographical narration, and therefore, the 
extended self.  
 
In recent years, the Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine et al., 2002) has become a popular 
tool for assessing ABM retrieval. This task requires participants to describe a past, personally 
experienced event, which occurred at a specific time and place, in as much detail as possible. 
Unlike other validated techniques which segregate episodic and semantic memory via the use 
of targeted subscales (Irish, Lawlor, et al., 2011; Kopelman et al., 1989; Piolino et al., 2000), 
the AI attempts to capture the naturalistic manner in which these two types of information 
are typically intertwined during autobiographical retrieval (see Barnabe et al., 2012). On the 
AI, narratives are scored in terms of the number and type of ‘internal’ (i.e., referring to the 
main event being described) and ‘external’ (i.e., any additional information provided) details, 
which are widely held to reflect episodic and semantic retrieval, respectively. Accordingly, 
this procedure permits the direct comparison of the constituent elements of ABM without 
imposing any constraints on their production (Barnabe et al., 2012). 
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To date, studies using the AI have predominantly focused on the internal details provided 
during ABM retrieval. This is unsurprising given internal details represent the primary 
outcome measure of the test, which was originally proposed to adjudicate between different 
theories regarding the hippocampal contribution to memory (i.e., standard consolidation 
versus multiple trace theories (Nadel & Moscovitch, 1997; Squire, Cohen, & Nadel, 1984). On 
the other hand, significantly less attention has been paid to the external details within the 
autobiographical narrative. These details often situate the retrieved event within the broader 
context of the individual’s life story, and as such, can provide an ecologically valid window 
into narrative continuity of the self. Currently, however, the external details metric is rarely 
interpreted in this manner, for a combination of methodological and theoretical reasons. 
Importantly, the AI allows for external details to be further divided into subcategories 
including ‘external events’ (separate from the main event being described), ‘semantic’ detail, 
‘repetitions’, and ‘other’, however, such segregation is not consistently performed. Instead, 
many studies have reported the total external details metric, without considering the 
constituent elements in more detail (e.g., Benjamin, Cifelli, Garrard, Caine, & Jones, 2015; 
Spreng et al., 2018), with others reporting only selective subcategories (e.g., Mair, Poirier, & 
Conway, 2017; Rensen et al., 2017), or failing to examine external details entirely (e.g., Baron 
& Bluck, 2009; Crete-Nishihata et al., 2012). In addition to their inconsistent reporting, there 
is a common tendency in the literature to consider the aggregated external details category 
as uniformly ‘semantic’ (e.g., Ally, Hussey, & Donahue, 2013; Zeman et al., 2016). By this 
approach, patient groups providing a relatively equal number of external details to healthy 
controls are considered to display intact semantic ABM. While no such claim was made in the 
original AI validation study (Levine et al., 2002), findings that elevated external details in 
healthy older adults are primarily driven by increased semantic information (Levine et al., 
2002; St. Jacques & Levine, 2007) may have led to this erroneous conclusion.  
 
A number of issues, however, are apparent with this tendency to equate the external detail 
category with semantic information. First, rather than exclusively representing semantic 
content, the external detail category can also contain episodic elements, as revealed by the 
inclusion of the external event subcategory in the original AI protocol (Levine et al., 2002). 
Furthermore, patients with SD have been found to produce elevated levels of external details 
during autobiographical retrieval (McKinnon et al., 2006) and episodic future thinking (Irish, 
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Addis, et al., 2012a, 2012b). Given the characteristic impairments in semantic memory in this 
syndrome, it is unlikely that this overproduction of external details is attributable to the 
provision of semantic content alone. Equating external details exclusively with ‘semantic’ 
retrieval, then, may obscure the true nature of information provided during ABM narration. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, semantic ABM may be subdivided into discrete 
subcomponents, which vary in their relative degree of ‘semanticity’ or ‘episodicity’. Namely, 
general events and personal semantics are proposed to lie in between the two extremes of 
the episodic-semantic continuum. No study, however, has disentangled these 
subcomponents of semantic ABM within the AI narrative.  
 
Taken together, these findings highlight the need for a revised approach to studying the 
composition of external details during ABM retrieval, in order to refine the understanding of 
episodic and semantic contributions to narrative continuity of the extended self. On a 
practical level, providing a streamlined approach to the conceptualisation and scoring of 
external details will permit the direct comparison of findings across studies. In addition, from 
a theoretical perspective, incorporating contemporary knowledge on the episodic-semantic 
continuum will improve the characterisation of the full range of episodic and semantic 
elements contained within autobiographical narratives.  
 
This study endeavours to achieve these goals, in two key stages. First, a literature review is 
undertaken of studies in which the AI scoring system was used as the main outcome measure 
to examine ABM. In doing so, the aim of Part 1 of this Chapter is to highlight the extensive 
variability in the reporting and interpreting of AI external details. It was hypothesised that 
marked inconsistencies in the breakdown of external details would be evident across studies 
of ABM, leading to divergent conclusions regarding the profile of these details during ABM 
narration. The findings from this literature review were then used to develop a new taxonomy 
for the fine-grained classification of external details on the AI. This new protocol (the ‘NExt’ 
taxonomy) is intended as an adjunct to the original AI method, allowing for a consistent 
approach to examining the components of external details. As outlined in Chapter 1, the 
syndromes of AD and SD provide an ideal test-bed for examining episodic and semantic ABM, 
and the extended self. Here, therefore, the NExt taxonomy is validated using previously 
collected AI data in AD and SD populations, compared with healthy older adults. In line with 
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their characteristic memory profiles, AD patients were predicted to provide more external 
details from the semantic end of the spectrum, whereas more episodic external details were 
expected in SD.  
 
3.2. Part 1 – Review of existing ABM studies using the AI 
3.2.1. Method 
Studies using the AI scoring method to examine ABM were identified via a review of the 
literature.2 An initial search was conducted in PubMed on 20th July 2017 using the term 
‘Autobiographical Interview’, which returned 274 results. Upon reviewing these results, 
however, it was apparent that several studies had not explicitly used the Autobiographical 
Interview methodology in their study. Therefore, a search was instead conducted for articles 
citing the original AI validation study (Levine et al., 2002) in PubMed, Web of Science, Scopus 
and Google Scholar. These citation searches returned 152, 441, 487, and 733 articles, 
respectively. In order to ensure all relevant studies were included, the articles from the most 
comprehensive list were reviewed (i.e., that returned by Google Scholar). The key criteria for 
inclusion of studies were a primary outcome measure of ABM retrieval, and use of the AI 
scoring method to segregate details within the narrative of a self-referential, personally 
experienced event. Studies that were not published in peer-reviewed journals (e.g., 
conference abstracts, academic theses), not in English, were not primarily experimental (e.g., 
review papers, opinion pieces, book chapters), did not primarily focus on ABM (e.g., studies 
of future thinking), assessed memory for events occurring in an experimental setting rather 
than the participants’ daily lives, or did not employ the AI as the primary measure of ABM, 
were excluded. Of the 733 articles returned by the citation search, 76 met criteria for 
inclusion. These studies were then classified based on their approach to reporting external 
details, and the population employed. 
 
3.2.2. Results 
Table 3.1. displays the studies included in the review, sorted by population, and their method 
of reporting AI external details. Of these 76 studies, 35 (46.1%) only reported results from the 
 
2 This literature review provides an adjunct to the main component of the study (i.e., the development and 
validation of the NExt method, reported in Part 2), and is therefore not intended to represent a formal 
systematic review or meta-analysis of previous studies. 
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total external details category, without any further information regarding external detail 
subcategories. Thirty (39.5%) studies segregated the overall external details into 
subcategories according to the AI scoring protocol. Of these studies, 21 reported results from 
three or more of the original Levine subcategories (external event, semantic, repetitions, and 
other). Further inconsistencies were noted, depending on the overall aims of the studies in 
question. For example, one study focused exclusively on the external event subcategory, 
whereas 8 studies reported only the semantic subcategory. Within the latter 8 studies, further 
variability was evident in that some studies focused only on semantic details and did not 
report total external details, whereas others adopted a modified scoring system wherein all 
details were classified as either episodic or semantic. The remaining 11 (14.5%) studies did 
not report any external detail results. 
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Table 3.1. Summary of studies using the Autobiographical Interview to examine autobiographical memory 
Reporting Method Population References 
Total external details  
(no breakdown of 
subcategories) (35) 
Healthy Adults (8) Sheldon and Chu (2017) 
Belfi, Karlan, and Tranel (2016) 
Palombo, Alain, Soderlund, Khuu, and Levine (2015) 
Barnier et al. (2014) 
Ally et al. (2013) 
Campbell, Nadel, Duke, and Ryan (2011) 
Aizpurua and Koutstaal (2010) 
Rudoy, Weintraub, and Paller (2009) 
 Healthy Aging (4) Spreng et al. (2018) 
Aizpurua and Koutstaal (2015) 
Ford, Rubin, and Giovanello (2014) 3 
Hohman, Peynircioglu, and Beason-Held (2013) 
 Medial Temporal Lobe Lesions/ 
Epilepsy (9) 
T. D. Miller et al. (2017) 
Zeman, Byruck, Tallis, Vossel, and Tranel (2017)4 
St-Laurent, Moscovitch, Tau, and McAndrews (2011) 
Milton et al. (2010) 
 
3 Reported internal details as a proportion of total details; external therefore inferred 
4 Only included raw values of external details in supplementary material, no statistical analysis 
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Milton, Butler, and Zeman (2011) 
Kirwan, Bayley, Galvan, and Squire (2008) 
Rosenbaum et al. (2008) 
Addis, Moscovitch, and McAndrews (2007) 
Gilboa et al. (2006) 
 Neurodegeneration (8) (Irish et al., 2018) 
Ernst et al. (2016) 
Hsieh et al. (2016) 
Irish, Kamminga, et al. (2016) 
Benjamin et al. (2015) 
Miles, Fischer-Mogensen, Nielsen, Hermansen, and Berntsen (2013) 
Irish, Hornberger, et al. (2011) 
McKinnon et al. (2006) 
 Other (parietal lesions) (1) Davidson et al. (2008) 
 Paediatric (1) Gascoigne et al. (2013) 
 Psychiatric (3) Parlar, Densmore, Hall, Lanius, and McKinnon (2017) 
Palombo et al. (2016) 
King et al. (2013) 
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 Traumatic Brain Injury (1) Esopenko and Levine (2017) 
Breakdown of external details 
subcategories (30) 
  
All subcategories (external 
event, semantic, repetitions, 
other) (21) 
Healthy Adults (5) Grysman (2017) 
Hodgetts et al. (2017)5 
Fuentes and Desrocher (2013) 
Palombo, Williams, Abdi, and Levine (2013) 
Fuentes and Desrocher (2011)6 
 Healthy Aging (2) St. Jacques and Levine (2007) 
Levine et al. (2002) 
 Medial Temporal Lobe 
Lesions/Epilepsy (4) 
Munera et al. (2014)7 
Levine, Svoboda, Turner, Mandic, and Mackey (2009) 
St-Laurent, Moscovitch, Levine, and McAndrews (2009)8 
Rosenbaum, McKinnon, Levine, and Moscovitch (2004) 
 
5 Included modified external details subcategories: semantic, categorical, extended, repetitions, tangential, other 
6 External events were included in subcategory description but not results 
7 Did not include external event subcategory 
8 Did not include external event subcategory 
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 Neurodegeneration (5) Bastin et al. (2013) 
Barnabe et al. (2012) 
Meulenbroek et al. (2010) 
McKinnon et al. (2008) 
Murphy, Troyer, Levine, and Moscovitch (2008) 
 Other (parietal lesions) (1) Berryhill, Phuong, Picasso, Cabeza, and Olson (2007) 
 Paediatric (2) Willoughby, McAndrews, and Rovet (2013) 
Willoughby, Desrocher, Levine, and Rovet (2012) 
 Psychiatric (2) McKinnon et al. (2015) 
Soderlund et al. (2014) 
Only semantic subcategory (8) Healthy Aging (2) Mair et al. (2017)9 
St. Jacques, Rubin, and Cabeza (2012)10 
 Medial Temporal Lobe 
Lesions/Epilepsy (1) 
Bayley, Hopkins, and Squire (2003)11 
 
9 Only examined semantic subcategory, excluded external event subcategory, did not report total external details, or other subcategories 
10 Classified all details as either episodic or semantic 
11 Divided all details into either episodic, semantic, or repetitions 
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 Neurodegeneration (1) Rensen et al. (2017)12 
 
 Paediatric (1) Gascoigne, Barton, Webster, Gill, and Lah (2015)13 
 Psychiatric (1) MacDougall, McKinnon, Herdman, King, and Kiang (2015)14 
 Traumatic Brain Injury (2) Wammes, Good, and Fernandes (2017)15 
Palombo, Kapson, et al. (2015)16 
Only external event 
subcategory (1) 
Medial Temporal Lobe 
Lesions/Epilepsy (1) 
Steinvorth, Levine, and Corkin (2005)17 
   
No results of external details 
reported (11) 
Healthy Adults (3) LePort, Stark, McGaugh, and Stark (2015) 
Rabin and Rosenbaum (2012) 
Nadel, Campbell, and Ryan (2007) 
 Healthy Aging (1) Baron and Bluck (2009) 
 Medial Temporal Lobe 
Lesions/Epilepsy (1) 
Hornberger, Mohamed, et al. (2010) 
 
12 Examined semantic subcategory in addition to total external details 
13 Only examined semantic subcategory, not total external details, or other subcategories 
14 Did not examine total external or other subcategories 
15 Divided all details into either episodic, semantic, or repetitions. Did not report total external details  
16 Classified all external details as either semantic or other  
17 Only examined external event details, external perceptual details and total external, no other subcategories 
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 Neurodegeneration (5) Kumfor, Teo, et al. (2016) 
Ernst et al. (2015) 
(Irish, Hornberger, et al., 2014) 
Crete-Nishihata et al. (2012) 
Ernst et al. (2012) 
 Other (encephalopathy) (1) Zeman et al. (2016) 
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3.2.3. Discussion 
The current review of the ABM literature reveals large variability in the reporting of external 
details. It is apparent that, despite containing several subcomponents, the majority of studies 
either collectively aggregate the external details category or disregard this detail type 
entirely. Studies that explore external details subtypes further demonstrate inconsistencies 
in their approach, resulting in a lack of clarity regarding exactly what external details 
represent. Because of their variable reporting of external details, studies using the AI to 
examine external details cannot be directly compared. 
 
As such, the current variability in the reporting and interpretation of external details may 
obscure the extent to which different forms of episodic and semantic information are 
enmeshed within the ABM narrative. A new taxonomy, providing a consistent method of 
reporting, as well as an accurate picture of the constituent elements that make up the 
external details category, therefore seems warranted.  
 
3.3. Part 2 – The NExt taxonomy: A new classification system for AI external 
details 
3.3.1. Method 
Participants  
AI data were re-analysed from 51 participants who had taken part in a previous study on ABM 
(Irish, Hornberger, et al., 2014; Irish, Hornberger, et al., 2011; Irish et al., 2018). Following the 
exclusion of one AD patient due to an unusually high score (94/100) on the ACE-R, the final 
sample for this study included 14 SD patients, 19 patients with AD, and 20 healthy Control 
participants. Control participants were selected from the original study cohort, matched to 
the patient groups as closely as possible for sex, age, and education. Chapter 2 provides 
further details of recruitment and neuropsychological assessment. In this study, ACE-R is 
included as a measure of global cognition, along with specific tests of verbal (ACE-R Address 
Recall and Word Recall subtests) and visual (RCF; Rey, 1941) episodic memory, 
language/semantic memory (ACE-R Fluency subscale; and SYDBAT Comprehension and 
Naming subtests; Savage et al., 2013), and executive function (Trail Making Test Part B-A; 
Tombaugh, 2004).  
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Procedure 
Participants completed an abbreviated version of the Autobiographical Interview (AI; Levine 
et al., 2002) and provided detailed descriptions of personally experienced events from four 
different time periods: Teenage Years (11-17 years), Early Adulthood (18-34 years), Middle 
Adulthood (35-55 years) and Recent period (within the last year). In order to shorten the 
testing session and reduce the burden on patients, the Early Childhood epoch (up to 11 years) 
from the original test was not included in this study. If participants were unable to 
independently retrieve an event, they were presented with a list of typical events for each 
time period. In keeping with the standard protocol (see Levine et al., 2002 for further details), 
the task involved an initial Free Recall condition, in which participants described the event in 
question without guidance or time restrictions. This was followed by General (i.e., asking the 
participant if there are any further details they can provide) and Specific Probing (i.e., asking 
directly about event, time, place, perceptual, and emotion/thought details), to encourage 
greater recall of particular details. As the purpose of the current study was to examine the 
spontaneous provision of details within an unconstrained narrative, only the condition of low 
retrieval support is reported here (i.e., a combined index of Free Recall and General Probing).  
 
All interviews were digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed. They were then scored 
using the original AI protocol (Levine et al., 2002), which segments autobiographical 
memories into ‘internal’ or ‘external’ details. Internal details are those that pertain directly 
to the main episode being described, whereas external details represent additional 
information provided in the narrative that is not specific to, or part of, this main event. The 
original AI protocol classifies these external details into subcategories of External Event 
(details of events, separate from the main episode being described), Semantic (factual 
information), Repetitions (details already provided during recall), and Other (metacognitive 
reflections about the event, comments on the current testing environment, etc.).  
 
NExt: A new taxonomy for external details 
A new scoring taxonomy was developed for use on the external content details of the AI (i.e., 
those external details initially classified as External Event or Semantic detail by the Levine et 
al., 2002 protocol). External details classified by the original protocol as Repetitions or Other 
were not considered in these analyses, as they do not provide any additional content.  
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The external content details were then re-classified into one of four categories: Specific 
Episodes (SE), Extended Episodes (EE), Personal Semantics (PS), and General Semantics (GS). 
The motivation for these categories was based on evidence for their potential cognitive and 
neurobiological parcellation (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Grilli 
& Verfaellie, 2016; Renoult et al., 2012; Renoult et al., 2016), and to capture the full episodic-
semantic spectrum of external details (i.e., from highly specific episodes to over-general 
semantic detail). The re-coding into the four new subcategories was completed independent 
of their original classification as External Event or Semantic.  
 
Specific Episodes (SE) were defined as events specific to time (i.e., lasting less than 24 hours) 
and place, that were separate from the defined main, internal event. Extended Episodes (EE) 
were also personally experienced memories, though less specific than SE (i.e., general events: 
either extended in time or repeated). Details classified as Personal Semantics (PS) were non-
episodic but personally relevant facts. Finally, General Semantics (GS) included facts and 
knowledge about the world that were not directly autobiographically relevant. The full NExt 
scoring protocol, including examples of each detail type, is provided in Box 3.1., and an 
excerpt from a healthy Control’s transcript scored using the NExt protocol is contained in 
Appendix B. Figure 3.1. also depicts the relationship between the NExt scoring system and the 
Levine et al. (2002) protocol, representing the intermediate status of the EE subcategory as 
reflecting an overlap between the original External Event and Semantic detail types.  
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Box 3.1. NExt External Details Scoring Protocol  
Specific Episodes (SE) 
Any details that are related to the memory of a specific event experienced by the 
participant but distinct from the central event described for this time period (i.e., the event 
which was scored predominantly in terms of ‘internal’ details). Although technically 
external to the main event being scored, this episode still fulfils the criteria of being a 
specific episodic, i.e., lasting no more than 24 hours in duration, and situated within a 
distinct spatiotemporal framework, yet falls in the external category as it is outside the 
scope of the main event. 
 
E.g., “My wife gave birth to our first child [internal event]. The next day, the people from 
the newspaper came and took a photo of us: me, my wife, and our child [external- SE]”; 
“One day I said to John, let’s go to the Whitsundays”; “A couple of days later we travelled 
back home.” 
 
Extended Episodes (EE) 
This refers to personally experienced memories that lack the specificity of SE, but still 
contain some spatiotemporal information (i.e., general events). Specifically, they are one 
(or a combination) of the following: 
• Extended in time (i.e., lasting greater than 24 hours, up to whole lifetime 
periods) 
E.g., “We stayed with my wife’s family for a few days”; “I recovered from my illness”; 
“I built a house for my parents”; “I worked in the city for a few years” 
• Repeated (i.e., occurred a number of times, or involve the drawing upon of a 
number of events) 
E.g., “We went there every Christmas”; “We spent a lot of time there”; “Whenever I 
go back to Victoria…”; “We sometimes danced in the rain”; “I moved house many 
times”; “Normally we would go the opposite way” 
 
*Note: EE does not include memories that refer to something that the participant has not 
done, as this would not be based on any constituent episodes. E.g., “I had never sailed 
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before”; or “I had not seen her for 30 years” would instead fall under the category of 
Personal Semantics (PS; see below). 
 
Personal Semantics (PS) 
This includes details that are non-episodic in nature, i.e., they have been abstracted and 
are no longer linked to a specific episode, yet remain personally or autobiographically 
relevant. For example: 
• Statements of personal roles 
E.g., “I was a dancer” 
• Statements of personal traits 
E.g., “I am more emotional these days”; “I’m good at reading maps” 
• Facts about oneself that are not linked to an episode 
E.g., “I have two brothers”; “I live in Sydney” 
• Personal thoughts and beliefs not related to an episode 
E.g., “I like sports” 
• Facts about other people if the statements are autobiographically relevant, i.e., 
are described in relation to oneself/one’s own life 
E.g., “My father was a government public servant”; “My parents have a holiday 
home”; “My grandfather died before I was born”; “They were older than me”; “She 
was married to my sister” 
 
*Note PS does not include statements about other people (including family and friends) if 
the statement is no longer directly autobiographically relevant. E.g., “Sam was my best 
friend” would be classed as PS. However, “Sam was always very shy” would be classed as 
General Semantics (GS; see below). Similarly, “My father remarried” would be classed as 
PS, however “My father’s first wife died when she was 45” would be GS (below).   
 
General Semantics (GS) 
This includes details that are non-episodic in nature and not explicitly self-relevant. For 
example: 
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• General knowledge (i.e., facts about the world and public events) including that 
which sets context for the event 
E.g., “Doctors have had years of training”; “The place is west of Port Lincoln”; “Long 
skirts were all the rage in those days” 
• Facts about other people (including family and friends) when the statements are 
not directly related to oneself 
E.g., “Uncle Sam was a very shy person”; “They have three children” 
• Events that happened to other people that the participant did not directly 
experience themselves 
E.g., “My sister-in-law gave birth to a daughter that same day” 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Comparison of the original (Levine et al., 2002; top) and NExt (bottom) taxonomies 
for classifying external details on the Autobiographical Interview (AI), demonstrating the 
episodic-semantic continuum captured by the NExt protocol, and the ‘Extended Episode’ (EE) 
subcategory reflecting an overlap between the original External Event and Semantic detail 
types. 
 
The thesis author (CSB) scored all of the participants’ transcripts using the NExt protocol. A 
second investigator (AM) re-scored a random sample of 40 of the memories (i.e., 
approximately 20% of the total, the accepted figure for establishing inter-rater reliability on 
narrative data; Syed & Nelson, 2015), blind to diagnosis and to the external detail coding 
completed by CSB. These transcripts were evenly distributed across each of the four time 
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periods and diagnostic groups. The two raters achieved excellent inter-rater reliability for 
overall external detail classifications (intraclass correlation coefficient: .95) and for each of 
the NExt subcategories (intraclass correlation coefficients: SE: .98, EE: .81, PS: .91, and GS: 
.99).  
 
Statistical analyses 
The AI variables of interest for the current study were Total Content details (i.e., internal and 
content-based external details combined), Internal details, External details (including only 
content details), and the newly created external detail categories of SE, EE, PS, and GS. The 
Levine et al. (2002) External detail subcategories of Semantic (SEM) and External Event (EXT-
EVT) were also examined, in order to compare the original and new scoring systems. To 
investigate profiles across life epochs, a Remote period composite (i.e., average of Teenage, 
Early Adulthood, and Middle Adulthood) was examined separately from Recent memory 
performance (consistent with Addis et al., 2009; Irish, Hornberger, et al., 2011; Irish et al., 
2018)18. Finally, Total scores were created for each external subcategory by summing 
performance across all time periods. 
 
A series of one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) and Sidak post hoc tests were used to 
explore between-group differences (Control, SD, AD) on demographic variables and 
neuropsychological tasks, with independent samples t-tests employed for variables only 
collected in the patient groups. Chi-squared tests (c2) were used to compare the frequency 
of dichotomous variables (i.e., sex). Univariate and multivariate analyses of covariance 
(MANCOVA) using the robust Pillai’s trace multivariate statistic and Sidak post hoc tests were 
employed to compare groups on AI variables, adjusting for age. A multivariate, as opposed to 
repeated measures, approach was chosen given the data violated the assumption of 
sphericity (i.e., significant Mauchly’s test) (O'Brien & Kaiser, 1985), the sample size was large 
relative to number of variables (Stevens, 1992), the NExt variables were not independent, and 
the primary research question related to between-group differences on, rather than the 
 
18 As 6 SD patients and 4 AD patients were reported to have onset of symptoms within the Middle Adulthood 
period (i.e., between 35-55 years), the potential effect of disease onset within this period on the profile of 
details provided for the epoch was explored. No significant relationships emerged. Results of these analyses 
are provided in Appendix B.  
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relationship between, the NExt variables. Effect sizes for the analyses of covariance were 
calculated using partial eta squared (η2) values. Finally, the robust Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient was used to explore associations between the new external detail subcategories 
and neuropsychological variables of interest in the patient groups. 
 
3.3.2. Results  
Demographics and neuropsychological performance 
Table 3.2. displays participant demographics and neuropsychological performance. Groups 
did not differ significantly for sex (p = .08) or years of education (p = .99), but Control 
participants were significantly older than SD patients (p = .02). Disease duration significantly 
varied between patient groups, with the SD group showing a longer disease duration 
compared with the AD group. Nonetheless, no significant differences were apparent between 
the two patient groups on the CBI (p = .98) or FTD-FRS (p = .47), indicating similar behavioural 
change and disease severity. 
 
Both patient groups displayed characteristic cognitive profiles on the core neuropsychological 
tests. Briefly, relative to Controls, SD patients showed significant reductions in global 
cognitive functioning (ACE-R Total), verbal episodic memory (ACE-R Address Recall and Word 
Recall), and semantic memory (ACE-R Fluency, and SYDBAT Naming and Comprehension). 
This was in the context of relatively preserved visual episodic memory (RCF 3-minute Recall), 
and executive function (TMT B minus A). AD patients also showed impairments in global 
cognitive functioning, verbal episodic memory, and semantic memory (ACE-R Fluency, 
SYDBAT Naming and Comprehension); with additional impairments in visual episodic memory 
and executive function.  
 
Direct comparison of the patient groups revealed disproportionate disruption of global 
cognitive functioning, Comprehension, and Naming in SD relative to AD, with worse visual 
episodic memory and executive function in AD compared with SD patients, in keeping with 
the hallmark clinical profiles of these syndromes. 
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Table 3.2. Demographics and clinical characteristics of the study cohort  
Variable SD AD Control F  Group 
effect 
Post hoc test 
N 13 18 20    
Sex (M/F) 11/2 15/3 11/9 c2 = 
5.09 
.08  
Age (years) 61.15 
(8.39) 
66.17 (8.95) 68.75 (5.22) 4.03 .02 Controls > SD 
Education 
(years) 
12.42 
(2.75) 
12.58 (3.05) 12.55 (3.31) .01 .99  
Disease 
duration 
(years) 
5.17 (1.85) 3.17 (2.20) n/a t = 
2.59 
.02 SD > AD 
CBI Total 
(180) 
46.31 
(21.78) 
43.53 
(31.70) 
8.10 (8.79) 16.35 <.001 SD & AD > 
Controls 
FTD-FRS 
Rasch Score 
1.51 (1.34) 1.14 (1.35) n/a t = .73 .47  
ACE-R (100) 64 (12.54) 74.61 
(12.49) 
93.4 (3.35) 37.47 <.001 Controls > SD 
& AD; AD > 
SD 
ACE-R 
Address 
Recall (7) 
1.69 (1.60) 1.44 (2.09) 5.90 (1.07) 43.59 <.001 Controls > SD 
& AD 
ACE-R Word 
Recall (3) 
1.17 (1.03) 1.22 (1.17) 2.80 (0.41) 19.02 <.001 Controls > SD 
& AD 
       
ACE-R 
Fluency (14) 
5.33 (3.68) 7.67 (3.20) 11.55 (1.57) 20.19 <.001 Controls > SD 
& AD 
RCF 3 min 
recall (36) 
13.62 
(8.19) 
4.10 (4.45) 17.05 (4.45) 22.24 <.001 Controls & SD 
> AD 
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SYDBAT 
Compr. (30) 
21.46 
(5.74) 
25.31 (4.27) 29.25 (0.79) 16.43 <.001 Controls > SD 
& AD; AD > 
SD 
       
SYDBAT 
Naming (30) 
6.85(4.36) 19.81(5.21) 26.15(2.54) 89.77 <.001 Controls > SD 
& AD; AD > 
SD 
Trail Making 
Test B-A  
52.92 
(32.71) 
94.91 
(45.00) 
54.16 
(31.61) 
5.46 .008 Controls & SD 
> AD 
Notes: Maximum test score depicted in brackets where appropriate. Values represent means 
and standard deviations for each group. 
n/a: not applicable; ACE-R: Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-Revised; AD: Alzheimer’s 
disease; CBI: Cambridge Behavioural Inventory; Compr: Comprehension; RCF: Rey Complex 
Figure; SD: semantic dementia; SYDBAT: Sydney Language Battery. 
Disease duration not available for 1 SD patient; ACE-R variables aside from Total not available 
for 1 SD patient (Total score converted from ACE-III); CBI Total not available for 1 AD patient; 
FTD-FRS not available for 1 SD and 2 ADs; RCF not available for 3 ADs and 1 Control; SYDBAT 
Comprehension and Naming not available for 2 ADs; Trail Making Test not available for 7 ADs 
and 1 Control. 
 
Overall performance on the AI – standard protocol 
Detailed analysis of AI performance using the standard protocol is contained in Appendix B. 
Briefly, the current results replicated previous findings of impaired Internal details for SD and 
AD groups compared with Controls, both overall (i.e., all time periods combined), and for the 
Remote period. For the Recent period, while ADs again provided significantly fewer Internal 
details than Controls, SD patients performed at Control level.  
 
Fine-grained analysis of external details – NExt protocol 
Consistent with the original AI scoring protocol, the between-group external detail 
subcategory (SE, EE, PS, and GS) comparisons were adjusted for total narrative output. In the 
current study, this involved including Total Content details as a covariate in the analyses.  
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Figure 3.2. displays the profiles of NExt external detail subcategories provided by each group, 
summed across all time periods. Using Pillai’s trace, a significant effect of group was found 
for the number of external details produced (V = .45, F(8, 88) = 3.23, p = .003, partial η2 = .23). 
Specifically, univariate ANCOVAs revealed significant main effects of group for Extended 
Episodes, Personal Semantics, and General Semantics (EE: F(2, 46) = 7.29, p = .002, partial η2 
= .24; PS: F(2, 46) = 3.81, p = .03, partial η2 = .14; GS: F(2, 46) = 10.46, p < .001, partial η2 = .31), 
but not for Specific Episodes (SE: F(2, 46) = .31, p = .74, partial η2 = .01). Follow up Sidak post 
hoc comparisons uncovered distinct differences between the groups across the various 
external subcategories. SDs and ADs gave significantly more Extended Episodes (p values = 
.04 & .002, respectively) and General Semantics (p values = .003 & <.001) relative to Controls. 
AD patients were further found to provide more Personal Semantics than Controls (p = .03). 
No differences were apparent between the patient groups for any of the external detail 
subcategories (all p values > .4). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Breakdown of external details according to the NExt classification system summed 
across all time periods for each group (estimated marginal means controlling for age and Total 
Content; error bars represent standard error of the mean). AD: Alzheimer’s disease; EE: 
Extended Episodes; GS: General Semantics; PS: Personal Semantics; SD: semantic dementia; 
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SE: Specific Episodes. Significant difference from Control performance at *p < .05, ** p < .01 
and ***p < .001 respectively. 
 
Comparison between the AI original scoring method and the NExt taxonomy 
In order to compare the NExt taxonomy with the original protocol, profiles of the Levine et 
al. (2002) external detail subcategories of Semantic (SEM) and External Event (EXT-EVT) were 
examined across each group, summed across all time periods (Figure 3.3.). As with the NExt 
analyses, Total Content was included as a covariate. Using Pillai’s trace, a significant effect of 
group was found for the number of external details produced (V = .41, F(4, 92) = 5.92, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .21). Univariate ANCOVAs revealed a main effect of group for SEM details 
(F(2, 46) = 11.68, p < .001, partial η2 = .34), with follow-up comparisons indicating AD patients 
provided more SEM than controls (p < .001). No significant differences were apparent 
between the number of SEM details recalled by SD and control groups (p = .08), or between 
the two patient groups (p = .18). Further, no significant between-group differences were 
observed for EXT-EVT details (F(2, 46) = 1.62, p = .21, partial η2 = .07). 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Breakdown of external details according to the original Levine et al. (2002) 
classification system summed across all time periods for each group (estimated marginal 
means controlling for age and Total Content, error bars represent standard error of the 
mean). AD: Alzheimer’s disease; EXT-EVT: External Event; SEM: Semantic; SD: semantic 
dementia. Significant difference from control performance at *** p < .001.  
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NExt external detail profiles by time period 
For the Remote period, Pillai’s trace revealed a significant effect of group on the number of 
external details produced (V = .39, F(8, 88) = 2.65, p = .01, partial η2 = .19). Using univariate 
ANCOVAs, significant between-group effects emerged for Extended Episodes, Personal 
Semantics and General Semantic categories (EE: F(2, 46) = 6.30, p = .004, partial η2 = .22; PS: 
F(2, 46) = 4.28, p = .02, partial η2 = .16; GS: F(2, 46) = 4.10, p = .02, partial η2 = .15), with no 
main effect of group for Specific Episodes (F(2, 46) = .65, p = .53, partial η2 = .03). Post hoc 
analyses revealed that SD and AD provided increased Extended Episodes relative to Controls 
(p values = .02 & .009, respectively). In addition, ADs provided a greater number of Personal 
Semantic and General Semantic details compared with Controls (PS: p = .02, GS: p = .03). 
Patient groups did not differ significantly in the provision of any of the external detail 
subtypes for the Remote period (all p values > .56) (Figure 3.4.). 
 
For the Recent period, Pillai’s trace revealed a significant effect of group on the number of 
external details produced (V = .35, F(8, 88) = 2.65, p = .03, partial η2 = .17). Specifically, an 
effect of group was apparent for Extended Episodes (F(2, 46) = 4.05, p = .02, partial η2 = .15) 
and General Semantics (F(2, 46) = 3.53, p = .04, partial η2 = .13), such that AD patients provided 
more EE details than Controls (p = .03) and SD patients gave more GS details than Controls (p 
= .03). No significant differences were present between SD and AD patients on their provision 
of Extended Episodes (p = .96) or General Semantics (p = .49), and all groups provided similar 
amounts of Specific Episodes and Personal Semantics for the Recent period (SE: F(2, 46) = .23, 
p = .79, partial η2 = .01; PS: F(2, 46) = 1.69, p = .20, partial η2 = .07) (Figure 3.4.).  
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Figure 3.4. Breakdown of external details according to the NExt classification system for each 
group, for Remote (left) and Recent (right) periods (estimated marginal means controlling for 
age and Total Content; error bars represent standard error of the mean). AD: Alzheimer’s 
disease; EE: Extended Episodes; GS: General Semantics; PS: Personal Semantics; SD: semantic 
dementia; SE: Specific Episodes. Significant difference from Control performance at *p < .05 
and **p < .01 respectively. 
 
Correlations between Extended Episodes and episodic and semantic performance 
Given the proposed overlap of semantic and episodic elements within the Extended Episode 
subcategory (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Renoult et al., 2012; Figure 3.1.), and the elevations in 
this detail type for both patient groups and time periods, the cognitive correlates of Extended 
Episodes were further explored. Spearman’s correlations between neuropsychological 
measures of episodic and semantic memory and Extended Episode proportion scores (i.e., 
individual EE score divided by Total Content details) were performed separately in AD and SD, 
for Remote and Recent periods (Table 3.3.).  
 
In SD, no significant correlations emerged for the Remote period, however Recent Extended 
Episodes were negatively correlated with independent measures of semantic processing 
(ACE-R Fluency: r = -.80, p = .002; SYDBAT Naming: r = -.77, p = .002). In AD, by contrast, a 
negative correlation between Extended Episodes and verbal episodic memory (Word Recall: 
r = -.48, p = .04) was observed in the Remote period.  
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Table 3.3. Correlations between NExt Extended Episode (EE) details generated on the 
Autobiographical Interview (AI) and scores on neuropsychological tests of episodic and 
semantic memory for semantic dementia (SD) and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) patients 
Notes: ACE-R: Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-Revised; RCF: Rey Complex Figure; 
SYDBAT: Sydney Language Battery. 
Asterisks denote significance at *p < .05 and **p < .01. 
 
3.4. General Discussion 
This study sought to characterise the variability in reporting and interpreting of external 
details on the AI, and use these findings to develop a new taxonomy to refine the 
understanding of the episodic and semantic information contained within autobiographical 
narratives. In turn, this study aimed to improve the characterisation of the mechanisms 
 SD AD 
 Remote EE Recent EE Remote EE Recent EE 
Episodic Memory     
ACE-R Address Recall .36 -.40 .08 .46 
ACE-R Word Recall .03 -.31 -.48* .18 
RCF .07 -.37 .01 .38 
Semantic Memory     
ACE-R Fluency .17 -.80** -.28 .02 
SYDBAT Comprehension -.04 -.49 -.17 -.03 
SYDBAT Naming -.04 -.77** -.11 -.16 
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underlying narrative continuity of the extended self. Motivated by recent theoretical 
frameworks emphasising the episodic-semantic continuum (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2014; Irish, 
2020; Renoult et al., 2012), the new external details (‘NExt’) taxonomy yielded distinct profiles 
of the external detail subtypes for AD, SD, and healthy Controls, and for remote and recent 
epochs. The potential of this NExt classification system to help clarify the episodic and 
semantic elements underpinning narrative continuity of the self will now be discussed. 
 
3.4.1. Sensitivity of the NExt taxonomy to differential profiles of ABM across groups 
The NExt taxonomy successfully discriminated between AD, SD, and healthy Control 
participants, with distinct external detail profiles emerging in each clinical group. Overall, AD 
patients gave disproportionately greater amounts of Extended Episode, Personal Semantic, 
and General Semantic external details compared with Controls, whereas the SD group 
provided higher levels of Extended Episodes and General Semantics only. No between-group 
differences were apparent for Specific Episodes (i.e., details of specific events separate from 
the main episode being described). All groups, however, provided a nontrivial amount of this 
external detail type (> 22% of total external details) within their autobiographical narratives. 
This observation supports the hypothesis that, rather than representing strictly semantic 
content, the ‘external’ details in the autobiographical narrative also contain episodic 
elements, further highlighting the confluence of episodic and semantic processes in 
supporting narrative self-continuity. In addition, compared with the original AI scoring 
protocol (Levine et al., 2002), the NExt taxonomy demonstrated improved sensitivity to 
detect differences in external detail provision across patient groups, both in the present 
analyses, and with reference to past work in AD and SD (no difference in external details 
between patients and controls in most previous studies; Barnabe et al., 2012; Benjamin et al., 
2015; Irish, Hornberger, et al., 2011; Irish et al., 2018; McKinnon et al., 2008; Meulenbroek et 
al., 2010). Direct comparison of external detail profiles across previous studies has also been 
impeded by the variability in how these details are reported, as demonstrated in Part 1 of this 
Chapter. The NExt taxonomy offers a theoretically informed approach to address these 
inconsistencies in the ABM literature, thus improving the characterisation of the episodic and 
semantic content contained within autobiographical narratives.  
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3.4.2. Composition of external details in AD 
Distinct profiles of NExt details in AD patients compared with Controls emerged for remote 
and recent time periods. Regarding the remote epoch, AD patients provided a greater level 
of Extended Episodes, Personal Semantic, and General Semantic details compared to 
Controls, in the context of impaired episodic (Internal details) retrieval. The elevation of 
remote Personal Semantic and General Semantic details is consistent with the proposed 
importance of semantic information in supporting narrative self-continuity for the remote 
past, as outlined in Chapter 1. Further, these findings are in line with the study hypothesis of 
increased semantic external details in AD, and also mesh well with the relative preservation 
of remote semantic ABM in AD established using direct probing methods (see Chapter 1). 
Typically, the Extended Episode category is suggested to occupy an intermediate position on 
the episodic-semantic continuum, but to more closely resemble episodic, rather than 
semantic, memory (Renoult et al., 2012). Counter to this proposal, however, was the finding 
that elevated EE in AD during remote ABM narration correlated inversely with episodic 
memory in this group, such that worse episodic memory related to the provision of more EE 
details. Accordingly, the constituents of EE in AD may rely more heavily upon semanticised, 
rather than episodic, elements. Such an interpretation is consistent with the proposal by Grilli 
and Verfaellie (2016), that this detail type may in fact draw upon either episodic or semantic 
memory. Collectively, the external detail profile in AD supports the suggestions outlined in 
Chapter 1 that these patients may retain some degree of narrative continuity for the remote 
period. Importantly, however, the current findings extend those previous, by revealing how 
individuals with AD may weave personally-relevant details, spanning the full spectrum of 
semantic information, into a naturalistic narrative of their life story for the remote past. This 
life story, albeit outdated, may be retold and shared with others, to maintain some degree of 
persistence of the extended self in AD. 
 
In contrast to their remote external detail profile, only Extended Episodes were elevated in 
AD for the recent period. Again, these details likely reflect AD patients’ reliance on semantic 
and/or schematic facets of retrieved events when narrating their past. It is unclear, however, 
whether the EE details provided during recent ABM narration in AD referred to general events 
occurring within the past year, versus more remote time periods. Nonetheless, the 
abundance of this detail type during narration of the recent past in AD provides the first 
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evidence of some semblance of narrative continuity for these patients for the recent period, 
even if it reflects the attempted ‘filling’ of recent time periods with remote events. Taken 
together, the external detail profiles in AD revealed by the NExt taxonomy suggest that even 
in the absence of detailed event-based recollection and subjective self-continuity, semantic 
elements including general events, personal semantic facts, as well as general conceptual 
information, may still be harnessed to allow a degree of narrative continuity across remote 
and recent periods in these patients (see also Rathbone et al., 2019). While a previous study 
revealed the overall coherence of autobiographical narratives to be reduced in AD compared 
with healthy older adults, these somewhat simplified life stories are nonetheless sufficient to 
provide a sense of continuity across time in these patients (Tippett et al., 2018).  
 
3.4.3. Composition of external details in SD 
Similar to AD, the lifetime period in question appeared to play an important role in the 
resultant external details provided by SD patients, with divergent NExt profiles displayed for 
SD versus Controls in remote and recent epochs. Regarding remote retrieval, only the 
Extended Episode category was significantly elevated in SD, relative to Controls. By contrast, 
SD patients provided increased General Semantic details for the recent period, compared 
with Control participants. These elevations in seemingly semantic details are contrary to the 
study hypotheses, and at first glance, appear counterintuitive, given the characteristic 
semantic impairments in the disorder. As these details are inextricably bound to a specific 
event, however, they may have been acquired in an episodic manner, rather than reflecting 
truly abstracted semantic knowledge (Graham et al., 1997; Irish, Addis, et al., 2012b; 
McKinnon et al., 2006). For example, a qualitative review of the recent GS details provided by 
the SD group in this study suggested that the majority of these details, despite appearing as 
facts, could reasonably have been recently encoded (and retrieved) as part of an episodic 
event. For example, mentioning the distance of a location relative to one’s home, while 
typically regarded as general semantic knowledge, could in fact reflect episodic recollection 
of a recent visit there. The proposal that external details in SD are more likely to be influenced 
by episodic, rather than general semantic, processes, is further supported by the finding of 
robust negative correlations between recent EE and measures of semantic memory in this 
group (r values larger than -.7). Unlike in AD, then, the Extended Episodes in SD may draw 
more heavily upon episodic, instead of semantic, representations. Irrespective of the origin 
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of such details, however, they may contribute to narrative continuity of the extended self in 
SD by providing relevant information for one’s life story (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), 
for both remote and recent time periods. It may be argued that this is the case even if the 
details are tangential to the main event being described (as seen in Seixas Lima et al., 2019), 
given they reflect self-relevant content that has been weaved into the personal narrative. 
Together these findings suggest a degree of narrative continuity of the extended self may be 
maintained in SD for both remote and recent periods. How the ‘episodic-like’ nature of this 
narrative manifests behaviourally, compared with the more ‘semantic-like’ life story seen in 
AD, will be interesting to explore. Studies examining the phenomenology (e.g., autonoetic 
consciousness, visual imagery) of the NExt detail types across patient groups will also be 
important in confirming their respective contributions to subjective versus narrative 
continuity.  
 
3.4.4. Conclusions 
The NExt taxonomy enables the fine-grained analysis of the episodic-semantic spectrum of 
external details, demonstrating improved sensitivity to differentiating between the ABM 
narratives of patient groups relative to healthy Controls. This allows for a refined 
understanding of the episodic and semantic contributions to narrative continuity of the 
extended self. Indeed, the distinct mechanisms underpinning external details outlined here 
in AD and SD, and across remote and recent epochs, highlight the varied ways in which 
narrative self-continuity for the past can be provided. Namely, details spanning the full 
episodic-semantic spectrum can be harnessed to provide narrative continuity for both remote 
and recent time periods. Intriguingly, the current findings suggest a preferential reliance on 
the most preserved memory type to support narrative continuity of the self, in the face of 
impairment to its counterpart (see also Irish, 2020). How the full range of episodic to semantic 
information contributes to narrative self-continuity for the future, however, remains to be 
uncovered, which forms the focus of Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4 
Applying NExt to the extended self in the future 
4.1. Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the extended self does not solely incorporate the personal past, but 
also extends into the future. The extant literature on episodic future thinking has uncovered 
how subjective continuity of the self for the future incorporates both episodic and semantic 
processes. The contribution of episodic and semantic memory to narrative self-continuity for 
the future, however, is not yet understood, given a paucity of studies on this topic.  
 
In order to improve characterisation of narrative continuity for the past, Chapter 3 proposed 
a novel method (the ‘NExt’ taxonomy) for categorising the ‘external’ details provided within 
descriptions of personally-relevant past events, given these details often capture 
contextually-relevant background information for one’s life story. The NExt taxonomy 
encompasses the full episodic-semantic spectrum of details provided within the ABM 
narrative, and as such, can examine the constituent elements of narrative self-continuity in a 
naturalistic manner. The distinct profiles of external details within ABM narratives in AD and 
SD, as revealed by the NExt taxonomy in Chapter 3, highlight how episodic and semantic 
processes may interact in the service of narrative continuity of the self for the past. It remains 
unclear whether this interplay also manifests for the future period. 
 
Moreover, while the neural correlates of subjective self-continuity for both past and future 
are now relatively well-characterised, the brain regions underlying past and future narrative 
self-continuity are incompletely understood (see Chapter 1). The limited research to date has 
implicated medial prefrontal, medial and lateral temporal, precuneus, and lateral parietal 
regions in semantic ABM (reviewed by Renoult et al., 2012), but it is unclear whether a similar 
brain network extends to personal semantic processing in the future. The neurodegenerative 
disorders of AD and SD offer a unique opportunity to examine the neural correlates of these 
processes, given their characteristic atrophy to many of the regions implicated in semantic 
ABM, and their varying degrees of personal semantic memory impairment (see Chapters 1 
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and 3). Surprisingly, however, no studies to date have examined the neural underpinnings of 
narrative self-continuity in these syndromes.  
 
This study employed the NExt taxonomy to explore the external content of episodic future 
thinking narratives, and their cognitive and neural correlates, with the aim to better 
characterise the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying narrative continuity for the future. 
Consistent with Chapter 3, NExt profiles were examined in patients with AD and SD, compared 
with healthy controls. In line with previous suggestions (Irish, 2020; Szpunar, 2010) and 
empirical findings (Chapter 3; Irish, Addis, et al., 2012b), the patterns of external details within 
future narratives were predicted to encompass the information that remains most accessible 
to the patients. Namely, AD patents were expected to draw predominantly upon intact 
semantic representations, whereas SD patients would primarily incorporate details from 
recent episodic memory. Similar patterns were hypothesised for the neural correlates, with 
patient groups predicted to draw upon the brain regions that remain relatively preserved 
(namely anterior DMN regions in AD, and posterior DMN regions in SD) in order to produce 
their external details, and in turn, narrative self-continuity for the future. 
 
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
Autobiographical past and future narratives were re-analysed for 39 participants who had 
previously taken part in a study on episodic future thinking (Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a, 2012b), 
including 11 AD and 13 SD patients, and 15 healthy Controls. Further details of recruitment 
and neuropsychological assessment are contained within Chapter 2. In this study, ACE-R is 
employed as a measure of global cognition, along with more specific tests of verbal (ACE-R 
Address Recall subtest) and non-verbal episodic memory (RCF; Rey, 1941), language/semantic 
memory (ACE-R Fluency; Mioshi et al., 2006; and SYDBAT Naming and Comprehension 
subtests; Savage et al., 2013), and executive function (Trail Making Test Part B-A; Tombaugh, 
2004). 
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4.2.2. Procedure 
Participants completed a modified version of the Past-Future task (Addis et al., 2009; Addis 
et al., 2008). Participants were required to describe in detail specific, personally relevant 
events that had occurred within the past year (Past), or that might occur over the next year 
(Future). In order to ensure suitability of the task for the dementia patients, the trials were 
limited to three Past and three Future events, with each involving the presentation of a cue 
word accompanied by a visual image. Two separate lists of 3 cue words were randomly 
allocated to Past or Future trials for each participant. The order of temporal condition (i.e., 
completing either 3 Past or 3 Future trials first) and the order of cue words within each list, 
was also randomised. The event generated, however, did not strictly need to involve the cued 
object, which instead acted as a general prompt. Specific probes from the AI (Levine et al., 
2002) were provided throughout the interview to elicit event, time, place, perceptual, and 
emotion/thought details. As such, unlike the AI, the Past-Future task did not contain separate 
conditions for general recall and specific probing. 
 
All interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed. The narratives were initially scored 
using the original AI protocol, in which narratives are segmented into internal and external 
details (see Chapter 3; and Levine et al., 2002 for the full scoring protocol).  
 
4.2.3. NExt: New external details taxonomy 
The NExt taxonomy (Chapter 3) was used to re-classify the external details that were 
predominantly content-based across Past and Future contexts, that is, those external details 
initially classified as External Event or Semantic according to the original AI scoring protocol 
(Levine et al., 2002). Content-based external details were reclassified into one of four 
categories: Specific Episodes (SE), Extended Episodes (EE), Personal Semantics (PS), and 
General Semantics (GS). An excerpt from a future event generated by a healthy Control, 
scored using the NExt protocol, is provided in Appendix C (see Chapter 3 for the full protocol). 
The thesis author (CSB) scored all of the transcripts using the NExt taxonomy. Excellent inter-
rater reliability was established for this scoring system in Chapter 3. 
 
4.2.4. Statistical analyses 
Chapter 4 
 86 
The main variables of interest were as follows: Total Content details (i.e., internal and 
content-based external details combined), Internal details, content-based External details, as 
generated from the original AI scoring protocol, as well as the NExt protocol categories of SE, 
EE, PS, and GS. Detail scores were averaged across the three Past or three Future events. 
Consistent with the original AI protocol (Levine et al., 2002), and Chapter 3, the external detail 
subcategories (SE, EE, PS, GS) were adjusted for total narrative output, with Total content 
details included as a covariate in the analyses. Variables were all calculated separately for 
Past and Future narratives.  
 
Between-group differences on demographic and background neuropsychological tasks were 
examined using one-way ANOVAs with Sidak post hoc tests. The frequencies of dichotomous 
variables (i.e., sex) were compared using chi-squared tests (c2). To ensure consistency with 
Chapter 3, ANCOVAs and MANCOVAs using the robust Pillai’s trace multivariate statistic and 
Sidak post hoc tests were employed to compare groups on Past-Future task variables, 
adjusting for age. Effect sizes were calculated using partial-eta squared (η2) values. Finally, 
Spearman’s correlations were used to examine associations between NExt subcategories and 
neuropsychological variables of interest in the patient groups.  
 
4.2.5. Neuroimaging analysis   
Thirty participants (11 AD, 10 SD, 9 Controls) were included in the voxel-based morphometry 
(VBM) analysis. Full details of MRI acquisition and pre-processing are outlined in Chapter 2.  
 
For grey matter intensity, VBM analyses were employed using SPM12. Two-sample t-tests 
were employed to explore differences in grey matter intensity between groups, controlling 
for age and total intracranial volume. Next, correlation analyses with grey matter intensity 
were conducted for the NExt detail subtypes that were significantly elevated in patient groups 
compared with Controls, with age, total intracranial volume, and Total Content details 
entered as covariates of no interest. These analyses were conducted in the patient groups 
only (i.e., not including Controls). Positive t-contrasts were used, providing an index of 
association between higher grey matter intensity and greater external detail counts. Clusters 
were uncorrected at a threshold of p < .001, with a cluster extent threshold of 100 contiguous 
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voxels. This statistical approach takes into consideration the small sample size and balances 
the risk of Type I versus Type II errors (see Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009).   
 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Demographics and neuropsychological performance 
Participant demographics and neuropsychological performance are displayed in Table 4.1. 
Groups did not differ significantly for sex (p = .13), or education (p = .27), but Controls were 
significantly older than SD patients (p = .04). No significant difference between patient groups 
was apparent for disease severity (disease duration: p = .60), behavioural change (CBI: p = 
.41), or level of functional impairment (FTD-FRS: p = .33).   
 
AD and SD groups displayed characteristic cognitive profiles on standard neuropsychological 
tests (Table 4.1.). Briefly, relative to Controls, AD patients showed impairments in global 
cognitive functioning (ACE-R Total), fluency (ACE-R) and naming (SYDBAT), and verbal (ACE-R 
Address Recall) and non-verbal (RCF 3-minute recall) episodic memory, in the context of 
relatively intact semantic comprehension (SYDBAT), and executive function (TMT B minus A). 
SD patients displayed significant reductions in global cognitive functioning, fluency, naming, 
comprehension, and verbal episodic memory, in the context of relatively intact non-verbal 
episodic memory, and executive function.   
 
In keeping with their hallmark neuropsychological profiles, non-verbal episodic memory was 
disproportionately disrupted in AD compared with SD patients, while fluency, naming, and 
comprehension were disproportionately impaired in SD relative to AD. 
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Table 4.1. Demographics and clinical characteristics of the study cohort 
Variable AD SD Control F Group 
effect 
Post hoc 
test 
N 11 13 15    
Sex M/F 9/2 11/2 8/7 X2 = 4.13 ns ns 
Age (years) 64.64 
(6.10) 
63.00 
(5.31) 
69.27 
(7.10) 
3.78 .03 Controls 
> SD 
Education 
(years) 
11.59 
(3.63) 
12.69 
(3.36) 
13.65 
(2.56) 
1.35 ns ns 
Disease 
duration 
(months) 
56.09 
(29.19) 
61.92 
(24.20) 
- .29 ns  
CBI Total 
Frequency 
(180) 
44.82 
(25.96) 
61.25 
(38.72) 
4.55 (4.01) 12.79 < .001 Controls 
> AD & 
SD 
FTD-FRS Rasch 
Score 
1.32 
(1.06) 
.76 (1.56) - 1.00 ns  
ACE-R Total 
(100) 
65.09 
(21.58) 
57.15 
(14.30) 
93.00 
(3.76) 
35.67 < .001 Controls 
> AD & 
SD 
ACE-R Address 
Recall (7) 
1.27 
(1.62) 
1.23 
(1.92) 
5.67 (1.40) 33.14 < .001 Controls 
> AD & 
SD 
ACE-R Fluency 
(14) 
7.27 
(3.47) 
4.15 
(3.63) 
 11.73 
(1.83) 
22.56 < .001 Controls 
> AD & 
SD; AD > 
SD 
RCF 3-minute 
recall (36) 
5.78 
(5.83) 
14.81 
(5.95) 
16.47 
(7.07) 
9.94 < .001 Controls 
& SD > 
AD 
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Notes: Maximum test score depicted in brackets. Values represent means and standard 
deviations for each group.  
ACE-R = Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-Revised; AD = Alzheimer’s disease; CBI = 
Cambridge Behavioural Inventory; FTD-FRS = Frontotemporal Dementia Functional Rating 
Scale; ns = nonsignificant; RCF = Rey Complex Figure; SD = semantic dementia; SYDBAT = 
Sydney Language Battery.  
CBI not available for 1 SD patient and 4 Controls, FTD-FRS not available for 1 SD patient, RCF 
not available for 1 AD patient, SYDBAT Comprehension not available for 5 Controls, SYDBAT 
Naming not available for 4 Controls, Trail Making Test B-A not available for 1 SD and 5 AD 
patients.  
 
4.3.2. Overall performance on the Past-Future task: standard AI protocol 
Detailed analysis of Past-Future task performance using the standard scoring protocol is 
provided in Appendix C. Briefly, the current results reproduced previous findings (Irish, Addis, 
et al., 2012a, 2012b) with AD patients showing significantly reduced Internal details across 
Past and Future conditions relative to Controls, while SD patients displayed an asymmetric 
impairment of Future Internal details in the context of intact Past retrieval.  
 
4.3.3. Fine-grained analysis of external details for Past and Future events: NExt protocol 
Figure 4.1. displays the profiles of NExt external detail subcategories produced by each group 
for Past and Future events. For Past events, using Pillai’s trace, a significant main effect of 
group was found for the number of external details produced (V = .48, F(8, 64) = 2.54, p = .02, 
partial h2 = .24). Specifically, univariate ANCOVAs revealed a significant between-group effect 
SYDBAT 
Comprehension 
(30) 
23.91 
(5.13) 
15.54 
(5.39) 
28.20 
(1.81) 
30.08 < .001 Controls 
& AD > 
SD 
SYDBAT 
Naming (30) 
18.73 
(6.99) 
5.00 
(3.51) 
25.36 
(1.96) 
95.16 < .001 Controls 
> AD & 
SD; AD > 
SD 
Trail Making 
Test B-A 
88.00 
(50.49) 
43.97 
(70.92) 
51.00 
(24.33) 
2.32 ns  
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for GS (F(2, 34) = 5.06, p = .01, partial h2 = .23), reflecting increased provision of GS details in 
AD relative to Controls (p = .01). No main effect of group was apparent for SE, EE, or PS 
categories (SE: F(2, 34) = 1.90, p = .17, partial h2 = .10; EE: F(2, 34) = 1.33, p = .28, partial h2 = 
.07; PS: F(2, 34) = 2.97, p = .07, partial h2 = .15). No significant differences between the 
external detail subtypes produced by SD versus Controls, or between the two patient groups, 
emerged for Past events (all p values > .06).  
 
For Future events, Pillai’s trace revealed a significant effect of group for the number of 
external details produced (V = .67, F(8, 64) = 4.02, p = .001, partial h2 = .33). Looking at each 
NExt subcategory in turn, univariate ANCOVAs revealed significant group effects for SE (F(2, 
34) = 7.71, p = .002, partial h2 = .31), EE (F(2, 34) = 7.14, p = .003, partial h2 = .30), GS (F(2, 34) 
= 5.58, p = .008, partial h2 = .25) but not for PS (F(2, 34) = .56, p = .58, partial h2 = .03). Relative 
to Controls, AD and SD patients provided more SE details (p values = .009 and .002, 
respectively), while SD patients provided increased amounts of EE (p = .002) and GS (p = .008) 
details. Patient groups did not differ on the external detail subtypes produced for future 
events (all p values > .27).  
 
Figure 4.1. Breakdown of external details according to the NExt classification system for each 
group, for Past (left) and Future (right) events (estimated marginal means controlling for age 
and Total Content; error bars represent standard error of the mean). AD = Alzheimer’s 
disease; EE = Extended Episodes; GS = General Semantics, PS = Personal Semantics; SD = 
semantic dementia; SE = Specific Episodes. Asterisks denote significant difference from 
Control performance at *p < .05 and **p < .01. 
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4.3.4. Association between Future NExt external detail subtypes and episodic and semantic 
performance  
In order to examine the cognitive correlates of the Future NExt details, Spearman correlations 
were used to explore associations between the Future NExt subcategories that differed 
significantly between groups and neuropsychological measures of episodic and semantic 
memory. Correlations were performed using proportion scores (i.e. individual NExt scores 
divided by Total Content details) (Table 4.2.). In AD, future SE details were negatively 
correlated with episodic memory (RCF recall, r = -.67, p = .04), suggesting that poorer episodic 
retrieval was associated with greater provision of SE details. In SD, a negative correlation 
emerged between future EE and semantic memory (SYDBAT comprehension, r = -.71, p = 
.006), such that impairments in semantic processing related to increased provision of EE 
details.  
 
Table 4.2. Correlations between NExt details generated for Future events and scores on 
episodic and semantic memory measures for Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and semantic 
dementia (SD) patients 
 AD SD 
 Future Specific 
Episodes (SE) 
Future Specific 
Episodes (SE) 
Future Extended 
Episodes (EE) 
Future General 
Semantics (GS) 
Episodic 
memory 
    
RCF recall -.67* .22 .06 .05 
Semantic 
processing 
    
SYDBAT 
Comprehension  
-.15 .09 -.71** .33 
Notes: RCF = Rey Complex Figure; SYDBAT = Sydney Language Battery 
RCF missing for 1 AD patient 
Asterisks denote significance at *p < .05 and **p < .01. 
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4.3.5. Voxel-based morphometry analyses 
Group differences in grey matter intensity 
Regional reductions in grey matter intensity between groups are displayed in Figure 4.2. 
Compared with Controls, widespread atrophy was apparent in AD, encompassing bilateral 
medial and lateral temporal lobes, incorporating the hippocampi, as well as bilateral frontal 
and posterior brain regions including the PCC and inferior parietal lobule. By contrast, SD 
patients presented with significant atrophy to the ATLs bilaterally, with a left>right 
hemisphere predominance, extending into frontoinsular regions primarily on the left. Direct 
comparison of the patient groups demonstrated a greater burden of atrophy in the AD group 
in bilateral medial and lateral parietal lobes, and frontal regions including the superior and 
middle frontal gyri. The reverse contrast revealed greater atrophy in bilateral ATLS, including 
left anterior hippocampus, and the left cerebellum in SD relative to AD. These patterns of 
atrophy are consistent with previous reports in AD (Karas et al., 2004) and SD (Rosen et al., 
2002).  
 
 
Figure 4.2. Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analyses showing brain areas with decreased 
grey matter intensity in Alzheimer’s disease (AD; green), and in semantic dementia (SD; 
yellow), compared with Controls. Coloured voxels emerged as significant in the analyses at p 
< .001 uncorrected with a cluster extent threshold of 100 contiguous voxels. Clusters are 
overlaid on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard brain. L = Left; R = Right. 
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Neural correlates of NExt subtypes 
For the neuroimaging correlation analysis, focus was constrained to those NExt detail 
subcategories in which significant elevations were evident in the patient groups relative to 
Controls during future simulation, namely SE details in AD patients, and SE, EE, and GS details 
in the SD group (Figure 4.3. and Table 4.3.). In AD, higher levels of SE details related to 
integrity of bilateral anterior frontal regions including the ventromedial, orbitofrontal, and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortices and precentral gyri, along with the left posterior middle 
temporal gyrus. By contrast, in SD, increased SE details correlated with integrity of right 
occipital cortex and cerebellum, left precuneus, and left-lateralised posterior frontal regions 
including superior and middle frontal gyri and supplementary motor cortex. Furthermore, in 
SD, increased EE details were associated with grey matter intensity in left supramarginal and 
angular gyri, while increased GS details correlated with integrity of right supramarginal and 
postcentral gyri.  
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Figure 4.3. Voxel based morphometry (VBM) covariate analyses showing brain areas in which 
grey matter intensity positively correlates with NExt detail types in future thinking narratives 
for Alzheimer’s disease (AD; green) and semantic dementia (SD; yellow) participants. A) 
Positive correlation between grey matter intensity and the provision of Future Specific Events 
(SE) in Alzheimer’s disease. B) Positive correlation between grey matter intensity and the 
provision of Future Specific Events (SE) in semantic dementia. C) Positive correlation between 
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grey matter intensity and the provision of Future Extended Events (EE) in semantic dementia. 
D) Positive correlation between grey matter intensity and the provision of Future General 
Semantics (GS) in semantic dementia. All coloured voxels emerged as significant in the 
analyses at p < .001 uncorrected with a cluster extent threshold of 100 contiguous voxels. 
Clusters are overlaid on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard brain. L = left; R 
= right. 
 
Table 4.3. Voxel-based morphometry results showing regions of significant grey matter 
intensity increase that covary with increased provision of NExt external subtypes during 
future simulation 
 
Contrast Regions Side Number of 
voxels 
MNI coordinates t-value 
    x y z  
AD        
Specific 
Episodes 
Precentral gyrus, superior frontal 
gyrus, middle frontal gyrus 
R 1,016 31 -16 64 14.72 
 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, middle 
frontal gyrus 
L 332 -50 24 36 11.43 
 Precentral gyrus R 269 14 -23 64 12.85 
 Ventromedial prefrontal cortex B 253 2 50 -31 8.12 
 Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, middle 
frontal gyrus 
R 227 48 21 32 34.23 
 Superior frontal gyrus, orbitofrontal 
cortex 
R 115 28 66 -7 8.20 
 Posterior middle temporal gyrus L 114 -53 -70 17 9.04 
 Precentral gyrus L 112 -30 -18 58 12.42 
 Orbitofrontal cortex R 107 23 42 -28 8.07 
        
SD        
Specific 
Episodes 
Superior frontal gyrus, middle frontal 
gyrus 
L 485 -22 7 58 17.02 
 Supplementary motor area, medial 
frontal gyrus, superior frontal gyrus 
L 200 -7 -8 67 10.31 
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 Occipital cortex, posterior fusiform 
gyrus, lingual gyrus, cerebellum 
R 123 43 -80 -22 19.31 
 Precuneus L 112 -14 -41 64 8.46 
        
Extended 
Episodes 
Supramarginal gyrus L 289 -50 -14 11 9.32 
 Angular gyrus L 165 -45 -61 49 17.04 
        
General 
Semantics 
Postcentral gyrus, supramarginal gyrus R 110 63 -18 15 16.58 
Notes: All clusters reported uncorrected using a strict threshold of p < .001 and cluster extent 
threshold of 100 contiguous voxels. Age, total intracranial volume, and Total Content details 
are included as covariates in all analyses. AD = Alzheimer’s disease; B = Bilateral; L = left; MNI 
= Montreal Neurological Institute; R = right; SD = semantic dementia. 
 
4.4. Discussion 
This study aimed to explore the ‘external’ component of episodic future thinking narratives 
in order to elucidate the neurocognitive processes underlying narrative self-continuity into 
the future. Employing the NExt taxonomy, distinct profiles of external details within narratives 
of Past and Future events were uncovered in AD and SD, neurodegenerative disorders 
characterised by differential disruption of the episodic and semantic memory systems, 
respectively. These profiles appeared to be mediated by divergent cognitive and neural 
mechanisms for each group. This fine-grained analysis of the external content of future 
narratives reveals important insights into episodic and semantic contributions to narrative 
continuity of the self into the future. 
 
4.4.1. External detail profiles in AD 
The NExt taxonomy revealed distinct profiles of external details for Past and Future narratives 
in each clinical group, compared with Controls. Firstly, AD patients provided a significantly 
greater amount of General Semantic details when narrating events from the recent past, 
relative to Control participants. The elevation of GS details for past narratives in AD is in line 
with study hypotheses, and consistent with previous observations of preserved semantic 
ABM in these patients (Chapters 1 and 3). Indeed, findings from both the current study and 
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Chapter 3 suggest some semblance of narrative continuity is maintained for the recent past 
in AD. The precise nature of the external details provided by these patients during recent 
narration does, however, diverge between the studies, with elevations in Extended Episodes 
versus General Semantics uncovered in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. Several 
methodological differences exist between the AI and Past-Future task that may account for 
these discrepancies. For example, the Past-Future task used here requires narratives of three, 
rather than one, event, in response to specific cue words, with more directed probing. Under 
these more demanding and constrained task conditions, AD patients may have difficulty 
retrieving more specific or personally-relevant details, and therefore default to providing 
generic semantic information. On the other hand, the one event and more general probing 
on the AI likely permits the retrieval of past experiences that remain easily accessible, albeit 
lacking in spatial and/or temporal specificity (i.e., Extended Episode details). These findings 
reinforce the importance of considering the nature of the assessment tool when attempting 
to characterise the processes underlying the extended self.  
 
In the future condition, Specific Episodes, reflecting descriptions of events that are separate 
from the main future episode, were elevated in AD. The elevation of seemingly episodic 
details in a disorder typified by episodic memory loss is initially surprising. Upon closer 
inspection, however, it was apparent that many of the Specific Episodes described by AD 
patients when narrating the future referred to self-relevant, often emotionally salient, events 
from their past, that they were ‘re-casting’ into the future (e.g., an important sporting match 
or family gathering). It is possible, therefore, that these descriptions of significant life events 
had been repeatedly rehearsed by the AD patients (see also Bright & Kopelman, 2004), 
whereby the essential information has been abstracted to form a schematised account. This 
observation is further supported by the strong negative correlation between these Specific 
Episode external details within future narratives, and episodic memory in AD, suggesting that 
the elevation in this detail type may reflect preserved semantic, rather than episodic, 
processes, at least in the AD group. Moreover, neuroimaging analyses revealed associations 
between future SE details in AD and the integrity of predominantly frontal regions, previously 
implicated in semantic, schematic processing (Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017; Sheldon, Farb, 
Palombo, & Levine, 2016), as well as emotional and self-relevance (Kumfor, Irish, Hodges, & 
Piguet, 2013; Lin, Horner, & Burgess, 2016), including ventromedial prefrontal cortex, 
Chapter 4 
 98 
orbitofrontal cortex, and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Importantly, the regions emerging 
from the present analysis were distinct from those displaying significant atrophy in AD 
patients compared with Controls, suggesting that the relative preservation of specific anterior 
cortical regions in AD (including both DMN and extra-DMN areas) may allow for the 
harnessing of semanticised past memories when attempting to imagine the future, at least in 
early stages of the disease. As such, some degree of narrative continuity for the future 
appears to be present in AD, however, this is likely based upon preserved semantic 
representations of the past. Accordingly, the future self in AD may be lacking in the growth 
or change over time that forms a key element of the extended self (Locke, 1690; Ricoeur, 
2010).  
  
4.4.2. External detail profiles in SD 
Turning attention to the findings in SD, no external detail types were elevated in these 
patients, compared with the other groups, during narration of recent events. This likely 
reflects the preserved episodic (internal) details for past events in SD, with no requirement 
for the compensatory provision of additional information. External detail profiles for recent 
events in SD diverged between the current study and that using the AI across the entire 
lifespan (Chapter 3), though as discussed above, this may be explained by methodological 
differences between the two tasks. In particular, the highly structured administration of the 
Past-Future task, involving the presentation of cue words and probing for specific details, may 
have reduced the tendency of SD patients to provide additional background information, as 
opposed to the more open-ended AI (resulting in increased General Semantic details for 
recent events). The increased structure of the Past-Future task may therefore have reduced 
the demands on executive function, with deficits in retrieval control and monitoring in SD 
proposed to contribute to the elevated external details on the AI in these patients (McKinnon 
et al., 2008). Notably, the pattern in SD contrasts from that seen in AD, whereby the task 
conditions of the Past-Future task lead to an increase in semantic details. The key difference 
between these groups, however, is the profile of internal details, with AD patients likely 
attempting to compensate for their impoverished internal details with semantic content. 
Taken together, these discrepancies highlight the need for future studies directly examining 
the effect of task requirements on the mechanisms underpinning narrative continuity, and 
how this may diverge across different patient groups.  
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Only one previous study has explored the nature of external details provided during future 
thinking narratives in SD, revealing striking elevations of External Event details using the 
traditional AI scoring method (Irish, Addis, et al., 2012b). The application of the sensitive NExt 
taxonomy, however, suggests that this inflation of External Event details in SD is driven by the 
increased provision of Specific Episodes, Extended Episodes, and General Semantic details 
compared with Controls. Consistent with findings in Chapter 3, the provision of future 
Extended Episodes in SD was negatively correlated with semantic memory performance, 
suggesting that these detail types (lying at an intermediate point on the episodic-semantic 
continuum) are more likely to reflect episodic, rather than semantic, processes in SD. In 
addition, taken together with Chapter 3, the present findings indicate that with increasing 
semantic impairment, the narratives of SD patients are more heavily weighted towards 
relative intact episodic representations, for both past and future epochs. Previous studies in 
SD have observed these patients to recapitulate previously experienced events into the 
future, describing these familiar events again in their entirety rather than generating a new 
scenario (Irish, 2016; Irish, Addis, et al., 2012a, 2012b). The current findings of elevations in 
both Specific and Extended Episode external details indicate that these recast events in SD 
likely comprise a combination of one-off (e.g., a specific concert) and repeated past occasions 
(e.g., regular family dinners). Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 3, while the elevation in 
General Semantic details in SD may appear counterintuitive, these details can be intrinsically 
bound to event representations (Greenberg & Verfaellie, 2010; Tulving, 1972), with their 
production within future narratives potentially reflecting episodic-like processes. The 
suggestion that the external details provided by SD patients during future simulation (i.e., 
Specific Episode, Extended Episode, and General Semantic details) reflect intact episodic 
processing is supported on the neural level, with the integrity of posterior DMN regions, 
typically implicated in vivid episodic recall (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Gardini, Cornoldi, De 
Beni, & Venneri, 2006; Ramanan et al., 2018), associated with all of these detail types in our 
study. Thus, while both AD and SD patients produce an excess of Specific Episode external 
details within their future narratives, and seemingly share a ‘static’ future self, the 
mechanisms (semantic versus episodic) underlying narrative self-continuity for the future 
may diverge between the groups, dependent upon their relative profiles of memory 
impairment.  
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4.4.3. Conclusions 
Here, the NExt taxonomy reveals that, as for the past, the future narratives of AD and SD 
patients also contain a spectrum of episodic and semantic content. These findings provide 
further evidence that external details represent a rich source of information regarding the 
processes underlying narrative continuity. Importantly, patient groups may preferentially rely 
upon the brain regions that remain relatively preserved in the disease, in order to imagine 
their personal future. The synergistic importance of the findings from Part 1 of the thesis 
(Chapters 3 and 4) for elucidating the neurocognitive mechanisms of the extended self will be 
discussed further in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 5 
Cognitive and neural mechanism of moral reasoning 
5.1. Introduction 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, morality forms a crucial facet of the interpersonal self, though its 
cognitive and neural mechanisms remain incompletely characterised. Namely, much of the 
understanding of the emotional contributions to personal moral reasoning is inferred from 
the implication of ‘emotional’ brain regions in lesion and neuroimaging studies, rather than 
experimental examination. In addition, despite early work on moral development revealing 
the importance of social rule understanding, the contribution of social conceptual knowledge 
to moral reasoning in adults has received comparatively less attention. This is likely due to 
the preponderance of studies examining moral reasoning in individuals with lesions to the 
mPFC (Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007; Taber-Thomas et al., 2014; Thomas, Croft, 
& Tranel, 2011). While such a focus has offered valuable insights into the necessity of the 
mPFC for personal moral decisions, the broader contributions of this research to the 
characterisation of the neurocognitive mechanisms of morality has remained limited.  
 
The syndrome of bvFTD provides an ideal opportunity to extend current knowledge about the 
neural and cognitive processes supporting personal moral reasoning. In addition to 
demonstrating gross moral transgressions in daily life (see Chapter 1), these patients display 
impairments in both emotional and conceptual processes, which includes knowledge of 
socially acceptable behaviour (Carr et al., 2015; Panchal et al., 2016; Possin et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 1, bvFTD results in the systematic degeneration of 
whole brain networks specialised for socioemotional processing. As such, this syndrome 
allows for the examination of the contributions of emotional and conceptual processes to 
personal moral reasoning, and the corresponding large-scale neural networks involved.  
 
Consistent with the trend in the field, the majority of studies examining personal moral 
reasoning in bvFTD have placed particular emphasis on emotional contributions. These 
studies have predominantly employed versions of the original moral reasoning paradigm 
developed by J. D. Greene et al. (2001), which distinguishes between personal and impersonal 
Chapter 5 
 102 
moral dilemmas. On this task, bvFTD patients provide increased amounts of utilitarian 
responses to personal, but not impersonal, dilemmas, compared with healthy controls 
(Chiong et al., 2013; Fong et al., 2017; Mendez, Anderson, et al., 2005; Mendez & Shapira, 
2009; Van den Stock et al., 2017), interpreted as reflecting impaired emotion processing. 
Further support for this notion stems from the reduced emotional responses reported by 
bvFTD patients toward their moral decisions on both personal (footbridge) and impersonal 
(trolley) dilemmas (Fong et al., 2017). Decreased autonomic arousal, as revealed by reduced 
skin conductance, was also observed in bvFTD during a personal moral dilemma (Fong et al., 
2017). Moreover, utilitarian responses to personal moral dilemmas in bvFTD correlated with 
poor performance on a separate measure of facial emotion recognition, but affective 
responses toward the actual decision were not collected in this study (Van den Stock et al., 
2017). 
 
By contrast, only one study has examined the role of conceptual knowledge in moral 
reasoning in bvFTD. Employing one personal (footbridge) and one impersonal (trolley) 
dilemma, Fong et al. (2017) reported a correlation between self-reported emotional 
responses toward the moral dilemmas, and knowledge of socially acceptable behaviour in 
bvFTD, such that poorer knowledge of social norms was associated with a more positive (i.e., 
abnormal) affective reaction toward both the personal and impersonal dilemmas. The 
interpretation of this finding, however, is limited by the small number of dilemmas employed 
(i.e., only one dilemma of each type), and the failure to distinguish between low- and high-
conflict personal moral dilemmas (see Chapter 1). In fact, only one study in bvFTD to date has 
employed this more sensitive distinction (high-/low-conflict), originally proposed by Koenigs 
et al. (2007). Interestingly, unlike the patterns revealed in other lesion groups (Koenigs et al., 
2007; McCormick et al., 2016), Van den Stock et al. (2017) uncovered an elevation in 
utilitarian decisions for low-, but not high-conflict, personal dilemmas in bvFTD. This finding, 
though, was interpreted in terms of emotional contributions to personal moral reasoning, 
with the relevance of other socio-cognitive processes for low- versus high-conflict personal 
moral dilemmas yet to be explored.  
 
Turning to the neuroimaging findings, structural and functional changes to frontal brain 
regions, including mPFC and insula, have been implicated in the abnormal responses to 
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personal moral dilemmas in bvFTD (Chiong et al., 2013; Van den Stock et al., 2017), 
particularly in the right hemisphere (Mendez & Shapira, 2009). In healthy individuals, the 
‘salience network’, centered on the insula and ACC, is purported to identify the personal 
relevance of moral dilemmas, and subsequently recruit the DMN for their processing (Chiong 
et al., 2013). Such recruitment of the DMN in response to personal moral dilemmas is 
diminished in bvFTD (Chiong et al., 2013), likely due to the salience network aberrations in 
this disorder (Zhou et al., 2010). Finally, utilitarian responses to both personal and impersonal 
moral dilemmas were associated with reduced perfusion/metabolism to bilateral ATLs in one 
study in bvFTD (Mendez & Shapira, 2009), though a mechanistic account for this involvement 
was not examined.  
 
This study aimed to address the methodological limitations of previous studies in order to 
comprehensively characterise the differential contributions of emotional and conceptual 
processes to personal moral reasoning in bvFTD, and their underlying brain networks. 
Specifically, a sensitive paradigm distinguishing between high- and low-conflict personal 
moral dilemmas was employed (Koenigs et al., 2007), along with ratings of emotional 
responses to the moral decisions, and a measure of social conceptual knowledge. 
Furthermore, advanced neuroimaging analyses were performed to examine the grey and 
white matter correlates of moral reasoning performance. In doing so, the current study aimed 
to help to further the understanding of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying this crucial 
aspect of the interpersonal self. It was predicted that both emotional and conceptual 
functioning would relate to moral reasoning performance in bvFTD patients, which would be 
associated with integrity of the brain regions supporting these component processes (i.e., 
affective and salience networks, ATLs).  
 
5.2. Method 
5.2.1. Participants 
Twenty-seven bvFTD patients and 22 healthy Control participants were recruited for this 
study. Details of recruitment procedures and neuropsychological assessment are outlined in 
Chapter 2. One of the bvFTD patients was excluded due to invalid responses on the Moral 
Reasoning task, leaving a final sample of 26. In this study, performance on the ACE-III is 
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reported as a measure of overall cognitive functioning, as well as additional tests of verbal 
attention and working memory (Digit Span Forward and Backward Maximum Span; Wechsler, 
1997), verbal episodic memory (Rey Auditory Verbal Learning Test Delayed Recall; Schmidt, 
1996), and executive function (Trail Making Test Part B-A; Tombaugh, 2004).  
 
5.2.2. Moral reasoning task 
Participants completed a moral reasoning task, adapted from Koenigs et al. (2007). Of the 
original 50 hypothetical scenarios, a subset of 14 were chosen for the current study. This 
reduced task length was chosen to accommodate the cognitive abilities of bvFTD patients. 
 
The 14 scenarios fell into four categories. Neutral scenarios (n = 4) were practical dilemmas 
without a moral component (e.g., choosing whether to buy a new DVD player, or have your 
old one fixed, for the same price). These scenarios acted as a control condition to ensure 
appropriate task understanding and compliance. Impersonal moral dilemmas (n = 4) required 
a choice whether to sacrifice the life of one person in order to save multiple lives, via the 
deflection of an existing threat (e.g., the traditional ‘trolley problem’, whereby flicking a 
switch would divert a runaway train from the track with five people on it, to a track with one 
person; n = 2), or involved morally conflictual scenarios that did not require the infliction of 
direct personal harm (e.g., choosing whether to commit tax fraud; n = 2). Personal moral 
dilemmas, requiring a choice to personally harm somebody in order to save multiple lives, 
were divided into High (n = 4) and Low (n = 2) Conflict scenarios. While Personal Low Conflict 
moral dilemmas involve rather inexcusable actions, which are often rejected by healthy 
individuals (e.g., committing cannibalism to save oneself and others), Personal High Conflict 
moral dilemmas (e.g., killing a fellow hostage so that oneself and others may escape from 
terrorists) are more divisive in control participants (Koenigs et al., 2007). Scenarios in each 
category were selected at random from the larger Koenigs et al. (2007) database. The full text 
of all scenarios is provided in Appendix D. 
 
Where necessary, phrasing of the scenarios was modified from the original task for cultural 
appropriateness (e.g., exchanging ‘watchman’ for ‘security guard’). Scenarios were presented 
in pseudorandomised order in text format on a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation, and 
concurrently read aloud by the examiner.  
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Each of the 14 dilemmas, along with one practice dilemma, consisted of five slides. An 
example five-slide trial for a Personal High Conflict moral dilemma is depicted in Figure 5.1. 
The first slide displayed the scenario, ending with a yes/no question about the hypothetical 
action (“Would you … in order to …?”). No time limit was set, though if a response was not 
provided within approximately 15 seconds of the examiner reading the scenario, generic 
prompting was provided (e.g., re-reading of the question). Responses were classed as either 
Utilitarian (i.e., the maximising of aggregate welfare) or Deontological (i.e., a refusal to do 
harm). The percentage of Utilitarian decisions was calculated for each moral dilemma type 
(i.e., Impersonal, Personal Low Conflict, Personal High Conflict), for use in analysis.  
 
In order to explore the mechanisms underlying moral decision making, the next four slides 
contained a series of follow-up questions regarding the decision-making process. Participants 
were required to rate “How sure are you about this decision?” (on a scale of ‘Extremely 
Unsure’ (1) to ‘Extremely Sure’ (5)), “How do you feel about your decision?” (on a scale of 
‘Extremely Bad’ (1) to ‘Extremely Good’ (5)) and “How vividly did you picture this scenario in 
your mind’s eye?” (on a scale of ‘Not Vividly at All (1) to ‘Extremely Vividly’ (5)). The average 
certainty, feeling, and vividness ratings were calculated for each of the moral dilemma types.  
 
Finally, in an attempt to qualitatively capture the moral decision-making process, for every 
trial participants were asked the open-ended question: “How did you make your decision?”. 
During the practice trial at the beginning of the task, example responses to this question were 
provided (e.g., picturing the scene in the ‘mind’s eye’; emotions/gut reaction; knowledge of 
right/wrong; future consequences/outcome). In the main task, however, participants were 
encouraged to respond using their own words19. If the response was unclear, generic prompts 
were provided (e.g., “Can you tell me anything else about how you made your decision?”). 
Responses were later classed into either emotional (i.e., based on emotional reactions, or 
personal/societal beliefs about right and wrong) or rational (i.e., considering the outcome, or 
picturing the scene), consistent with McCormick et al. (2016). A proportion of emotional 
 
19 For the first 10 participants that were tested, individuals were required to choose from one of the example 
options (or the ‘other’ category) during the main task, in order to explain their decision-making process. The 
methodology was altered after observing that participants’ responses did not always fit cleanly into one of the 
provided categories, and it was thought that an open-ended question would provide a broader and more 
accurate reflection of the decision-making process. 
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reasons was then calculated for each dilemma type, by dividing the number of emotional 
responses by the number of dilemmas.  
The entire task lasted approximately 30-45 minutes.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Example of a five-slide trial for a personal high-conflict moral dilemma.  
 
5.2.3. Social norms questionnaire 
To explore the effect of social conceptual knowledge on moral decision making, the Social 
Norms Questionnaire (SNQ; Possin et al., 2013) was administered. The SNQ measures the 
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ability to identify socially appropriate and inappropriate behaviours. For each of the 22 items, 
participants are required to respond yes or no as to whether a hypothetical behaviour would 
be considered socially appropriate in mainstream local culture. To ensure cultural 
appropriateness, slight modifications were made to the phrasing of the original version (e.g., 
switching ‘sidewalk’ for ‘footpath’). Total number of errors were calculated, with higher 
values reflecting poorer social knowledge. Separate scores were also obtained for errors on 
the ‘Break Norms’ (rating socially unacceptable behaviours as acceptable, e.g., telling a 
stranger you don’t like their hairstyle), and ‘Overadherence’ (rating socially acceptable 
behaviours as unacceptable, e.g., telling a stranger you like their hairstyle) subscales.  
 
5.2.4. Statistical analyses 
Independent samples t-tests were employed to assess group differences on demographic 
measures and neuropsychological tasks. The frequencies of dichotomous variables (i.e., sex) 
were compared using chi-squared tests (c2). Given significant differences in Years of 
Education between bvFTD and Controls, repeated measures ANCOVAs with Sidak post hoc 
tests were used to investigate main effects of group (bvFTD, Control) and dilemma type 
(Impersonal, Personal Low-Conflict, Personal High-Conflict), and their interaction, on the 
percentage of Utilitarian responses provided, controlling for education. For the subjective 
ratings, non-parametric Mann Whitney U tests were run to examine group differences in 
average Certainty, Feeling and Vividness ratings. Univariate ANCOVA was used to investigate 
between-group differences in the proportion of emotional reasons given for the decisions. 
For the SNQ, a repeated-measures ANCOVA, with Sidak post hoc tests, was employed to 
explore main effects of group and error type (Rule Break, Overadhere), and their interaction, 
controlling for education. Finally, Spearman’s correlations were employed to examine the 
relationship between moral reasoning and SNQ. The significance level was set at p < .05 for 
all analyses, and effect sizes were calculated using partial eta-squared (h2) for parametric 
analyses and eta-squared (h2) for nonparametric analyses.  
  
5.2.5. Neuroimaging analysis 
Voxel-based morphometry 
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Forty-five participants (22 Controls, 23 bvFTD) were included in the voxel-based 
morphometry (VBM) analysis. Full details of MRI acquisition and pre-processing are outlined 
in Chapter 2. 
 
For analyses of grey matter intensity, permutation-based non-parametric testing was 
employed using unbiased whole-brain General Linear Models (GLM) in FSL, with 5000 
permutations per contrast (Nichols & Holmes, 2002). Differences in grey matter intensity 
between bvFTD and Controls were assessed using t-tests, including age and education as 
covariates of no interest. Significant clusters were extracted using the threshold-free cluster 
enhancement (TFCE) method at a strict threshold of p < .005, corrected for multiple 
comparisons via familywise error (FWE) correction, with a cluster extent cut-off of 200 
contiguous voxels.  
 
Next, correlations between the moral reasoning variables that significantly differed between 
bvFTD and Controls (i.e., feeling rating for Personal High Conflict dilemmas) and grey matter 
intensity were investigated. For this analysis, a negative contrast was employed, providing an 
index of association between higher (i.e., more positive/more abnormal) feeling ratings and 
decreased grey matter intensity. Consistent with previous studies, these correlation analyses 
were performed on bvFTD patients combined with Controls, in order to provide greater 
variance in behaviour scores, and therefore increase the statistical power to detect brain-
behaviour relationships (Sollberger et al., 2009). Age and education were included as 
covariates of no interest. Significant clusters were extracted using the TFCE method at a 
threshold of p < .01, FWE corrected, with a cluster extent cut-off of 200 contiguous voxels. 
Given the widespread neural networks that may be involved in social and affective 
functioning (Chapter 1), the statistical approach for the correlation analysis was more lenient 
than that employed for the between-group analysis, in order to increase the likelihood of 
detecting meaningful associations with behaviour. 
 
Together, the statistical approaches for these neuroimaging analyses take into consideration 
the relatively large sample size and balance the risk of Type I versus Type II errors (see 
Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009).  
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Significant results were overlaid on the MNI standard brain, with maximum co-ordinates 
provided in MNI stereotaxic space. Anatomical labels were determined with reference to the 
Harvard-Oxford probabilistic cortical and subcortical atlases.  
 
Diffusion tensor imaging 
Diffusion-weighted MRI data were available for 40 participants (22 bvFTD; 19 Controls). Full 
details of acquisition and pre-processing are provided in Chapter 2.  
 
Diffusion tensor imaging analyses were conducted to examine whole-brain changes in white 
matter microstructure (i.e., fractional anisotropy; FA). FA values were compared between 
groups using permutation-based non-parametric testing in FSL as outlined for the VBM 
analysis (above). Age and education were included as nuisance variables in this analysis. 
Significant clusters were extracted using the TFCE method and corrected for FWE at p < .05. 
The Johns Hopkins University probabilistic white matter atlas and the ICBM-DTI-WM atlas 
were used to determine anatomical labels.  
 
Masks of selected white matter tracts of interest, namely the uncinate fasciculus and inferior 
longitudinal fasciculus, were created from the Johns Hopkins University probabilistic white 
matter atlas. Correlations between FA values of these tracts, extracted for each participant, 
and moral reasoning performance (i.e., feeling rating for Personal High Conflict moral 
dilemmas) were examined in the bvFTD group using one-way Spearman’s correlations. 
 
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Demographics and neuropsychological performance  
Participant demographics and cognitive performance are displayed in Table 5.1. Groups did 
not significantly differ in age (p = .88) or sex (p = .10), but Controls were more educated than 
bvFTD patients (p = .009).  
 
In keeping with their characteristic clinical profile, bvFTD patients showed impairments in 
behaviour (CBI), global cognitive functioning (ACE-III Total), attention (Digit Span Forward) 
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verbal episodic memory (RAVLT Delayed Recall), and executive function (Trails B-A). By 
contrast, verbal working memory (Digit Span Backwards) was relatively preserved.  
 
Table 5.1. Demographics and clinical characteristics of the study cohort 
Variable bvFTD Control t value p value 
N 26 22   
Age 62.96 (8.27) 63.32 (7.20) .16 ns 
Sex (M/F) 21/5 13/9 X2 = 2.71 ns 
Education 
(Years) 
12.28 (3.12) 14.77 (3.09) 2.73 .009 
Disease 
duration 
(Months) 
81.36 (60.26) n/a n/a n/a 
CBI Total 
Frequency (180) 
66.28 (35.67) 8.71 (7.11) -7.26 < .001 
FTD-FRS Rasch 
Score 
-.96 (1.53) n/a n/a n/a 
ACE-III Total 
(100) 
80.35 (10.84) 94.82 (3.74) 5.96 < .001 
Digit Span 
Forwards 
Maximum Span 
(9) 
6.15 (1.52) 7.36 (1.50) 2.77 .008 
Digit Span 
Backwards 
Maximum Span 
(8) 
4.46 (1.42) 5.18 (1.33) 1.80 ns 
RAVLT 30-
minute Recall 
(15) 
5.08 (4.05) 10.10 (2.21) 5.07 < .001 
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Trail Making 
Test Part B-A 
89.86 (104.18) 42.67 (17.63) -2.05 .048 
Notes: Maximum test score depicted in brackets. Values represent means and standard 
deviations for each group.  
ACE-III = Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-III; CBI = Cambridge Behavioural Inventory; 
FTD-FRS = Frontotemporal Dementia Functional Rating Scale; ns = nonsignificant; RAVLT = Rey 
Auditory Verbal Learning Test. 
Years of Education missing for 1 Control, Disease duration missing for 2 bvFTD patients, CBI 
Missing for 1 bvFTD patient and 1 Control, RAVLT missing for 1 bvFTD patient and 1 Control, 
Trail Making Test missing for 4 bvFTD and 1 Control. 
 
5.3.2. Moral reasoning task performance 
The majority of participants responded appropriately (i.e., provided the most logical 
response) to all Neutral dilemmas, confirming their understanding of the task and basic 
decision-making ability. Three Controls and one bvFTD patient responded counterintuitively 
to one out of four of the neutral scenarios, however their verbal explanations for these 
decisions indicated that these participants had nonetheless understood the dilemma (e.g., 
responding that they would rather save 15 minutes off a car trip than take the beautiful scenic 
route).  
 
Figure 5.2. displays the average percentage of Utilitarian responses provided by bvFTD and 
Controls for each moral dilemma type. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated for the main effect of dilemma type (c2(2) = 10.23, p = .006). 
Degrees of freedom were therefore corrected for this variable using Huynh-Feldt estimates 
of sphericity (ε = .89).  
 
A significant main effect of dilemma type emerged (F(1.79, 80.47) = 3.84, p = .03, partial h2 = 
.08), such that participants provided a greater percentage of Utilitarian responses for 
Impersonal moral dilemmas compared with Personal Low- and High Conflict dilemmas (p < 
.001 and .02, respectively). A higher percentage of Utilitarian responses was also observed 
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for Personal High- compared to Low-Conflict dilemmas (p < .001). This pattern of results is 
consistent with previous findings (Koenigs et al., 2007), confirming validity of the current task. 
 
By contrast, no significant main effect of group (F(1, 45) = 1.02, p = .32, partial h2 = .08), or 
interaction between group and dilemma type (F(1.79, 80.47) = .73, p = .47, partial h2 = .08), 
on the responses to the moral dilemmas was observed (Figure 5.2.).   
 
 
Figure 5.2. Violin plots representing the average percentage of Utilitarian responses provided 
by each group on each of the moral dilemma types. bvFTD = behavioural variant 
frontotemporal dementia. 
 
Given the particular variability in responses to Personal High Conflict dilemmas across both 
groups (Figure 5.2.), and previous findings that these dilemmas differentiate between lesion 
patients and controls (Koenigs et al., 2007; McCormick et al., 2016), further analyses were 
conducted on the follow-up questions to Personal High Conflict dilemmas. No significant 
difference between groups was apparent for certainty (Mann Whitney U = 226.00, exact two-
sided p = .22, h2 = .03) or vividness ratings (Mann Whitney U = 247.50, exact two-sided p = 
.42, h2 = .01). A significant between-group effect emerged, however, for feeling ratings (Mann 
Whitney U = 166.50, exact two-sided p = .01, h2 = .13), such that bvFTD patients reported 
feeling better about their decisions on Personal High Conflict moral dilemmas than Controls 
(Figure 5.3.).  
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Figure 5.3. Violin plots representing the average certainty, vividness, and feeling ratings for 
the Personal High Conflict moral decisions provided by each group. bvFTD = behavioural 
variant frontotemporal dementia. Asterisk denotes significant difference between groups at 
*p < .05. 
 
Finally, no significant differences were found between the groups in the reasons given for 
their moral decisions, with both groups providing relatively equal proportions of emotional 
(versus rational) reasons for their decisions on the Personal High Conflict moral dilemmas 
(bvFTD: M= .47, SD = .33: Control: M = .50, SD = .24) (F(1, 45) = .11, p = .75, partial h2 = .002). 
 
5.3.3. Social norms questionnaire (SNQ) 
For the SNQ, a main effect of group emerged, such that bvFTD patients made more errors in 
social norm judgment, compared with Controls (F(1, 45) = 6.63, p = .01, partial h2 = .13) (Figure 
5.4.). By contrast, no main effect of error type (Rule Break, Overadhere) was observed (F(1, 
45) = 2.87, p = .10, partial h2 = .06), nor a significant interaction between group and error type 
(F(1, 45) = .16, p = .69, partial h2 = .004), suggesting the impairment in social conceptual 
knowledge in bvFTD was not specific to, or driven by, either error type. 
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Figure 5.4. Violin plots representing (from left to right) Total errors, Rule Break errors, and 
Overadherence errors on the Social Norms Questionnaire. bvFTD = behavioural variant 
frontotemporal dementia, SNQ = Social Norms Questionnaire. Asterisks denote significant 
difference between groups at *p < .05. 
 
5.3.4. Correlations between emotional response to Personal High Conflict moral dilemmas 
and social conceptual knowledge 
To examine the contribution of social conceptual knowledge to personal moral reasoning, the 
relationship between feeling ratings toward Personal High-Conflict moral dilemmas and 
performance on the SNQ was examined in the bvFTD group using Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient. A significant negative correlation emerged, such that poorer social conceptual 
knowledge related to a reduced emotional response following Personal High-Conflict moral 
decisions (r = -.43, p = .03).  
 
5.3.5. Voxel-based morphometry analyses 
Group differences in grey matter intensity 
VBM analyses revealed a characteristic pattern of grey matter atrophy in the bvFTD group. 
Briefly, compared with Controls, bvFTD patients displayed reduced grey matter intensity in 
predominantly frontal and temporal lobes, including frontal pole, OFC, medial and lateral 
prefrontal cortex, extending into bilateral ATLs and MTLs and subcortical regions (e.g., basal 
ganglia, amygdala) (Figure 5.5.). 
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Figure 5.5. Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analyses showing brain areas with decreased 
grey matter intensity in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) compared with 
Controls. Coloured voxels emerged as significant in a threshold-free cluster enhancement 
(TFCE) analysis at p < .005, corrected for familywise error, with a cluster extent threshold of 
200 contiguous voxels. Clusters are overlaid on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) 
standard brain. L = Left. 
 
Neural correlates of moral reasoning performance 
In bvFTD and Control participants combined, a more positive feeling rating toward Personal 
High Conflict moral dilemmas (i.e., a more abnormal emotional response) was associated with 
decreased grey matter intensity in frontal and subcortical regions including mPFC, OFC, 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, ACC, insula, amygdala, anterior hippocampus, and basal 
ganglia, as well as bilateral ATLs (Figure 5.6. and Table 5.2.).   
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Figure 5.6. Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) correlation analyses showing brain areas in 
which grey matter intensity negatively correlates with emotional response to personal high 
conflict moral dilemmas in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) patients 
combined with Controls. Coloured voxels emerged as significant in a threshold-free cluster 
enhancement (TFCE) analysis at p < .01, corrected for familywise error, with a cluster extent 
threshold of 200 contiguous voxels. Clusters are overlaid on the Montreal Neurological 
Institute (MNI) standard brain. L = left. 
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Table 5.2. Voxel-based morphometry results showing regions of significant grey matter 
intensity that negatively correlate with emotional response to Personal High Conflict moral 
dilemmas  
Regions Hemisphere Number 
of voxels 
MNI 
coordinates 
   x y z 
Bilateral frontal pole, medial prefrontal cortex, 
orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, 
superior frontal gyrus, supplementary motor 
cortex, accumbens, caudate, putamen, pallidum, 
insula, amygdala, anterior hippocampus, 
parahippocampal gyrus, and temporal pole;  
extending into left central and frontal opercula, 
inferior frontal gyrus, precentral gyrus, and 
temporal fusiform cortex 
B 10305 6 30 -16 
Insula, central operculum, putamen R 524 44 -6 12 
Notes: All t values ≥ .998. B = bilateral, MNI = Montreal Neurological Institute, R = right.  
 
5.3.6. Diffusion tensor imaging analyses 
DTI analyses revealed a typical profile of white matter atrophy in bvFTD patients compared 
with Controls, in the bilateral uncinate fasciculi, inferior fronto-occipital fasciculi, forceps 
minor, superior longitudinal fasciculi, and corpus callosum; and left cingulate, forceps major 
and inferior longitudinal fasciculus.  
 
The uncinate fasciculus was chosen as the main white matter tract of interest given it is the 
primary tract connecting mPFC/OFC to ATL (Von Der Heide, Skipper, Klobusicky, & Olson, 
2013): grey matter regions that correlated with moral reasoning performance in the VBM 
analyses (Figure 5.6. and Table 5.2.). Associations between emotional response to Personal 
High Conflict moral dilemmas and integrity of the bilateral uncinate fasciculi (i.e., mean FA) 
were examined within the bvFTD group. Negative correlations emerged for left and right 
uncinate fasciculi, such that reduced integrity of the tracts (i.e., lower FA values) was 
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associated with higher (i.e., an abnormal) feeling rating toward Personal High Conflict moral 
dilemmas (left: r = -.49, p = .01; right: r = -.50, p = .009) (Figure 5.7.).  
 
 
Figure 5.7. Relationship between Fractional Anisotropy (FA) values for the left and right 
uncincate fasciculi and feeling rating toward Personal High Conflict moral dilemmas in the 
behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). 
 
The inferior longitudinal fasciculus, which connects the ATL to the occipital lobe, was chosen 
as a control white matter tract to examine the specificity of the current findings. No significant 
associations emerged between FA of the right or left inferior longitudinal fasciculus and 
feeling rating toward Personal High Conflict moral dilemmas in bvFTD patients (left: r = -.22, 
p = .17; right: -.28, p = .10). 
 
5.4. Discussion 
This study sought to employ contemporary updates in cognitive neuroscience, in order to 
comprehensively examine the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying personal moral 
reasoning in bvFTD, in turn informing the understanding of the interpersonal self. While no 
significant difference emerged between bvFTD and Controls for the actual moral decisions 
made, on personal high-conflict dilemmas, bvFTD patients displayed an attenuated emotional 
response toward their decision. This diminished emotional reaction further correlated with 
social conceptual knowledge, with worse knowledge of social norms associated with a more 
abnormal emotional response. Finally, a distributed network of frontal, subcortical, and 
temporal regions, and their white matter connections, were implicated in the impaired 
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emotional responding to highly conflictual moral dilemmas in bvFTD. These findings suggest 
multiple cognitive and neural processes likely interact in the service of personal moral 
reasoning, which will now be discussed in detail.  
 
Regardless of group (i.e., bvFTD or Controls), the pattern of decisions made by participants 
across the different dilemma types was consistent with previous findings (Koenigs et al., 2007; 
McCormick et al., 2016), confirming the validity of the subset of dilemmas chosen for the 
current study. Overall, the utilitarian response was chosen more often than not (i.e., 65% of 
the time) for the impersonal moral dilemmas. By contrast, few utilitarian responses were 
made to personal low-conflict moral dilemmas. Personal high-conflict dilemmas proved more 
divisive, with the utilitarian response chosen approximately 50% of the time. Given this 
variation in responses, combined with previous findings that these dilemmas differentiate 
between lesion patients and controls (Koenigs et al., 2007; McCormick et al., 2016), personal 
high-conflict dilemmas represented the condition of interest for this study.  
 
In contrast to findings in other patient groups (Koenigs et al., 2007; McCormick et al., 2016), 
no differences emerged between bvFTD and Controls in the percentage of utilitarian 
responses toward personal high-conflict dilemmas. Further, the groups did not significantly 
differ in their decisions for personal low-conflict or impersonal dilemmas. Previous studies in 
bvFTD have revealed increases in utilitarian decisions for personal moral dilemmas when the 
level of conflict is not specified (Chiong et al., 2013; Fong et al., 2017; Mendez, Anderson, et 
al., 2005; Mendez & Shapira, 2009), though the findings of Van den Stock et al. (2017) 
suggested this pattern of responses was specific to personal low-conflict dilemmas. In the 
present study, however, only a subset of bvFTD patients (6/26) provided a utilitarian response 
to one or more personal low-conflict dilemmas. As individual data points are not presented 
in Van den Stock et al. (2017), it is unclear whether this previous finding was driven by a subset 
of patients. Given that utilitarian decisions on personal low-conflict dilemmas involve the 
endorsement of highly unacceptable actions (e.g., committing cannibalism), it is possible the 
bvFTD patients providing these responses across both studies experienced a particular 
decline in knowledge of socially acceptable behaviour. It is interesting, then, that the patients 
included in the Van den Stock et al. (2017) study predominantly harboured atrophy to both 
left and right temporal poles: regions critically implicated in representing social conceptual 
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knowledge (Olson, McCoy, Klobusicky, & Ross, 2013)20. Unfortunately, the limited range of 
responses to personal low-conflict moral dilemmas in the present study precluded 
correlational analyses with social conceptual knowledge or brain atrophy. Future studies 
employing a larger bvFTD sample, and a broader range of atrophy profiles, may enable more 
in-depth exploration of the mechanisms underlying moral reasoning for personal low-conflict 
dilemmas.  
 
Despite no between-group differences in the actual decisions made, analysis of the subjective 
ratings revealed a reduced emotional response to the personal high-conflict moral dilemmas 
in bvFTD, with these patients reporting more positive feelings about their decisions than 
Controls. As mentioned, these dilemmas are highly conflictual, as they require a choice 
between personally harming somebody, or indirectly causing the harm of many other people. 
As such, regardless of the chosen decision, participants are expected to experience some 
degree of negative emotional reaction, which was observed in the Control group. By contrast, 
the bvFTD patients appeared not to experience this affective response, instead commonly 
reporting they felt ‘extremely good’ about their decision. To date, the majority of the 
evidence for an emotional contribution to moral decision making is inferred from 
neuroimaging and lesion studies that implicate emotional brain regions, rather than drawing 
upon experimental investigation. The current findings in bvFTD, however, provide robust 
behavioural evidence for the importance of emotional processing in resolving moral 
dilemmas, specifically those of a highly conflictual, personal nature. 
 
Consistent with study hypotheses, the current findings also reveal a contribution of social 
conceptual knowledge to personal high-conflict moral dilemmas. The abnormal emotional 
reaction to these dilemmas in bvFTD correlated with impaired knowledge of social norms, 
such that reduced knowledge of socially acceptable behaviour related to a more positive 
emotional response. This finding replicates that of Fong et al. (2017) in response to the 
footbridge dilemma, though in a larger sample of both patients and dilemmas. Despite early 
 
20 It is possible that the ATL atrophy also produced semantic comprehension deficits in these patients. It is 
unlikely, however, that the abnormal responding to personal low-conflict moral dilemmas in the Van Den 
Stock et al. (2017) study was exclusively attributable to difficulties understanding the scenarios, given the 
specificity of the findings to this dilemma type. 
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work on moral development revealing the importance of social rule understanding (Piaget, 
1932), less focus has been placed on the contribution of social knowledge to moral reasoning 
in adults. Furthermore, conceptual, rational processes are typically only considered relevant 
for impersonal, and not personal, moral dilemmas, with the latter believed to predominantly 
rely upon emotion (J. D. Greene et al., 2001). The current findings demonstrate the 
importance of both emotional and social conceptual processes for personal moral decision 
making. Importantly, these appear to interact to produce an affective response to the 
dilemma under situations of high conflict.  
 
The behavioural evidence for contributions of both emotional processing and social 
conceptual knowledge to personal high-conflict moral reasoning in the present study was 
further supported by the neuroimaging findings. The emotional response to personal high-
conflict moral dilemmas correlated with grey matter intensity in frontal and subcortical brain 
areas typically associated with emotion and salience processing, including bilateral mPFC, 
OFC, ACC, insula, basal ganglia, amygdala, and hippocampus, with a more abnormal 
emotional response to the moral decision associated with reduced integrity of these regions. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, these regions have emerged in previous functional neuroimaging 
studies of personal moral reasoning, though this is the first patient study to implicate this 
widespread brain network in the emotional reaction to highly conflictual personal moral 
dilemmas. Intriguingly, in addition to these emotion and salience processing regions, grey 
matter integrity of the bilateral temporal poles was also related to emotional responses to 
personal high-conflict moral dilemmas. The ATLs have a well-established role in representing 
conceptual, semantic knowledge (see also Part 1 of this thesis), which is thought to extend to 
the storage of social concepts, including knowledge of social rules, norms, and socially 
appropriate behaviour (Carr et al., 2015; J. Moll et al., 2005; Panchal et al., 2016). This region 
has previously been activated in functional neuroimaging studies of moral reasoning (Pascual 
et al., 2013). Utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas in bvFTD have also been associated with 
reduced perfusion/metabolism to bilateral ATLs (Mendez & Shapira, 2009). The precise role 
of the ATLs in moral reasoning, however, has to date remained unclear. Interestingly, the 
implication of this region in the present study dovetails nicely with the behavioural finding of 
a correlation between knowledge of social norms and emotional response to personal high-
conflict moral dilemmas in bvFTD. Taken together, the current behavioural and neuroimaging 
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findings suggest that the emotional response to personal high-conflict moral dilemmas is 
produced via a combination of emotional and social conceptual processes, arising from 
fronto-subcortical and anterior temporal brain regions, respectively.  
 
In additional support of this hypothesis, white matter analyses revealed an association 
between the abnormal emotional response to personal high-conflict moral dilemmas in the 
bvFTD group and reduced integrity of the bilateral uncinate fasciculi, a tract connecting the 
OFC/mPFC to the ATLs. This relationship was not evident for the control tract, the inferior 
longitudinal fasciculus, suggesting its specificity to the uncinate. Indeed, it is tentatively 
proposed that the uncinate fasciculus may form the pathway by which social knowledge (from 
the ATLs) is transferred to the prefrontal cortex, where it is integrated with information from 
other frontal and subcortical regions to inform the emotional response to personal high-
conflict moral dilemmas. Such directionality, however, cannot be inferred from the current 
analyses. As such, future studies examining the functional and effective connectivity between 
mPFC and ATLs, and its relationship with emotional and conceptual contributions to personal 
moral reasoning, will be of great interest.  
 
Collectively, the current findings in bvFTD aid in clarifying the nature of the emotional and 
social conceptual contributions to the process of personal moral reasoning, and their 
corresponding brain regions. These findings have important implications for understanding 
the interpersonal self. Morality is one of the most defining traits of one’s identity, both in 
terms of how an individual views themselves, as well as how others view them (Strohminger 
& Nichols, 2014, 2015). Moreover, given moral behaviour is defined by societal standards of 
right and wrong, it critically affects interpersonal interactions and relationships. While the 
majority of current understanding regarding morality stems from laboratory studies of moral 
reasoning, encouragingly, performance on these tasks is associated with various aspects of 
real-world moral behaviour (reviewed by Peng & Huashan, 2014). This includes caring for 
others (Latif, 2000), fulfilling commitments (Krebs & Rosenwald, 1977), aggression (Palmer, 
2005) and even criminality (Palmer, 2003). As such, the present findings suggest that emotion 
and knowledge of right and wrong may be synergistically drawn upon to behave and interact 
appropriately with others in daily life, particularly in situations of high moral conflict. In 
bvFTD, the breakdown in both of these processes might help to explain the severe 
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interpersonal dysfunction in this syndrome (reviewed in Chapter 1). Namely, the absence of 
the normal affective response to highly conflictual moral scenarios in these patients may 
cause them to act in ways that are jarring to others, thereby damaging social relationships. 
For example, faced with a decision to go on a long-planned holiday, or stay home to look after 
a sick relative (everyday moral dilemma taken from Singer, Kreuzpointner, Sommer, Wüst, & 
Kudielka, 2019), a bvFTD patient may not experience the typical negative emotional response 
(e.g., guilt, shame) associated with the egoistic decision, and therefore choose the holiday, 
subsequently affecting social interactions with their family. Results from the current study 
suggest that this altered affective response may stem from impaired emotional processing, 
as well as loss of the conceptual knowledge that caring for family members is considered the 
‘right’ thing to do, attributable to degeneration of a fronto-temporal-subcortical brain 
network. Evidently, drawing upon the syndrome of bvFTD provides valuable insights into the 
mechanisms underlying the interpersonal self, by revealing the dire consequences to social 
functioning when these processes break down (discussed further in Chapter 7).
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Chapter 6 
The neurocognitive relationship between  
visual perspective taking and theory of mind 
This chapter includes revised material from: 
Strikwerda-Brown, C., Ramanan, S., Irish, M. (2019). Neurocognitive mechanisms of theory of 
mind impairments in neurodegeneration: A transdiagnostic approach. Neuropsychiatric 
Disease and Treatment, 15, 557-573.  
 
6.1. Introduction 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the examination of visual versus more conceptual forms of 
perspective taking (i.e., ToM) have largely formed two separate lines of enquiry. A number of 
similarities, however, are apparent in terms of the developmental, cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underlying these two functions, though evidence also exists for their divergence. 
As such, whether VPT and ToM represent overlapping or distinct processes, remains unclear. 
The syndrome of bvFTD provides an exciting opportunity to help adjudicate between these 
two accounts. These patients present with pronounced deficits in understanding the 
thoughts, feelings, and beliefs of others (i.e., ToM), with the neurocognitive mechanisms of 
such impairments forming the focus of rigorous research efforts. By contrast, no study to date 
has examined more fundamental forms of perspective taking (i.e., VPT) in bvFTD. Examining 
VPT and ToM in bvFTD, and their cognitive and neural correlates, may therefore aid in 
clarifying the nature of the relationship between these two forms of perspective taking, and 
the brain regions involved. 
 
bvFTD is characteristically a disorder of social interaction (Mendez et al., 2014) (see also 
Chapters 1 and 5). Considerable parallels between the social difficulties displayed in bvFTD 
and in individuals with autism provided an early clue that ToM may be altered in this dementia 
syndrome (John R Hodges, personal communication). Pervasive deficits have since been 
revealed across all aspects of ToM in bvFTD, including the basic decoding of emotion from 
visual cues (Torralva, Gleichgerrcht, Torres Ardila, Roca, & Manes, 2015) and understanding 
others’ false beliefs about the world (Gregory et al., 2002), to the more complex functions of 
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attributing intentions in social interaction (Cotelli et al., 2018), and detecting social faux pas 
(Brioschi Guevara et al., 2015). Importantly, these impairments are dissociable from general 
cognitive decline in bvFTD (Bertoux, O'Callaghan, Dubois, & Hornberger, 2015), implying a 
specific difficulty in this social aspect of perspective taking. Carer reports of behavioural 
disruption in bvFTD reveal the extensive ToM deficits found in the laboratory in these patients 
also extend to the real world, manifesting in difficulties adopting other people’s perspectives 
in everyday life (Dermody et al., 2016). Indeed, ToM impairments on formal measures are 
strongly correlated with carer ratings of behavioural disturbance (Gregory et al., 2002) and 
empathy (Synn et al., 2018) in bvFTD , suggesting that performance on laboratory measures 
may accurately capture functionally relevant impairments in this syndrome.  
 
Deficits in bvFTD are commonly attributed to early structural and functional abnormalities in 
the mPFC (Adenzato, Cavallo, & Enrici, 2010). Converging evidence reveals clear associations 
between atrophy (Gregory et al., 2002; Synn et al., 2018) and reduced functional connectivity 
(Caminiti et al., 2015) of the mPFC and poor performance on various ToM tasks in bvFTD. 
Further, transcranial direct current simulation of this region has been demonstrated to 
improve ToM accuracy in bvFTD, suggesting a causal role of the mPFC in ToM performance 
(Cotelli et al., 2018). Emerging evidence, however, points to a distributed network of brain 
regions, beyond the mPFC, underpinning ToM impairments in bvFTD. With disease 
progression, atrophy in this syndrome encroaches into the anterior and superior lateral 
temporal lobes (Moller et al., 2016), and parietal cortices including precuneus and TPJ 
(Whitwell et al., 2015). Importantly, atrophy to these temporoparietal regions in bvFTD has 
also been shown to correlate with impaired ToM performance (Brioschi Guevara et al., 2015; 
Cerami et al., 2014; Eslinger et al., 2007; Irish, Hodges, & Piguet, 2014), suggesting a crucial 
contribution of regions beyond the mPFC. 
 
In contrast to the abundant literature on ToM in bvFTD, no studies to date have assessed VPT 
in this syndrome. This may be attributable to the well-documented preservation of 
visuospatial functioning in bvFTD (Salimi et al., 2018), including mental rotation abilities 
(Binetti, Locascio, Corkin, Vonsattel, & Growdon, 2000), well into late stages of the disease. 
Nonetheless, deficits in VPT have been documented in other neuropsychiatric conditions 
characterised by impaired ToM, such as autism and schizophrenia (see Chapter 1). Further, 
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the VPT deficits in these syndromes have been found to correlate with, and therefore are 
proposed to underlie, their impairments in ToM  (Farrant et al., 2006; Hamilton et al., 2009; 
Langdon et al., 2001). As such, a similar mechanism may be predicted in bvFTD, a hypothesis 
supported by the atrophy to key brain regions associated with VPT in this syndrome (i.e., IFG, 
along with TPJ and precuneus later in the disease course). On the other hand, the association 
between VPT and ToM has not consistently been revealed, with some studies supporting their 
dissociation (David et al., 2008; Drayton et al., 2018; Pearson et al., 2013) (reviewed in 
Chapter 1). Moreover, the precise relationship between different forms of VPT, namely Level 
1 (i.e., understanding what someone else sees) and Level 2 (i.e., understanding how someone 
else sees the world), and ToM remains poorly understood, in particular whether their 
neurocognitive mechanisms are overlapping or distinct. The functional implications of Level 
1 and Level 2 VPT impairments also remain unclear, as their behavioural manifestations in the 
real-world have not yet been explored. 
 
The current study aimed to examine Level 1 and Level 2 VPT, ToM, and real-world perspective 
taking in bvFTD. The relationships between these functions, with other cognitive processes, 
and with underlying brain integrity were explored, in order to compare and contrast the 
cognitive and neural underpinnings of each of these forms of perspective taking. In doing so, 
this study endeavoured to discern whether VPT and ToM form discrete or overlapping 
components of the interpersonal self, and how this manifests in the real world. Despite their 
preserved spatial abilities, bvFTD patients were predicted to display impairments in both 
types of VPT, consistent with previous findings in other social disorders. In turn, these deficits 
were expected to correlate with ToM performance and perspective taking in daily life, and 
atrophy to a core perspective taking network (i.e., IFG, TPJ, and precuneus).  
 
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Participants 
Sixteen bvFTD patients and 15 healthy Control participants were recruited for this study (an 
independent sample from that included in Chapter 5). Details of recruitment procedures and 
neuropsychological assessment are outlined in Chapter 2. One bvFTD patient was excluded 
due to invalid responding on both VPT tasks, leaving a final sample of 15 in each group. 
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Genetic information was available for the bvFTD sample, revealing a C9orf72 mutation in 5 
out of 15 patients. In this study, ACE-III performance is reported as a measure of general 
cognitive functioning, along with specific tests of processing speed (Trail Making Test Part A; 
Tombaugh, 2004), visuospatial ability (Rey Complex Figure Copy; Rey, 1941) and ACE-III 
Visuospatial subscale, and executive functions of inhibition (Hayling test; Burgess & Shallice, 
1997) and set-switching (Trail Making Test Part B minus A). FTD-FRS was not available for this 
sample, but disease duration and CBI Total provide alternative measures of disease staging. 
 
6.2.2. Procedure  
Participants completed a comprehensive battery of perspective taking tasks, including tasks 
of Level 1 and Level 2 VPT and ToM, as well as questionnaires capturing behavioural 
manifestations of perspective taking in everyday life. A mental rotation task was also 
completed, to assess the potential effect of mental rotation abilities on performance on the 
Level 2 VPT task. 
 
Level 1 VPT task 
Participants completed a computerised Level 1 VPT task, assessing the ability to imagine what 
someone else may see. The task was modified from Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, 
and Bodley Scott (2010) to ensure suitability for the cognitive abilities of bvFTD patients. 
Stimuli were presented using E-Prime software, with reaction times and accuracy recorded 
for each trial. 
 
During the task, participants were presented with pictures of a human avatar in the centre of 
a room, with the left, back, and right walls visible (Figure 6.1.). Red dots were present on the 
left, right, or both walls, and the avatar faced either the left (50% trials) (Figure 6.1.A, D) or 
right (50% trials) (Figure 6.1.B, C) wall. The dots were positioned such that on 50% of the trials, 
the avatar saw the same number of dots as the participant completing the task (Consistent 
perspective condition; Figure 6.1.A, B). On the remaining 50% of trials, the avatar was unable 
to see some of the dots that were visible to the participant (i.e., the dots were positioned on 
the wall behind the avatar; Inconsistent perspective condition) (Figure 6.1.C, D).  
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For each trial, participants were presented with a picture of a room, with a question at the 
top of the screen indicating the perspective to be taken (Self or Other), and the number of 
dots to be verified (0-3 dots), for example, “Do YOU see a total of 1 dot?” (Self condition), or 
“Does HE see a total of 3 dots?” (Other condition) (Figure 6.1.). Participants were required to 
respond YES or NO to the question, using labelled buttons on the computer keyboard. While 
the original Samson et al. (2010) task presented the perspective (self/other), dots to be 
verified, and picture of the room across three successive screens, this information was 
condensed into a single screen for the current task, to reduce demands on memory. 
Furthermore, participants were encouraged to respond as quickly as possible, however given 
the characteristic reductions in processing speed in bvFTD patients (Ranasinghe et al., 2016), 
there was no time cut-off for the responses. 
 
The task consisted of 72 main trials: 36 Self trials requiring participants to judge their own 
perspective (18 Consistent and 18 Inconsistent perspective trials), and 36 Other trials where 
participants were asked to judge the perspective of the avatar (18 Consistent and 18 
Inconsistent perspective trials). The proportion of Matching (i.e., correct response of yes) and 
Mismatching (i.e., correct response of no) trials was equally distributed across these 
conditions. Eight filler trials were also presented, where no dots were displayed on the wall 
(consisting of an equal number of Self, Other, Matching, and Mismatching trials), though 
these were not included in the analysis (see Samson et al., 2010). 
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Figure 6.1. Examples of the main trial types for the Level 1 Visual Perspective Taking (VPT) 
task. A) Consistent Self Mismatching Trial: The participant sees the same number of dots as 
the avatar, must respond with respect to their own perspective, and the correct response is 
‘no’. B) Consistent Other Matching Trial: The participant sees the same number of dots as the 
avatar, must respond with respect to the avatar’s perspective, and the correct response is 
‘yes’. C) Inconsistent Self Matching Trial: The participant sees a different number of dots to 
the avatar, must respond with respect to their own perspective, and the correct response is 
‘yes’. Incorrect responses on Inconsistent Self trials reflect ‘altercentric’ errors. D) 
Inconsistent Other Mismatching Trial: The participant sees a different number of dots to the 
avatar, must respond with respect to the avatar’s perspective, and the correct response is 
‘no’. Incorrect responses on Inconsistent Other trials reflect ‘egocentric’ errors. 
Note: Each condition (Consistent Self, Consistent Other, Inconsistent Self, Inconsistent Other) 
contains an equal number of Matching and Mismatching trials.  
 
Following a practice block of 10 trials, the test trials were presented in four blocks, separated 
by a self-paced break. The order of trials within each block was pseudorandomised and 
consistent across participants.   
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The primary measures of interest in the current study were egocentric errors (i.e., the total 
number of errors on Inconsistent Other perspective trials, involving a projection of one’s own 
viewpoint onto the avatar, Figure 6.1.D), and altercentric errors (i.e., the total number of 
errors on Inconsistent Self perspective trials, involving the adoption of the avatar’s viewpoint 
as one’s own, Figure 6.1.C). To ensure basic compliance with the task, error rates on 
Consistent perspective trials were also analysed (Figure 6.1.A, B).  
 
As secondary measures of interest, reaction times were analysed, specifically indices of 
egocentric interference (i.e., the mean difference in response time between Inconsistent 
Other and Consistent Other perspective trials) and altercentric interference (i.e., the mean 
difference in response time between Inconsistent Self and Consistent Self perspective trials) 
(see Drayton et al., 2018). For these interference measures, outlying trials (i.e., a z-score of 
+/- 2 from the participant’s mean score for the trial type), as well as incorrect trials, were 
removed from the analysis.   
 
For reaction time analyses, only Matching trials were included. This is due to the unbalanced 
nature of the Mismatching trials, with Mismatching Consistent trials being particularly easy 
to process compared with the other trial types. Specifically, on Mismatching trials (i.e., a 
correct response of ‘no’) in the Inconsistent perspective condition, the number of dots to be 
verified was that seen by the irrelevant perspective (i.e., the number seen by the avatar when 
asked to judge one’s own perspective, and the number seen by oneself when asked to judge 
the avatar’s perspective) (e.g., Figure 6.1.D). On Mismatching trials in the Consistent 
perspective condition, however, participants were required to verify a number of dots that 
did not correspond to either one’s own, or the avatar’s, perspective (e.g., Figure 6.1.A). 
Accordingly, as the egocentric and altercentric interference measures required a direct 
comparison of reaction time between Inconsistent and Consistent trials, Mismatching trials 
were excluded from reaction time analyses (see Samson et al., 2010).  
 
Level 2 VPT task 
A simple, novel, computerised task was designed to examine Level 2 VPT, measuring the 
ability to imagine how a scene may look from a viewpoint different from one’s own. Stimuli 
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were presented using E-Prime software, with reaction times and accuracy recorded for each 
trial. 
 
On each trial, participants were shown a picture of a room created using Planner 5d interior 
design software (https://planner5d.com) (Figure 6.2.). The left, right, and back walls of the 
room were visible, and each contained 2 items of furniture and an avatar. Below the picture 
of the room was the question: “How does the room look from HIS perspective?”. Underneath, 
three different rooms were presented (numbered 1-3), with the instruction “Choose the most 
correct option using numbers 1-3 on your keyboard”. One of these options was the correct 
picture of the room as viewed by the avatar, one was an egocentric foil (i.e., a picture of the 
room from the participant’s perspective), and one was a spatial foil (i.e., the picture was taken 
from the opposite side of the room from which the avatar is standing, see Figure 6.2.A option 
2; or the furniture was located on the opposite side of the room see Figure 6.2.B option 1). 
Participants selected their response using the number keys 1-3 on the keyboard. While the 
onscreen instructions at the beginning of the task stated to respond as quickly as possible, 
participants were advised that accuracy was more important than speed for this task.  
 
 
Figure 6.2. Example trials for the Level 2 Visual Perspective Taking (VPT) task. A) A mental 
rotation of 180°	 is required. In this trial, option 1 represents the correct response, with 
options 2 and 3 representing the spatial and egocentric foils, respectively. B) A mental 
rotation of 90°	is required. In this trial, option 3 represents the correct response, with options 
1 and 2 representing the spatial and egocentric foils, respectively. 
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Six practice trials were presented, followed by two blocks of 18 trials each. The correct 
responses and egocentric and spatial errors were equally distributed across the three 
response options. The position of the avatar in the room was also equivalently distributed 
across four locations (i.e., the two back corners, and the two side walls) so that half of the 
trials involved an imagined rotation of 180 degrees (Figure 6.2.A), and the other half a rotation 
of 90 degrees (Figure 6.2.B). The order of these trials was pseudorandomised and consistent 
across participants.  
 
The primary measure of interest was egocentric errors on the task, with spatial errors and 
reaction times included as secondary measures. 
 
One bvFTD patient could not complete the Level 2 VPT task due to cognitive impairment, 
leaving a final sample of 14 bvFTD and 15 healthy Controls completing this task. 
 
Theory of mind task 
ToM ability was examined using a cartoon mental state attribution task (Irish, Hodges, et al., 
2014; Lough et al., 2006). Participants were presented with two sets of 10 cartoons, depicting 
scenarios requiring either (i) understanding of physical humour (e.g., a bucket of water falling 
on a man’s head after walking into a joke shop), or (ii) the inference of mental states (i.e., 
ToM; e.g., escaped prisoners unknowingly tunnelling into a police station), respectively 
(Figure 6.3.). The physical and ToM cartoons were presented in pseudorandom order, 
consistent across participants, with participants required to describe the intended joke in the 
cartoon, or why someone might find it funny. Responses for the physical cartoons were 
deemed correct if the humour of the scenario was adequately conveyed. For the ToM 
scenarios, correct responses required appropriate attribution of mental states to the 
characters (e.g., ‘he doesn’t realise’, ‘unbeknownst to them’). No time limit was imposed, 
however, if correct responses were not provided on the first attempt, participants were given 
a single, generic prompt (e.g., ‘Is there anything else you can tell me about why someone 
might find this funny?’). A maximum score of 10 was possible for both physical and ToM 
cartoons.  
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The same bvFTD patient excluded from the Level 2 VPT task was also unable to complete the 
ToM task due to cognitive impairment, leaving a final sample of 14 bvFTD and 15 healthy 
Controls completing the ToM task. 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Example trials for the Physical (left) and Theory of Mind (right) cartoons. Stimuli 
adapted from Lough et al. (2006). 
 
Mental rotation task 
A computerised mental rotation task was completed to assess the potential effect of mental 
rotation abilities on performance on the Level 2 VPT task. The task was administered using 
the PsyToolkit online software program (Stoet, 2010, 2016). Participants were presented with 
three 2-dimensional shapes, and were required to choose which of the bottom two shapes 
represented a rotated version of the top one, via a mouse click (Figure 6.4.). Participants 
completed 5 practice trials and 10 test trials and had unlimited time to complete the items. 
Accuracy was recorded as the primary measure of interest. 
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Figure 6.4. Example trial for the mental rotation task, adapted from the PsyToolkit online 
software program (Stoet, 2010, 2016). The correct answer is the left object. 
 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)  
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) was completed as a measure of 
perspective taking in daily life. Given the well-documented lack of insight in bvFTD, carers 
completed the questionnaire with reference to patients with bvFTD, whereas Control 
participants completed the self-report version. The IRI comprises 28 statements about 
thoughts and feelings, and requires the respondent to rate the degree to which each of these 
describe oneself/the patient. Responses are made on a five-point Likert scale (ranging from 
‘Does not describe me/him/her well’ to ‘Describes me/him/her very well’). The IRI contains 
four 7-item subscales, though the primary measure of interest for the present study was the 
Perspective Taking (PT) subscale, indexing the ability to imagine the perspective of another in 
daily life (e.g., ‘He/she sometimes tries to understand their friends better by imagining how 
things look from their perspective’). A higher score on this subscale reflects greater reported 
perspective taking (maximum = 35). For the bvFTD patients, carers were required to rate the 
patient on the statement both before the onset of dementia, and at the present time. IRI data 
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was missing for one Control, and ratings for prior to disease onset were missing for one bvFTD 
patient. 
 
Egocentric Behaviour questionnaire (EBQ) 
The Egocentric Behaviour Questionnaire (EBQ) (Bon, Belliard, Eustache, & Desgranges, 2009) 
is a carer report measure of egocentric behaviour in daily life. The original questionnaire was 
translated from French into English for the present study. Thirty-six behaviours are listed, with 
carers rating the extent to which they agree with each of the statements in relation to the 
patient, on a 4-point Likert scale (Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree, 
Strongly Disagree). Four 9-item subscales are produced, namely Egocentric Speech (e.g., 
‘He/she talks about himself/herself a lot’), Impaired Empathy (e.g., ‘He/she is sensitive to your 
feelings’), Imposing Preferences (e.g., ‘He/she always wants to have the last word’) and 
Failure to Consider Others (‘e.g., ‘He/she sometimes says or does things that irritate or offend 
others’), along with a Total score. Higher values represent increased egocentric behaviour. 
EBQ data was missing for 1 bvFTD patient. 
 
6.2.3. Statistical analyses 
Independent samples t-tests were employed to assess group differences on demographic 
measures and neuropsychological tasks. The frequencies of dichotomous variables (i.e., sex) 
were compared using chi-squared tests (c2). Between-group differences on experimental 
variables were examined using parametric analyses, namely independent samples t-tests, 
where possible (i.e., when the raw variables were normally distributed in the patient group, 
or logarithmic transformation of the variable restored normality in the patient group). 
Otherwise, non-parametric tests were employed (i.e., Mann Whitney U). These analyses were 
chosen over repeated-measures tests given the primary interest in examining between-group 
differences on the tasks, rather than within-subject differences between different task 
components. Relationships between the experimental variables were explored using the 
robust Spearman’s correlation coefficient, given non-normality in some of the experimental 
variables. The significance level was set at p < .05 for all analyses (including the correlation 
analyses, given these were exploratory in nature), and effect sizes were calculated using 
Cohen’s d (for parametric analyses) and h2 (for nonparametric analyses).  
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6.2.4. Neuroimaging analysis 
Twenty-five participants (12 bvFTD, 13 Controls) were included in the voxel-based 
morphometry (VBM) analysis. Full details of MRI acquisition and pre-processing are outlined 
in Chapter 2. 
 
For analyses of grey matter intensity, permutation-based non-parametric testing was 
employed using unbiased whole-brain General Linear Models (GLM) in FSL, with 5000 
permutations per contrast (Nichols & Holmes, 2002). Differences in grey matter intensity 
between bvFTD and Controls were assessed using t-tests. Age was included as a covariate of 
no interest in these atrophy analyses. Significant clusters were extracted using the threshold-
free cluster enhancement (TFCE) method at a threshold of p < .001 uncorrected, with a cluster 
extent cut-off of 200 contiguous voxels. This statistical approach takes into consideration the 
small sample size and balances the risk of Type I versus Type II errors (Lieberman & 
Cunningham, 2009). Significant results were overlaid on the MNI standard brain, with 
maximum co-ordinates provided in MNI stereotaxic space. Anatomical labels were 
determined with reference to the Harvard-Oxford probabilistic cortical and subcortical 
atlases.  
 
Next, a region of interest approach was employed to explore associations between grey 
matter intensity and perspective-taking task/questionnaire performance, irrespective of 
group membership (i.e., bvFTD patients and Controls combined). Four brain areas were 
selected based on meta-analyses of studies on VPT and ToM, namely the mPFC, TPJ, 
precuneus, and IFG (Molenberghs, Johnson, Henry, & Mattingley, 2016; Schurz et al., 2013; 
Schurz et al., 2014; Van Overwalle, 2009), and bilateral masks of these regions were extracted 
using the Harvard-Oxford probabilistic atlas. One-tailed Spearman’s correlations (with an 
alpha of p < .05, given the exploratory nature of these analyses) were employed to explore 
associations between the extracted grey matter intensities and perspective taking 
performance, such that higher grey matter intensity was associated with better task 
performance.  
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6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Demographics and neuropsychological performance  
Participant demographics and neuropsychological performance are presented in Table 6.1. 
Groups did not significantly differ in age (p = .08), sex (p = .07), or years of education (p = .07). 
 
In keeping with their characteristic clinical profile, bvFTD patients showed impairments in 
behaviour (CBI Total), global cognitive functioning (ACE-III Total), processing speed (Trails A) 
and executive function (Hayling and Trails B-A). By contrast, visuospatial function was 
relatively preserved (ACE-III Visuospatial and RCF Copy). 
  
Table 6.1. Demographics and clinical characteristics of the study cohort 
 
Variable bvFTD Control t value p value 
N 15 15   
Age 61.27 (8.75) 66.07 (5.59) -1.79 ns 
Sex (M/F) 11/4 6/9 X2 = 3.39 ns 
Education 
(Years) 
11.92 (2.99) 13.93 2.76) -1.92 ns 
Disease 
duration 
(Months) 
99.08 (64.82) n/a n/a n/a 
CBI Total 
Frequency (180) 
68.33 (32.63) 6.38 (4.81) 6.77 < .001 
ACE-III 
Visuospatial 
(16) 
14.67 (1.35) 15.47 (.92) -1.90 ns 
ACE-III Total 
(100) 
81.93 (11.61) 93.93 (2.94) -3.88 .002 
RCF Copy (36) 28.97 (5.30) 31.37 (3.23) -1.50 ns 
Hayling Total AB 
score 
10.00 (9.87) 3.47 (3.56) 2.40 .03 
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Trail Making 
Test Part A 
43.47 (16.13) 31.27 (10.62) 2.45 .02 
Trail Making 
Test Part B-A 
98.50 (70.66) 50.87 (26.25) 2.44 .03 
Notes: ACE-III: Addenbrooke’s Cognitive Examination-III; CBI: Cambridge Behavioural 
Inventory (CBI); ns = nonsignificant; RCF: Rey Complex Figure. 
Disease duration missing for 1 bvFTD patient, CBI missing for 2 Controls, Hayling missing for 
1 bvFTD patient, Trail Making Test Part B missing for 1 bvFTD patient. 
 
6.3.2. Level 1 VPT task performance 
On the Level 1 VPT task, bvFTD patients made significantly more egocentric errors compared 
with Controls (i.e., errors on Inconsistent Other perspective trials, which involved projecting 
one’s own visual perspective onto the avatar) (Mann Whitney U = 64.00, exact two-sided p = 
.03, h2 = .17). By contrast, no significant difference between the groups emerged for 
altercentric errors (i.e., errors on Inconsistent Self perspective trials, which involved adopting 
the avatar’s visual perspective as one’s own) (Mann Whitney U = 105.50, exact two-sided p = 
.78, h2 = .003) (Figure 6.5.)21. Furthermore, groups did not significantly differ on errors for the 
Consistent Self perspective trials (Mann Whitney U = 97.50, exact two-sided p = .48, h2 = .07), 
though bvFTD patients did make more errors on the Consistent Other perspective trials, 
compared with Controls (Mann Whitney U = 75.00, exact two-sided p = .04, h2 = .20)22.  
 
21 Outlying error rates (i.e., > 3 SD from the group mean) were observed for 1 bvFTD and 1 Control participant 
on Inconsistent Other errors. The significant difference between the groups was, however, maintained when 
the outlying participants were removed (Mann Whitney U = 50.00, p = .02, h2 = 0.22). For the Inconsistent Self 
condition, no participants made error rates > 3 SD from the group mean. 
22 The same bvFTD patient described above also displayed outlying error rates for Consistent Self and Consistent 
Other conditions. Removal of this participant, however, did not change the patterns of results (Consistent self: 
Mann Whitney U = 97.50, p = .48, h2 = .04; Consistent Other: Mann Whitney U = 75.00, p = .04, h2 = .17). 
Chapter 6 
 139 
 
Figure 6.5. Egocentric (left) and altercentric (right) error rates for the two groups on the Level 
1 Visual Perspective Taking (VPT) task. bvFTD = behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia. 
Asterisk denotes significant between-group difference at *p < .05. 
 
In terms of the reaction time analysis, no significant difference was apparent between the 
groups for egocentric interference scores (i.e., the difference in reaction time between 
Inconsistent and Consistent Other perspective trials) (t(28) = -.02, p = .98, d = .008) or 
altercentric interference scores (i.e., the difference in reaction time between Inconsistent and 
Consistent Self perspective trials)  (t(28) = 1.64, p = .11, d = .60).  
 
6.3.3. Level 2 VPT task performance 
On the Level 2 VPT task, the variances in egocentric error rates significantly differed between 
the groups, as revealed by a significant Levene’s test (F = 25.17, p < .001). As such, the degrees 
of freedom were modified to account for unequal variances. Relative to Controls, bvFTD 
patients made significantly more egocentric errors (t(13.73)= 3.56, p =.003, d = 1.34) (Figure 
6.6.). No significant differences were apparent for spatial errors (t(27) = 1.52, p = .14, d = 0.56) 
or reaction time (t(27) = .25, p = .81, d = .09).  
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Figure 6.6. Egocentric (left) and spatial (right) error rates for the two groups on the Level 2 
Visual Perspective Taking (VPT) task. bvFTD = behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia. 
Asterisk denotes significant between-group difference at **p < .01. 
 
6.3.4. Theory of mind task performance  
On the ToM task, the variances in accuracy on the ToM and physical cartoons significantly 
differed between the groups, as revealed by a significant Levene’s test (ToM: F = 21.93, p < 
.001; Physical: F = 4.48, p = .04), with the degrees of freedom modified accordingly. bvFTD 
patients performed worse than Controls on the theory of mind cartoons (t(15.36) = -4.64, p < 
.001, d = 1.75) (Figure 6.7.). bvFTD patients were also impaired relative to Controls on the 
physical cartoons (t(20.178) = -3.79, p = .001, d = 1.42). When controlling for performance on 
the physical cartoons, however, the ToM impairments in bvFTD remained apparent, with 
patients performing significantly worse than Controls on the ToM cartoons (F(1, 26) = 9.33, p 
= .005, partial η2 = .26). This suggests the findings reflect a ToM deficit in bvFTD, over and 
above any impairment in detecting humour in general.  
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Figure 6.7. Performance on Theory of Mind (left) and Physical (right) cartoons in each group. 
bvFTD = behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia. Asterisks denote significant between-
group difference at ***p < .001; **p < .01.  
 
6.3.5. Mental rotation task performance 
No significant difference emerged between bvFTD and Control participants on mental 
rotation accuracy (t(28) = -1.53, p = .14, d = .56). 
 
6.3.6. Interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) 
No significant difference emerged for Perspective Taking (t(26) = -.71, p = .49, d = .27) 
between Controls (self-rated) at the present time and bvFTD patients prior to their disease 
onset (informant-rated). This suggests that before the onset of bvFTD, these patients 
displayed normal perspective taking behaviour. At the present time, however, bvFTD patients 
were rated as displaying significantly worse Perspective Taking (t(27) = -6.08, p < .001, d = 
2.26) than Controls. 
 
6.3.7. Egocentric behaviour questionnaire (EBQ) 
bvFTD patients were rated as displaying high degrees of Overall Egocentric Behaviour (EBQ 
Total: M = 66.64, SD = 14.87), Egocentric Speech (M = 17.64, SD = 4.57), Impaired Empathy 
(M = 15.21, SD = 5.01), Imposing Preferences (M = 16.14, SD = 4.38) and Failure to Consider 
Others (M = 17.64, SD = 4.31). This measure was not completed in Controls given its specificity 
to symptoms of FTD. 
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6.3.8. Correlations between the measures  
Two-tailed Spearman’s correlations were conducted to examine the relationship between the 
various perspective taking measures and questionnaires in the patient group, using the 
primary measure of interest for each task (Table 6.2.). Furthermore, correlations were 
examined between Level 2 perspective taking and mental rotation performance. Given the 
limited range of participant scores on the Level 1 VPT task (i.e., the majority of participants 
making between 0-2 errors), correlations with performance on this measure were unable to 
be performed.  
 
Interestingly, a significant negative correlation was observed between Egocentric errors on 
the Level 2 VPT task and Total Score on the EBQ, such that more egocentric errors were 
associated with carer ratings of less egocentric behaviour in bvFTD. The EBQ was also 
negatively correlated with the IRI PT scale, such that greater egocentric behaviour was related 
to poorer perspective taking in daily life. Finally, a significant negative correlation emerged 
between Egocentric errors on the Level 2 VPT task and Mental Rotation performance, with 
worse mental rotation associated with more egocentric errors. No other significant 
correlations were apparent between any of the measures of perspective taking.  
 
Table 6.2. Correlations between perspective taking and questionnaire variables in the 
behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) 
Test ToM cartoons IRI PT EBQ Mental Rotation 
Level 2 VPT 
egocentric 
errors 
-.05 .24 -.58* -.55* 
ToM cartoons  .03 .22  
IRI PT   -.65*  
 
Notes: Mental rotation and IRI available for 15 patients, Level 2 VPT available for 14 patients, 
ToM available for 14 patients, EBQ available for 13 patients. bvFTD = behavioural variant 
frontotemporal dementia, EBQ = Egocentric Behaviour Questionnaire, IRI = Interpersonal 
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Reactivity Index, PT = Perspective Taking, ToM = Theory of Mind, VPT = Visual Perspective 
Taking. Asterisks represent significant correlation at * p < .05.  
 
6.3.9. Voxel-based morphometry analyses 
Group differences in grey matter intensity 
Briefly, compared with Controls, bvFTD patients displayed reduced grey matter intensity in 
bilateral frontal and temporal lobes, including frontal pole, orbitofrontal and medial 
prefrontal cortex, superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri, precentral gyrus, insula, and 
temporal pole (Figure 6.8.). Atrophy extended into the right caudate, left cerebellum, and 
posterior cortical regions including bilateral posterior cingulate cortex, precuneus, and lateral 
parietal and occipital areas on the left. Atrophy in posterior regions is commonly reported in 
bvFTD patients with the C9orf72 genetic mutation (Whitwell et al., 2012), consistent with the 
high proportion of such patients in this study (4/12 included in imaging).  
 
 
Figure 6.8. Voxel-based morphometry (VBM) analyses showing brain areas with decreased 
grey matter intensity in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) compared with 
Controls. Coloured voxels emerged as significant in a threshold-free cluster enhancement 
(TFCE) analysis at p < .001 uncorrected, with a cluster extent threshold of 200 contiguous 
voxels. Clusters are overlaid on the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) standard brain. L = 
Left; R = Right.  
 
Region of interest analyses 
Given the wide range of variability in the regional grey matter intensities within both bvFTD 
and Control groups, correlation analyses between grey matter integrity and perspective 
taking performance were performed for all participants combined. This increased the 
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statistical power to detect meaningful brain-behaviour relationships. One-tailed Spearman’s 
correlations between the perspective taking performance (on the Level 2 VPT task, theory of 
mind, and IRI PT) and regional grey matter intensity across all participants are displayed in 
Figure 6.9. Significant correlations represent regions where worse perspective taking was 
associated with less grey matter intensity. Egocentric errors on the Level 2 VPT task were 
significantly associated with reduced integrity of the IFG (r = -.43, p = .02) (Figure 6.9.a). 
Poorer performance on the ToM cartoon task correlated with reduced integrity of the mPFC 
(r = .43, p = .02) and precuneus (r = .49, p = .007) (Figure 6.9.b). Finally, poorer reported 
perspective taking on the IRI was significantly associated with reduced integrity of TPJ (r = .42, 
p = .02), precuneus (r = .69, p < .001), and IFG (r = .46, p = .01) (Figure 6.8c). No other significant 
correlations emerged (all p values > .06). Figure 6.10. collectively depicts the brain regions 
associated with the different aspects of perspective taking in this study. 
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Figure 6.9. Significant correlations between perspective taking task performance and grey 
matter intensity within the selected regions-of-interest, for all participants combined.  bvFTD 
= behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index, VPT = 
Visual Perspective Taking. 
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Figure 6.10. Brain regions-of-interest that were significantly correlated with different forms 
of perceptive taking in this study. Real world perspective taking refers to the Perspective 
Taking subscale on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (i.e., IRI PT).  
 
6.4. Discussion 
This study aimed to examine VPT and ToM concurrently in patients with bvFTD, in order to 
clarify the neurocognitive mechanisms of, and relationship between, these forms of 
perspective taking, and how they manifest in daily life. Compared with healthy Controls, 
bvFTD patients were impaired on all aspects of perspective taking, including Level 1 and Level 
2 VPT, ToM, and carer ratings of everyday perspective taking. Despite intact mental rotation 
performance in bvFTD at an overall group level, poorer performance on this task in the patient 
group correlated with deficits in Level 2 VPT. Furthermore, impairments in Level 2 VPT in 
bvFTD were associated with carer ratings of less egocentric behaviour in daily life. Finally, 
distinct neural correlates emerged for Level 2 VPT versus ToM, which partially overlapped 
with those implicated in perspective taking in daily life. Overall, despite deficits in these 
functions co-occurring in bvFTD, the current findings support a distinction between VPT and 
ToM.  
 
In relation to Controls, bvFTD patients provided an elevated amount of egocentric errors on 
the Level 1 VPT task. In other words, they had difficulty imagining what another person sees, 
instead projecting their own visual perspective onto the character in the task. Increased 
errors rates, however, were also observed in bvFTD on trials on which the participant and 
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avatar shared the same visual perspective, and a response about the avatar’s perspective was 
required (Consistent Other trials). Together, these findings hint at a generalised deficit in 
adopting the visual perspective of another in bvFTD, regardless of one’s own visual 
perspective. Caution should be taken, though, when interpreting these results, given the 
majority of participants (both bvFTDs and Controls) made very low error rates on the Level 1 
VPT task (i.e., between 0-2 errors in each condition). This reduced range of responses also 
precluded any correlational analyses between Level 1 VPT and the other behavioural or 
neuroanatomical measures. Furthermore, unlike in studies of other populations using the 
original Samson et al. (2010) task (Drayton et al., 2018; Schwarzkopf et al., 2014), no 
differences between patients and Controls emerged on reaction time measures on the Level 
1 VPT task, purported to capture implicit VPT. As such, the modifications made to the task for 
the current study, while ensuring suitability for the cognitive abilities of bvFTD, may have 
rendered the task too simple to reliably detect between-group differences in Level 1 VPT. 
Future studies focused on developing sensitive, though cognitively appropriate, measures of 
Level 1 VPT in bvFTD are clearly warranted in order to clarify the nature and extent of VPT 
deficits in this syndrome. This would also aid in better establishing the brain regions essential 
for Level 1 VPT, and how this ability relates to Level 2 VPT, ToM, and real-world behaviour. 
 
By contrast, robust impairments in Level 2 VPT emerged in bvFTD (Cohen’s d = 1.34), with 
patients making significantly more egocentric errors on the task, involving a projection of 
their own perspective onto the virtual character. These impairments were specific to 
perspective taking, with patients and Controls making a similar number of spatial errors on 
the task. Surprisingly, despite no difference between bvFTD and Controls in visuospatial 
function, including performance on a mental rotation task, increased egocentric errors on 
Level 2 VPT were significantly correlated with worse mental rotation performance in the 
patient group. As discussed in Chapter 1, the involvement of spatial abilities in Level 2 VPT is 
well-established (Zacks & Tversky, 2005), however, the mental rotation required by these 
tasks, of rotating oneself to adopt the viewpoint of another, is often considered distinct from 
the capacity to mentally rotate an object relative to the self, as measured by classic mental 
rotation tasks (Inagaki et al., 2002; Wraga et al., 2000; Zacks, 2008). Nonetheless, the current 
findings, albeit correlational, tentatively suggest that object-based mental rotation may be 
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involved in Level 2 VPT. Exploring the potential causal link between these mental rotation and 
Level 2 VPT abilities will be an important avenue for future inquiry. 
 
In line with the established socioemotional deficits in this syndrome (see Section 6.1.), ToM 
was impaired in bvFTD on the cartoon task. Carer reports of behavioural change in bvFTD 
revealed the difficulties in perspective taking extend to the real world (on the IRI 
questionnaire), along with high levels of egocentric behaviour (EBQ questionnaire). No 
significant correlations, however, emerged between ToM and Level 2 VPT in bvFTD, 
suggesting these two forms of perspective taking may in fact involve divergent mechanisms. 
While no associations were found between ToM and the carer-reported measures, a strong 
negative correlation (r = -.58) emerged between egocentric errors on the Level 2 VPT task and 
carer reports of egocentric behaviour in bvFTD, such that poorer visual perspective taking was 
related to less self-centred behaviour in daily life. This suggests that Level 2 VPT as captured 
on the laboratory task forms a distinct, even inversely related, ability from the egocentricity 
occurring in the real-world in these patients. Adopting another’s visual perspective, 
therefore, may not necessarily be required for the social behaviours that are captured by the 
questionnaire, such as considering the preferences, interests, or feelings of the other person.  
 
Further supporting their potential dissociation, region-of-interest neuroimaging analyses 
revealed distinct grey matter correlates of Level 2 VPT versus ToM, irrespective of group 
membership. Namely, increased egocentric errors on the Level 2 VPT task related to reduced 
grey matter integrity of the IFG. This finding meshes well with the established role of the IFG 
in inhibiting one’s own perspective (Ramsey et al., 2013), a process heavily relied upon for 
successful performance on the Level 2 VPT task. Furthermore, a specific deficit in inhibiting 
one’s own perspective has also been found in bvFTD on ToM tasks, which also correlated with 
metabolism of the ventrolateral frontal lobe in these patients (Le Bouc et al., 2012). On the 
other hand, integrity of the mPFC and precuneus were associated with performance on the 
ToM task in the current study. As outlined in Chapter 1 and Section 6.1., the mPFC is typically 
viewed as the central brain region implicated in ToM, purported to play a role in decoupling 
from current perceptions to imagine alternative circumstances, as well as processing 
emotional and socially relevant information about others: key processes required by the 
cartoons task. This socioemotional component supported by the mPFC likely represents a 
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source of divergence between ToM and Level 2 VPT processes. Despite the inclusion of a 
virtual character, the situations represented in the Level 2 VPT tasks (pictures of rooms) did 
not involve any social interaction. This is in contrast to the ToM cartoons, which were 
inherently interpersonal in nature and embedded in a broader social context (e.g., a woman 
unknowingly sticking her umbrella into the back of a man, who believes he is being held up). 
Compared with the mPFC, the role of the precuneus in ToM is less well-defined, though is 
believed to represent internal states, and/or lend visual imagery to enable the representation 
of another person’s perspective (Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). Given this latter proposed 
function, it is interesting that this region emerged exclusively for the ToM, and not the VPT 
task, with the latter predicted to draw upon visual imagery to simulate the alternative visual 
perspective. As such, it is tentatively proposed that ToM and Level 2 VPT may draw upon 
dissociable forms of visual imagery with distinct neural underpinnings (e.g., object versus 
spatial; Kozhevnikov, Kosslyn, & Shephard, 2005), though further studies incorporating 
manipulations of the visual requirements of the tasks are required to confirm this.  
 
Finally, poorer carer-reported perspective taking on the IRI questionnaire correlated with 
reduced grey matter integrity in IFG, precuneus, and TPJ. That is, the neural correlates of 
perspective taking in daily life incorporated regions also implicated in Level 2 VPT and ToM, 
implying perspective taking in everyday life may involve a combination of visual and ToM 
elements. Closer inspection of the IRI questionnaire supports this proposal, with the 
perspective taking subscale incorporating items that capture VPT (e.g., ‘seeing things from 
the other guy’s point of view’, as well as ToM (‘imagining how I would feel in their place’). 
This is in contrast to the divergence between Level 2 VPT performance and carer-reports of 
egocentric behaviour in daily life found in bvFTD, with the latter scale focusing more on 
empathic concern (i.e., the consideration of others, which involves additional emotional 
processing) rather than perspective taking per se. While no significant relationships between 
TPJ integrity and performance on Level 2 VPT and ToM tasks emerged in the current study, 
this region has previously been associated with both of these processes, attributable to its 
involvement in the representation of differing perspectives, regardless of task demands 
(McCleery et al., 2011; Perner et al., 2006). Taken together, these findings suggest that the 
fundamental processes of ToM and Level 2 VPT as measured in the laboratory, while 
potentially distinct from one another, may both be involved in perspective taking in the real-
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world: a process underpinned by a distributed brain network. Level 2 VPT, however, at least 
in bvFTD, is proposed to be distinct from the behavioural manifestations of empathy, with 
the ability to visually simulate another perspective perhaps not necessarily required for the 
consideration of others in everyday social interactions. 
 
Overall, by integrating theoretically driven, objective measures of perspective taking in the 
laboratory with ecologically valid insights into everyday behaviour, the findings of this study 
suggest that VPT and ToM form distinct abilities, with different cognitive and neural 
underpinnings. While Level 2 VPT was associated with mental rotation and brain regions 
associated with the inhibition of one’s own perspective, and inversely linked with egocentric 
behaviour (i.e., the empathic consideration of others), the neural correlates of ToM included 
areas implicated in socioemotional processing and visual imagery. Despite their dissociation 
in the laboratory, however, it is tentatively proposed that VPT and ToM may jointly occur in 
perspective taking in daily life, potentially drawing upon a distributed network of brain 
regions. As such, attempting to parcellate complex aspects of social interactions into discrete 
elements may overlook the ways in which they inherently intertwine in the real-world, and 
the importance of the broader social context. These findings have important implications for 
refining the understanding the interpersonal self. While the ability to adopt other’s 
perspectives has long been recognised as crucial for successful social relationships (Mead, 
1934), this study aids in characterising the distinct forms of perspective taking, which seem 
to both be important for interpersonal function. As was raised in Chapter 5, the severity of 
the impairment in social functioning in bvFTD may stem from the combined deficits in multiple 
dissociable components of the interpersonal self (in this case, both VPT and ToM). These ideas 
will be developed further in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
General discussion 
 
7.1. Introduction 
The objective of this thesis was to leverage modern theory and methods from cognitive 
neuroscience, combined with neurodegenerative lesion models, to improve characterisation 
of the neurocognitive mechanisms underlying the extended and interpersonal aspects of the 
‘self’. Employing a novel experimental method (the ‘NExt’ taxonomy), Part 1 of this thesis 
(Chapters 3 and 4) illustrates the complex interplay of episodic and semantic memory in 
supporting the extended self. Moreover, Part 2 (Chapters 5 and 6) reveals how the complex 
social interactions that comprise the interpersonal self can be deconstructed into several 
distinct, yet interacting, neurocognitive components. How these findings integrate with one 
another, and the broader literature on the self, will be considered in the following sections. 
Clinical implications will also be discussed, along with reflections on methodological 
limitations and potential future directions. 
 
7.2. Part 1: The extended self 
As outlined in Chapter 1, existing work on the extended self has predominantly focused on 
the contribution of episodic memory to the autonoetic, subjective component of self-
continuity. By contrast, the contribution of different forms of memory to one’s life story, i.e., 
narrative continuity of the self, remains poorly understood. Drawing upon contemporary 
theoretical frameworks proposing a continuum between episodic and semantic memory, the 
new scoring taxonomy employed in Chapters 3 and 4 (‘NExt’) reveals important insights into 
the mechanisms underlying narrative self-continuity. Distinct profiles of external details were 
uncovered for each patient group (AD and SD) compared with Controls, which varied across 
remote, recent, and future epochs. These details arguably represent relevant contextual 
background information for one’s life story, and as such, provide a proxy for narrative 
continuity of the self. In Chapter 1, it was hypothesised that episodic and semantic memory 
may differentially contribute to narrative continuity, contingent upon the time period (Figure 
1.4.). The fine-grained NExt method, however, exposes how a full spectrum of episodic to 
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semantic details may be used to support narrative continuity across all lifetime periods. 
Importantly, the novel findings from Part 1 of this thesis highlight how, in neurodegenerative 
disorders, episodic and semantic representations may be preferentially drawn upon to 
provide a sense of narrative self-continuity, in the face of impairment to their counterpart. 
Indeed, this observation aligns well with recent theoretical models (e.g., Irish, 2020; Renoult 
et al., 2019; Sekeres, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2018), which propose that memories may be 
recalled in many different ways, dependent upon the accessibility of the representations, and 
the demands of the situation or task. The current findings suggest that this flexibility in 
memory retrieval may also be applied when narrating one’s life story, with the available 
episodic or semantic content harnessed by AD and SD patients in order to maintain continuity 
of the extended self. Interestingly, such a shift toward the most preserved memory 
representations to support one’s life story has also been documented with the normal ageing 
process (Acevedo-Molina, Matijevic, & Grilli, 2019; Craik & Bialystok, 2006; Levine et al., 2002; 
Spreng et al., 2018), corresponding to the harnessing of intact brain regions (Spreng et al., 
2018). Whether this relative dependence on a ‘preferred’ memory type to provide narrative 
self-continuity also occurs in other clinical populations, however, or indeed, young, healthy 
individuals, remains to be determined. The individual differences in episodic and semantic 
autobiographical memory abilities and preferences, which map on to distinct neural 
fingerprints (Hodgetts et al., 2017; Sheldon et al., 2016; Spreng et al., 2018), do hint at this 
possibility. Nonetheless, as observed in the AD and SD patients in Chapters 3 and 4, this 
preference is expected to shift contingent upon the particular context, conditions under 
which autobiographies are narrated, as well as the current goals of the self (Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Future studies exploring the relationship between autobiographical 
memory and narrative self-continuity across an array of ages, clinical groups, and task 
conditions will be of utmost interest in further characterising how episodic and semantic 
memory give rise to a sense of self across time. 
 
Findings from Chapter 3 and 4 also unveil the temporal shift in the extended self that may 
occur in response to memory impairment. Namely, patients with AD, experiencing deficits in 
episodic memory and subjective continuity, retain a degree of narrative continuity for the 
remote past, supported by semantic memory. For the first time, however, this thesis reveals 
that some semblance of narrative continuity for recent time periods may also persist in AD. 
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Despite the specific profiles of external details in AD diverging between Chapters 3 and 4, 
these patients nonetheless provided an abundance of semantic information, compared with 
Controls, during autobiographical narration of the recent past in both studies. Typically, a 
temporal gradient exists for semantic ABM in AD, such that remote facts about the self remain 
preserved, in the context of impaired recall of personal semantic information for recent 
epochs (reviewed in Chapter 1). Accordingly, as proposed in Chapter 3, it is possible that the 
semantic details provided during recent ABM narration in AD are drawn from these patients’ 
early life, with their sense of self for the recent past experienced as markedly similar to their 
remote self. Unlike previous studies, however, this thesis suggests that the temporal gap 
between current reality and the preserved, remote self in AD may reflect a continuous form 
of self-narrative, albeit lacking in growth or change over time. Such observations provide a 
poignant reflection of the innate human tendency to maintain continuity in one’s sense of 
self, despite the disruptions produced by memory impairment (see also Conway, 2005; 
Medved & Brockmeier, 2008; Rathbone et al., 2009). On the other hand, the somewhat 
outdated or ‘petrified’ nature of the personal narrative in AD may lead to an unawareness of 
their disease (Mograbi, Brown, & Morris, 2009; Morris & Mograbi, 2013). This ‘anosognosia’ 
can negatively impact upon the quality of life of carers of AD patients (Conde-Sala et al., 
2016), who find the poor insight challenging to deal with. By contrast, it may have a somewhat 
protective effect for the mental wellbeing of patients themselves, with increased anosognosia 
associated with better quality of life in AD (Conde-Sala et al., 2016). These findings further 
highlight the complexity of the relationship between memory and the extended self, and its 
subsequent manifestation in daily life.   
 
This ‘static’ self-narrative for the past also appears to also persist into the future in both AD 
and SD. In Chapter 4, applying the NExt taxonomy, both patient groups were observed to 
project self-relevant information from their past, into their future life story. The composition 
of the details comprising these future narratives, however, varied for each patient group 
compared with Controls. The nature of the external detail profiles, combined with their 
neurocognitive correlates, suggested AD patients drew upon semantic information to 
populate their narrative, whereas SD patients harnessed episodic content. As such, the 
qualitative flavour of the future self likely diverges between these two patient groups. For 
example, a future self-narrative based upon episodic details from one’s recent past, as is the 
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case in SD, is likely to be more specific and rigid, than the more vague, general future life story 
drawn from semantic elements in AD. In fact, these contentions are borne out at the 
behavioural level, in the characteristic inflexibility observed in SD (Kamminga et al., 2014) and 
vagueness seen in AD (Klimova, Maresova, Valis, Hort, & Kuca, 2015). It is interesting to note, 
then, that marked anguish in relation to the static future self has been documented in SD 
(Hsiao et al., 2013). By contrast, a recent meta-analysis revealed associations between a less 
specific future self and higher levels of both major and subclinical depression (Gamble, 
Moreau, Tippett, & Addis, 2019). Further research is clearly required to clarify how the 
relative contributions of episodic and semantic memory to future self-narratives affects 
mental health and wellbeing.  
 
7.3. Part 2: The interpersonal self  
An individual’s moral traits, along with their ability to adopt other’s perspectives, enable the 
adaptive social interactions that give rise to the interpersonal self. The component 
mechanisms underlying these complex human processes, however, have remained 
incompletely characterised. Chapters 5 and 6 help to refine our understanding of the 
interpersonal self, by deconstructing the cognitive and neural underpinnings of morality and 
perspective taking. While typically considered an exclusively emotional process, Chapter 5 
unveils the additional importance of conceptual knowledge for highly conflictual personal 
moral reasoning, supported by a frontotemporal brain network. Findings from Chapter 6 
support a distinction between visual and conceptual (ToM) perspective taking, at both the 
cognitive and neural level. Despite their dissociation, however, these two forms of 
perspective taking appear to interact during social interactions in daily life. Taken together, 
findings from Part 2 of this thesis suggest that the interpersonal self hinges upon a synergy of 
emotional, conceptual, and visuospatial functions, underpinned by a widespread brain 
network incorporating DMN, as well as extra-DMN regions, namely medial and lateral 
prefrontal, parietal, and temporal cortices.  
 
Based on principles from lesion network neuroscience (Boes et al., 2015), impairment to one 
or more of the brain regions within the neural network uncovered in Part 2 of this thesis is 
expected to be sufficient to produce a disruption to the interpersonal self. Moreover, as 
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proposed in Chapters 5 and 6, the level of interpersonal dysfunction is expected to scale with 
the number of neurocognitive components affected. Indeed, observations in clinical 
populations support these proposals. For example, individuals with acquired, circumscribed 
lesions to bilateral amygdalae, despite primary deficits in emotion processing, do not display 
obvious impairments in social behaviour (Ortega-Escobar, Alcázar-Córcoles, Puente-
Rodríguez, & Peñaranda-Ramos, 2017). On the other hand, the developmental disorder of 
psychopathy is associated with structural and functional abnormalities of the amygdala, but 
involves additional disruptions to orbitofrontal and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Blair, 
2013). These patients display marked social dysfunction, including disproportionate rates of 
criminality (Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011). Nonetheless, in some cases, individuals with psychopathy 
may function somewhat effectively in society (Patrick, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1994). This may be 
attributable to their preserved social conceptual knowledge (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010), 
and ability to adopt alternative visual perspectives (Drayton et al., 2018), despite a reduced 
propensity to do so. By contrast, bvFTD patients experience degradation to all of the 
component processes of the interpersonal self characterised in this thesis, resulting in 
pervasive impairments in social functioning. The relative contribution and level of importance 
of each of the fundamental cognitive and neural mechanisms in producing the interpersonal 
self, however, remains to be uncovered. In fact, it is possible that specific neurobiological 
processes may be disproportionately implicated. For example, early deposition of pathology 
in bvFTD is thought to selectively target von Economo neurons, which reside exclusively in 
the salience network (i.e., ACC and insula) (Seeley, 2008). These neurons are hypothesised to 
be evolutionarily specialised to allow rapid responses to social situations, including those 
crucial for the interpersonal self, such as adopting others’ perspectives, and making decisions 
in situations of high conflict/ambiguity (Allman, Watson, Tetreault, & Hakeem, 2005). Studies 
comparing distinct clinical groups, with varying degrees of socio-cognitive and neural 
impairment, on a combination of experimental tasks, real-world behavioural measures, and 
neuroimaging, will be of pivotal importance in exploring these claims.  
 
Further intriguing insights about the nature of the interpersonal self stem from the 
experimental findings in bvFTD in this thesis. These patients reflect somewhat of a paradox, 
by which they become increasingly self-centered with the onset of disease, and have difficulty 
shifting from their own perspective, though in turn, this egocentricity leads to the dysfunction 
Chapter 7 
 157 
in social interactions and the subsequent breakdown of the interpersonal self described in 
Chapter 1. Interpersonal relationships are particularly affected by the egocentricity in bvFTD 
(Takeda et al., 2019), given this behaviour represents a stark contrast from the individuals’ 
premorbid personality, which is difficult for close others to adjust to (Strohminger & Nichols, 
2015; see further in Section 7.4.). According to Neisser’s (1988) model of the five selves, the 
‘ecological self’ represents the self as perceived with respect to the physical environment, 
that is, one’s egocentric perspective of the world. As such, the ecological self appears to be 
heightened in bvFTD (egocentric navigation is also intact, Tu, Spiers, Hodges, Piguet, & 
Hornberger, 2017), but this comes at the expense of a disrupted interpersonal self. The extent 
of the difficulties in everyday functioning that occur in bvFTD, however, suggest that the 
interpersonal, compared with the ecological, aspect of the self may be more important for 
adaptive functioning in daily life. In fact, the disintegration in the ecological self that occurs 
during certain psychological states (e.g., meditation, under the influence of psychedelic 
drugs) often results in an increased feeling of connection to others (i.e., a heightened 
interpersonal self) (Letheby & Gerrans, 2017; Millière, Carhart-Harris, Roseman, Trautwein, 
& Berkovich-Ohana, 2018; Nour, Evans, Nutt, & Carhart-Harris, 2016). This perception 
corresponds to increased whole-brain functional connectivity with the TPJ and insula 
(Tagliazucchi et al., 2016), key regions implicated in the interpersonal self (Chapters 5 and 6). 
Most importantly, the extent of dissolution of the ecological self under the psychedelic state 
strongly correlates with subjective ratings of subsequent improvements in well-being (Nour 
et al., 2016). As such, it is proposed that a precise balance may need to be struck between 
the different aspects of the self in order to ensure optimal functioning. While this thesis 
exclusively focused on extended and interpersonal aspects of the self, further cognitive 
neuroscientific examination of the other ‘selves’ proposed by Neisser (1988), and their 
interactions, is clearly required. 
 
7.4. The self  
Collectively, this thesis uncovers the multiple distinct cognitive and neural mechanisms that 
underlie interpersonal and extended aspects of the self. By further breaking down the self 
into its constituent elements, the current body of work extends our understanding of the 
building blocks that lay beneath the elusive construct of the self. Despite this demonstrated 
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ability to deconstruct the self, however, in reality the self is experienced as a coherent and 
continuous whole. Extensive philosophical debate has ensued regarding how the separate 
components of the self are perceived as a unified entity. The ‘pattern theory’ of self holds 
that a number of discrete features together give rise to the self, though on their own do not 
constitute a self (S. Gallagher, 2013). This theory is likened to the underpinnings of emotion, 
whereby distinct components such as autonomic processes, expressions, cognitions, and 
situational aspects are not themselves sufficient, but in combination produce an emotion (S. 
Gallagher, 2013). Extending this theory, in this thesis the patterns underlying the self, and 
their cognitive and neural nature, are further characterised. What is it then, that holds these 
disparate elements together? Clues may be drawn from the field of etymology, with the word 
‘self’ stemming from the Old Gothic word for ‘I’ and the Anglo-Saxon word for ‘same’ (Levin, 
1992). In other words, it is the same I who remembers the past and imagines the future, and 
behaves a certain way across social situations, with this consistency across time and place 
proposed to represent the glue that binds the self (see also Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). 
If this consistency is able to be maintained, even in the face of impairment to its 
neurocognitive underpinnings, some persistence of the self is expected. For example, in AD 
and SD, despite the alterations to the component processes underlying the extended self 
revealed in Chapters 3 and 4, these patients nonetheless seem to retain relative consistency 
in their self-narrative across time. By contrast, as documented in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
interpersonal self in bvFTD undergoes marked changes when compared with previous social 
behaviour in these individuals. It is precisely this departure from the patients’ premorbid 
personality that leads to such profound distress in close others and results in the deterioration 
of interpersonal relationships (Strohminger & Nichols, 2015). The lack of consistency in the 
self in bvFTD therefore seems to result in much more severe disruptions to daily functioning, 
compared with the other syndromes.  
 
While considered separately in this thesis, the extended and interpersonal aspects of the self 
are inherently intertwined. For example, ABM has an important social function, enabling the 
building of intimacy and trust within relationships, and the display of empathy (Alea & Bluck, 
2003). Indeed, memories of personal experiences and facts about the self contribute to moral 
decision making (Casebeer & Churchland, 2003), inference of others’ mental states (Duclos, 
Desgranges, Eustache, & Laisney, 2018), empathic responding (Ciaramelli, Bernardi, & 
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Moscovitch, 2013), and prosocial behaviour (Gaesser & Schacter, 2014). Furthermore, 
patients with episodic amnesia display alterations in moral reasoning (McCormick et al., 2016) 
(but see Craver et al., 2016), empathy (Beadle, Tranel, Cohen, & Duff, 2013), and social 
judgment (Staniloiu, Borsutzky, Woermann, & Markowitsch, 2013), along with difficulty 
establishing and maintaining social relationships (Davidson, Drouin, Kwan, Moscovitch, & 
Rosenbaum, 2012). Finally, a relationship between impairments in ABM and ToM have also 
been uncovered in individuals with schizophrenia (Corcoran & Frith, 2003) and autism (Adler, 
Nadler, Eviatar, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2010). The relationship between the extended and 
interpersonal selves, however, is not unidirectional, with social processes also affecting 
memory. In particular, moral traits and memories of moral actions are central to the 
construction of one’s autobiographical narrative (Stanley, Henne, & De Brigard, 2019; Stanley, 
Henne, Iyengar, Sinnott-Armstrong, & De Brigard, 2017). Remembering the past and 
imagining the future also often involves VPT, with approximately one-third of episodic ABMs 
spontaneously recalled from a third-person (i.e., observer) rather than first-person (i.e., field) 
perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). These egocentric and allocentric reference frames 
employed during recollection and imagination overlap with those applied to social situations, 
when representing the perspective of self and others (Arzy & Schacter, 2019). Perspective-
taking is further involved in establishing a self-narrative, with accurate representation of 
one’s personality traits requiring the ‘seeing’ of one’s own social behaviour through the eyes 
of others (Ruby et al., 2009; Ruby et al., 2007). Despite this established overlap between 
extended and interpersonal aspects of the self, few studies have comprehensively examined 
these functions, and their interactions, within the same sample of participants: which 
represents an essential direction for future research. Experimental paradigms combining 
these two aspects, such as generating (past/future) personal events involving moral 
transgressions (e.g., Stanley et al., 2017), or relating to other people versus oneself (e.g., 
Bertossi, Tesini, Cappelli, & Ciaramelli, 2016), may also be of interest in this regard. 
 
Nonetheless, considering the syndromes of AD, SD, and bvFTD provides preliminary insights 
into the relationship between the interpersonal and extended selves. First, observations in 
AD and SD hint at a role for personal semantic memory in supporting interpersonal functions. 
Namely, patients with AD, in which the extended self appears to be largely supported by 
semantic processes (see Chapters 3 and 4), are widely reported to maintain appropriate social 
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functioning, at least in the mild-to-moderate stages of the disease. In particular, social graces, 
interpersonal warmth, and the ability to form and maintain interpersonal relationships 
remain intact in AD (Rankin, Kramer, Mychack, & Miller, 2003; Sabat & Gladstone, 2010; Sabat 
& Lee, 2011), along with empathic concern and behaviour (Dermody et al., 2016). In fact, 
preliminary evidence suggests that socio-emotional sensitivity and empathy may even be 
enhanced with the onset of AD (Sturm et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2010). By contrast, in SD, where 
the extended self relies upon recent episodic experiences, patients can exhibit similar social 
behavioural disturbances to those seen bvFTD (Hodges & Patterson, 2007), albeit to a milder 
degree, corresponding to the encroachment of atrophy into right frontotemporal regions 
(Irish, Hodges, et al., 2014). This includes deficits in ToM (Duval, Bejanin, et al., 2012; Irish, 
Hodges, et al., 2014) and empathy (Rankin et al., 2006; Rankin, Kramer, & Miller, 2005), along 
with increased egocentric behaviour manifesting in a failure to consider others’ perspectives 
(Bon et al., 2009). Few studies, however, have directly examined the contribution of personal 
semantic memory to the interpersonal self. On the other hand, patients with bvFTD, 
presenting with severe disruptions to multiple components of the interpersonal self 
(characterised in Chapters 5 and 6), additionally appear to experience pervasive impairments 
in both subjective (Bastin et al., 2011; Irish, Hodges, & Piguet, 2013; Irish, Hornberger, et al., 
2011) and narrative (Irish et al., 2013; Thomas-Anterion, Jacquin, & Laurent, 2000) aspects of 
self-continuity. Such alterations to the extended self in bvFTD, though, are attributed as 
secondary to the social dysfunction and alterations in personality and behaviour that define 
the interpersonal self (Irish, Piguet, & Hodges, 2012; Wong et al., 2017). Empirical studies 
examining the directionality of the association between extended and interpersonal aspects 
of the self will therefore be of critical interest. Given neurodegenerative populations may also 
experience alterations to the other ‘selves’ defined by Neisser (i.e., the ecological, private, 
and conceptual self) (see Seeley & Miller, 2005), exploring these additional aspects of the self, 
and their interactions, represents another important future research direction.   
 
As outlined in Chapter 1, at a neural level, the experience of the ‘self’ has primarily been 
attributed to the DMN. This spatially-distributed brain network is anchored on cortical midline 
regions (i.e., mPFC and PCC), believed particularly crucial for self-referential processing 
(Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004), though also incorporates medial and lateral temporal and 
parietal structures. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the mPFC emerged as the sole 
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common neural correlate of the extended and interpersonal self across all studies in this 
thesis (Chapters 4-6). In addition, however, a widespread neural network beyond the mPFC 
was also implicated, which included regions both common and unique to the extended and 
interpersonal self (Figure 7.1.). Namely, components of the DMN including medial and lateral 
parietal cortices were associated with both aspects of the self (Chapters 4 and 6), with medial 
and lateral temporal regions correlating exclusively with moral reasoning performance 
(Chapter 5). Surprisingly, though, regions beyond the DMN were implicated in both the 
extended and interpersonal self, including lateral prefrontal cortices typically considered part 
of the frontoparietal or ‘executive control’ network (Menon, 2011). As such, evidence from 
this thesis suggests that the self is not necessarily specific to the mPFC or DMN. It is 
interestingly to note that the DMN and frontoparietal networks represent the most 
phylogenetically recent regions within the human brain (Hill et al., 2010; Vendetti & Bunge, 
2014). This is of particular relevance given the uniquely human nature of the self, specifically 
its extended and interpersonal components (MacLean, 2016; Suddendorf & Busby, 2003) (but 
see Fabbro, Aglioti, Bergamasco, Clarici, & Panksepp, 2015; Hills & Butterfill, 2015). Further 
studies of comparative psychology and neurobiology will help to clarify whether the 
emergence of a sense of self in human evolution may have been the product of the concurrent 
development of the multiple, higher-level neurocognitive processes characterised in this 
thesis. 
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Figure 7.1. Brain regions associated with the extended (purple) and interpersonal (red) 
aspects of the self in this thesis. This is not intended to represent an exhaustive 
neurocognitive model of the self, rather, it encompasses those aspects that were examined 
in this thesis (i.e., moral reasoning, perspective taking, and future narrative self-continuity). 
ATL = anterior temporal lobe; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex; 
OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; ToM = theory of mind; TPJ = temporoparietal junction; VPT = visual 
perspective taking. 
 
7.5. Clinical implications 
In addition to extending the theoretical characterisation of the self, this thesis has a number 
of significant clinical implications. By highlighting the dynamic and multifaceted nature in 
which the self may change with the onset of different forms of dementia, these findings have 
important ramifications for person-centered care. Notably, in contrast to a prevailing view in 
the field (as noted by Feast et al., 2016), this thesis reveals how the self is not entirely lost in 
dementia. Rather, by leveraging those cognitive and neural functions which remain relatively 
preserved, patients with AD and SD may maintain some sense of self-continuity, albeit 
temporally shifted. Understanding the self-experience of these patients can inform 
personalised management strategies. For example, environments may be modified and 
Chapter 7 
 163 
communication tailored to support the individual’s current sense of self, such as encouraging 
the enacting of roles from remote lifetime periods in AD (e.g., a previous nurse helping out in 
the nursing home, interactions with young children), and the provision of regular routines in 
SD (e.g., allowing repetition of recently performed activities for which they have preserved 
recollection). Furthermore, as outlined in Section 7.3., despite demonstrating impairments 
across all constituent elements of the interpersonal self, bvFTD patients nonetheless appear 
to retain some ecological sense of self, manifesting as a heightened representation of their 
own egocentric perspective of the world. This observation, combined with the established 
impairments in mentally-projecting oneself beyond the here-and-now in bvFTD (see Section 
7.4. and O’Callaghan, Shine, Hodges, Andrews-Hanna, & Irish, 2019), suggests that 
interactions with these patients may be most successful if focused on the immediately 
perceived environment. While such a reorienting of attention towards preserved, rather than 
impaired, function in neurological patients is not new (Caddell & Clare, 2011; Clark & Maguire, 
2016; Midorikawa et al., 2016; B. L. Miller & Hou, 2004), this thesis is the first to offer a 
comprehensive breakdown of the specific elements of the extended and interpersonal self 
that are affected versus intact in different dementia syndromes, with the aim to improve 
functioning and quality of life in these individuals.   
 
7.6. Methodological considerations 
Collectively, this thesis emphasises the utility of cognitive neuroscience in refining the 
understanding of philosophical constructs. Several methodological issues regarding this 
approach, however, warrant consideration.  
 
In Chapters 3 and 4, external details on the Autobiographical Interview (AI) and Past-Future 
task are employed as a measure of narrative continuity. These details are held to represent 
the contextual, background information that is integral to one’s life story. The AI and Past-
Future task are extremely popular tools for examining ABM and episodic future thinking, 
though unfortunately a large portion of the data collected with these measures (i.e., the 
external details) is often discarded or inaccurately interpreted (see Chapter 3). As such, the 
NExt taxonomy provides a resourceful means of harnessing existing data in order to provide 
relevant insights into narrative self-continuity. As mentioned in Chapter 4, however, the 
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differential methodology (i.e., cues, probing, and number of events) of the AI and Past-Future 
task may affect the composition of information within the narratives provided, limiting 
comparability between the tasks. Furthermore, it should be noted that these tasks directly 
probe for an account of a specific episode, rather than requesting a description of one’s life 
story, which has the potential to bias the nature of the subsequent details elicited. 
Interestingly, however, in healthy older adults the nature of the information provided within 
descriptions of unique events on the AI is largely similar to that provided when participants 
are explicitly asked to narrate their life story (Acevedo-Molina et al., 2019). Further studies 
comparing the full spectrum of episodic to semantic information provided during these two 
types of autobiographical narration (using the NExt taxonomy), across various populations, 
will aid in confirming the utility of AI external details as a measure of narrative continuity.  
 
Like the majority of psychological research, existing studies of the extended and interpersonal 
self, including the current thesis, have predominantly been conducted in Western, educated, 
industrialised, rich, and democratic (i.e., WEIRD) societies, who only represent approximately 
12% of the world’s population (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Such findings regarding 
the cognitive and neurobiological underpinnings of the self, therefore, are not necessarily 
generalisable to humankind as a whole. For example, the importance of specific episodic 
memories for supporting the extended self appears to be unique to Western cultures, with 
such detailed remembering of one’s own experiences seen as incongruent with Asian societal 
norms that emphasise a collective, rather than unique, identity (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). 
In fact, highly specific, episodic remembering has been associated with negative mental 
health and wellbeing in Chinese individuals (Wang, Hou, Koh, Song, & Yang, 2018). In this 
culture, personal semantic facts including general events, that convey social routines and 
schemas, may be more important for supporting the extended self (Wang et al., 2018). Similar 
cultural differences are also evident in the mechanisms underlying the interpersonal self. 
While morality is often assumed to represent an innate and universal human capacity 
(Fleischacker, 1997), emerging evidence points to significant variation in the cognitive 
processes employed, and even brain regions involved, in moral decision making across 
cultures (reviewed in Sachdeva, Singh, & Medin, 2011). The crucial role of social norms in 
moral reasoning revealed in Chapter 5 further supports this notion, in that moral decisions 
are likely largely influenced by the behaviours considered socially acceptable in one’s own 
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society. Intriguingly, distinct neural correlates of perspective taking have also emerged across 
cultures, with distinct recruitment of IFG and TPJ during ToM in American versus Japanese 
individuals (Kobayashi, Glover, & Temple, 2007). Evidently, cross-cultural studies will be vital 
for accurately characterising the nature of the self across our entire species.  
 
As a final remark, consistent with the majority of studies in cognitive neuroscience, the 
psychological tests employed in this thesis relied upon self-reports, via either detailed 
descriptions or simple multiple-choice responses. Accordingly, these measures inherently 
require some access to one’s subjective consciousness (Caddell & Clare, 2013). Directly 
testing whether patients with dementia indeed retain the ability to reliably report their 
personal mental experience, however, is an extremely difficult endeavour (Caddell & Clare, 
2013). As discussed in Chapter 1, therefore, it is important to draw upon observable 
manifestations of the self (i.e., patient behaviour) as convergent evidence for the findings 
from cognitive neuroscience measures. In addition to anecdotal reports and carer 
questionnaires, though, borrowing tools from the fields of evolutionary, comparative, and 
developmental psychology may also prove useful in capturing behavioural expressions of the 
self. For example, the classic ‘mirror mark test’ is often used in children and animals to 
ascertain the presence of a ‘self’ (Gallup Jr, Anderson, & Shillito, 2002). In this test, 
unbeknownst to the participant, a mark is placed on the individual’s forehead. The participant 
is then presented with a mirror, with touching of the mark interpreted as reflecting an intact 
sense of self. Such self-recognition, however, only represents the presence of an ‘ecological’ 
or ‘physical’ self (Neisser, 1988). By contrast, a lesser-used extension of this task, involving 
delayed video feedback, provides a behavioural measure of the extended self (Povinelli, 
Landau, & Perilloux, 1996). This time, the placing of the mark on the forehead is filmed, with 
participants later watching the footage. Touching of the mark during viewing of the video is 
therefore interpreted as recognition of one’s past self, reflecting preserved self-continuity. As 
such, the video mark test may be employed to objectively characterise the extended self in 
cognitively impaired populations, in which self-report measures are not appropriate. Such 
cross-disciplinary collaborations represent an exciting opportunity to bring us closer to an 
exhaustive model of how a sense of self is produced. 
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7.7. Conclusions 
By integrating philosophy, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical lesion populations, this thesis 
offers novel insights into the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying the extended and 
interpersonal aspects of the self. These findings highlight the importance of both episodic and 
semantic memory for supporting a sense of self-continuity. Indeed, the relative contribution 
of these forms of memory to the extended self may scale dependent upon the integrity of its 
counterpart, the lifetime period in question, as well as the task demands and current goals of 
the self. Further, multiple neurocognitive processes underpinning the interpersonal self are 
uncovered, including emotional, conceptual, and visuospatial functions, supported by frontal, 
parietal, and temporal brain regions. Finally, at a clinical level, distinct profiles of the self 
across AD, SD, and bvFTD reveal how ‘all is not lost’ in neurodegeneration. Together, this 
thesis highlights the complex and multifaced nature of the self, ultimately advancing our 
understanding of what it means to be human. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Table A2.1. Summarised international consensus criteria for Alzheimer’s disease (AD)  
Dementia 
Presence of cognitive or behavioural symptoms that: 
Interfere with functioning 
Represent a decline from previous levels of functioning 
Are not explained by delirium or major psychiatric disorder 
Are detected and diagnosed through a combination of history-taking and objective 
assessment 
Involve a minimum of two of the following domains: 
Memory 
Executive function 
Visuospatial function 
Language 
Personality or behaviour  
Probable AD 
Meets criteria for dementia, AND 
Insidious onset  
Clear deterioration in cognition 
Initial and most prominent deficits are evidence in one of the following categories: 
Amnestic presentation: deficits include impairment in learning and recall of 
recently learned information, along with cognitive dysfunction in one other 
cognitive domain 
Non-amnestic presentations: 
Language presentation: most prominent deficits are in word-finding, but 
deficits in other cognitive domains are also present 
  204 
Visuospatial presentation: most prominent deficits are in spatial cognition, 
but deficits in other cognitive domains are also present 
Executive dysfunction: most prominent deficits are impaired reasoning, 
judgment, and problem-solving, but deficits in other cognitive domains are 
also present 
Notes: Taken from McKhann et al. (2011).  
 
Table A2.2. Summarised international consensus criteria for semantic dementia (SD)  
Primary progressive aphasia (PPA) 
Most prominent clinical feature is difficulty with language 
These deficits are the principal cause of impaired daily living activities 
Aphasia should be the most prominent deficit at symptom onset and for the initial phases 
of the disease 
Semantic dementia (SD) 
Meets criteria for PPA 
Both of the following core features must be present: 
Impaired confrontation naming 
Impaired single word comprehension 
At least three of the following other diagnostic features must be present: 
Impaired object knowledge 
Surface dyslexia or dysgraphia 
Spared repetition 
Spared speech production (grammar and motor speech) 
Imaging supported diagnosis of SD 
Clinical diagnosis of SD, AND 
Neuroimaging results consistent with SD (i.e., predominant anterior temporal lobe 
atrophy on MRI and/or predominant anterior temporal lobe 
hypometabolism/hypoperfusion on PET or SPECT) 
SD with definite pathology 
Clinical diagnosis of SD, AND 
Histopathological evidence of a specific neurodegenerative pathology, OR 
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Presence of a known pathogenic mutation 
Notes: Taken from Gorno-Tempini et al. (2011). MRI = magnetic resonance imaging; PET = 
positron emission tomography; SPECT = single-photon emission computed tomography. 
 
Table A2.3 Summarised international consensus criteria for the behavioural variant of 
frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD)  
Possible bvFTD 
Three of the following symptoms must be present, persistent, and/or recurrent: 
Disinhibition 
Apathy 
Loss of empathy 
Perseverative/stereotyped behaviour 
Hyperorality/dietary changes 
Executive function deficits with relative sparing of memory & visuospatial function 
Probable bvFTD 
Meets criteria for possible bvFTD  
Exhibits significant functional decline 
Neuroimaging results consistent with bvFTD (i.e., frontal and/or temporal atrophy 
on MRI/CT; frontal and/or temporal hypometabolism/hypoperfusion on PET or 
SPECT) 
Definite bvFTD 
Meets criteria for possible or probable bvFTD, AND 
Histopathological evidence of FTLD on biopsy or post-mortem, OR 
Presence of a known pathogenic mutation 
Notes: Taken from Rascovsky et al. (2011). CT = computed tomography; FTLD = 
frontotemporal lobar degeneration; MRI = magnetic resonance imaging; PET = positron 
emission tomography; SPECT = single-photon emission computed tomography. 
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A3.1. Excerpt from a Control participant’s memory with external details (Specific Episodes [SE], 
Extended Episodes [EE], Personal Semantics [PS] and General Semantics [GS]) separated 
according to the NExt taxonomy, and internal (INT) details delineated based on the original 
Levine et al. (2002) scoring protocol  
“My 2 children… both travelled from England [GS] for my 70th birthday (INT)… my son said to 
me ‘Did you have an inkling that I was coming?’ [SE]…And we all went out (INT)… they took 
me to a beautiful restaurant (INT)… and it was just superb (INT)… It was a restaurant that I’d 
always wanted to go to [PS]. It was a very exclusive restaurant [GS]… always, when I drove 
past, used to look at it and think, ‘Oh, one day I’d like to go there’ [EE].” 
 
A3.2. Overall performance on the AI 
Figure A3.1. displays the Total Content details summed across all time points for each group. 
Total content did not significantly differ between the groups (F(2, 47 = 1.74, p = .19).  
 
A3.3. Internal detail performance 
Across all time periods combined, a significant between-group effect was apparent (F(2, 47) 
= 9.94, p < .001), such that patient groups provided significantly less Internal details than 
Controls (ps = .003 and .001 for SD and AD, respectively), with no significant differences 
between AD and SD (p = 1.00) (Figure A3.2.). This was also the case for the Remote period 
(F(2, 47) = 7.36, p  = .002), with patients providing less Internal details than Controls (ps = .01 
& .003 for SD and AD), and no significant between-patient group differences (p = 1.00). 
However, in the Recent period (F(2, 47) = 6.85, p = .002), while ADs gave significantly less 
Internal details than Controls (p =  .002), SDs performed at Control level (p  = .11). No 
significant differences were found between SD and AD (p = .68). 
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A3.4. Overall external detail performance 
No between-group differences emerged for External details provided across all time periods 
combined (F(2, 47) = .24, p = .79), nor for the Remote (F(2, 47) = .66, p = .52) or Recent periods 
(F 2, 47) = .49, p = .61) (Figure A3.3.). 
 
A3.5. Effect of dementia onset during Middle Adulthood on AI performance 
No significant differences in the number of Total Content, Internal details, or any of the NExt 
external detail categories (Specific Episodes, Extended Episodes, Personal Semantic or 
General Semantics) for the Middle Adulthood period were apparent between patients with 
disease onset during this period (i.e., between age 35 and 55 years) and those with onset 
post-age 55 in either SD (Total Content: U = 15, p = .63; Internal: U = 16, p = .75; SE: U = 17.5, 
p = .94; EE: 12.5, p = .37; PS: U = 13.5, p = .46, GS: U = 16.5, p = .81) or AD patients (Total 
Content: U = 27, p = .92; Internal: U = 25, p = .75; SE: U = 25, p = .75; EE: U = 24, p = .67; PS: U 
= 24.5, p = .71, GS: U = 26.5, p = .87). This suggests that dementia onset in the Middle 
Adulthood period did not impact upon the profile of details provided for this epoch. 
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Figure A3.1. Total Content details summed across all time periods for each group (estimated 
marginal means controlling for age; error bars represent SEM). SD: semantic dementia; AD: 
Alzheimer’s disease.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3.2. Total Internal details summed across all time periods for each group (estimated 
marginal means controlling for age; error bars represent SEM). SD: semantic dementia; AD: 
Alzheimer’s disease. Significant difference from Control performance at ** p < .01. 
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Figure A3.3. Total External details summed across all time periods for each group (estimated 
marginal means controlling for age; error bars represent SEM). SD: semantic dementia; AD: 
Alzheimer’s disease.  
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A4.1. Excerpt from a Control participant’s future event with external details (Specific Episodes 
[SE], Extended Episodes [EE], Personal Semantics [PS] and General Semantics [GS]) separated 
according to the NExt taxonomy, and internal (INT) details delineated based on the original 
Levine et al. (2002) scoring protocol 
“I love driving cars [PS]… I’m thinking of changing (INT) to a twin cab (INT) with similar power 
(INT). That means I can put the boat trailer [EE] and the motor [EE] and everything in the back 
[EE] and still put the dogs [EE] in the backseat [EE] and still go [EE]... We may even upgrade 
the caravan [SE]. It will happen in Melbourne (INT)… knowing Melbourne it could be one of 
three seasons [GS].” 
 
A4.2. Overall performance on the Past-Future thinking task 
Figure A4.1. displays the Total Content details provided by each group, for Past and Future 
events. For the Past period, a significant between-group effect emerged (F(2, 35) = 6.99, p = 
.003, partial h2 = .29), such that AD patients provided significantly less Total Content than 
Controls (p  = .002). No significant differences emerged between SD and Control (p = .45) or 
SD and AD patients (p = .07). A similar pattern was apparent for Future events (F(2, 35) = 4.23, 
p = .02, partial h2 = .20), with less Total Content details provided by AD compared with 
Controls (p  = .02), with no significant differences between SD and Control (p = .23) or AD (p 
= .62) groups.  
 
A4.3. Internal detail performance 
For Past events, a significant between-group effect emerged for Internal details (F(2, 35) = 
15.94, p < .001,  partial h2 = .48, such that AD patients produced significantly less Internal 
details compared with Controls (p < .001) and SDs (p = .01), while SD patients performed in 
line with Controls (p = .05) (Figure A4.2.). For Future events, a significant effect of group was 
also found (F(2, 35) = 23.77, p < .001, partial h2 = .58, with both SD and AD groups providing 
reduced Internal details compared with Controls (ps both < .001). No significant differences 
emerged between SD and AD groups (p = .98).  
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A4.5. Overall external detail performance 
No between-group differences emerged for the External details provided for Past (F(2, 35) = 
.97, p = .39, partial h2 = .05) or Future (F(2, 35) = 2.56, p = .09, partial h2 = .13) events (Figure 
A4.3.).   
 
 
 
Figure A4.1. Violin plots representing the mean Total Content details provided by each group, 
for Past (left) and Future (right) events. AD = Alzheimer’s disease; SD = semantic dementia. 
Asterisks denote significant difference between groups at *p < .05 and **p < .01. 
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Figure A4.2.  Violin plots representing the mean Internal details provided by each group, for 
Past (left) and Future (right) events. AD = Alzheimer’s disease; SD = semantic dementia. 
Asterisks denote significant difference between groups at *p < .05 and ***p < .001. 
 
 
Figure A4.3. Violin plots representing the mean External details provided by each group, for 
Past (left) and Future (right) events. AD = Alzheimer’s disease; SD = semantic dementia.  
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A5.1. Neutral scenarios 
You have brought your broken DVD player to the local repair shop. The woman working at 
the shop tells you that it will cost you about $100 to have it fixed. You notice that the 
electronics shop next door is selling a new DVD player, which is slightly better than your old 
one, for $100. Would you have your old DVD player fixed in order to avoid spending money 
on a new one? 
 
You are a farmer on a tractor that is approaching two different paths. By choosing the path 
on the left you can pick 30 tonnes of apples. By choosing the path on the right you can pick 
15 tonnes of apples. If you do nothing your tractor will turn to the left. Would you turn your 
tractor to the right in order to harvest 15 tonnes of apples instead of 30? 
 
You want to buy a new computer. At the moment the computer that you want costs $1000. 
A friend who knows a lot about computers has told you that this computer’s price will drop 
to $500 next month. If you wait until next month to buy your new computer you will have to 
use your old computer for a few weeks longer than you would like to. Nevertheless you will 
be able to do everything you need to do using your old computer during that time. Would 
you use your old computer for a few more weeks in order to save $500 on the purchase of a 
new computer? 
 
An old friend has invited you to spend the weekend with him at his holiday home down the 
coast. You plan to travel there by car, and there are two routes that you can take: the highway 
and the coastal road. The highway will get you to your friend’s house in about three hours, 
but the scenery along the highway is very boring. The coastal road will get you to your friend’s 
house in about three hours and fifteen minutes, and the scenery along the coastal road is 
breathtakingly beautiful. Would you take the coastal road in order to look at the beautiful 
scenery as you drive? 
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A5.2. Impersonal moral dilemmas 
You are at the wheel of a runaway train quickly approaching a fork in the tracks. On the track 
to the left is a group of five railway workmen. On the track to the right there is one railway 
workman. If you do nothing the train will continue to the left, causing the deaths of the five 
workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to hit a switch on your 
dashboard that will cause the train to go to the right, causing the death of one workman. 
Would you hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the five workmen? 
 
You are a hospital security guard. Due to an accident in the building next door, there are 
deadly fumes rising up through the hospital’s ventilation system. In a certain room of the 
hospital are three patients. In another room there is one patient. If you do nothing the fumes 
will rise up into the room containing the three patients and cause their deaths. 
The only way to avoid the deaths of these patients is to hit a switch, which will cause the 
fumes to bypass the room containing the three patients. As a result of doing this the fumes 
will enter the room containing the single patient, causing his death. Would you hit the switch 
in order to avoid the deaths of the three patients? 
 
You are walking down the street when you find a wallet lying on the ground. You open the 
wallet and find that it contains several hundred dollars in cash as well the owner’s driver’s 
licence. From the credit cards and other items in the wallet it’s very clear that the wallet’s 
owner is wealthy. You, on the other hand, have been hit by hard times recently and could 
really use some extra money. You consider sending the wallet back to the owner without the 
cash, keeping the cash for yourself. Would you keep the money you found in the wallet in 
order to have more money for yourself? 
 
You are the owner of a small business trying to make ends meet. You realise that you could 
lower your taxes by pretending that some of your personal expenses are business expenses. 
For example, you could pretend that the stereo in your bedroom is being used in the lounge 
at the office, or that your dinners out with your wife are dinners with clients. Would you 
pretend that certain personal expenses are business expenses in order to lower your taxes? 
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A5.3. Personal low-conflict moral dilemmas 
You are a doctor. You have five patients, each of whom is about to die due to a failing organ 
of some kind. You have another patient who is a healthy young man. The only way that you 
can save the lives of the first five patients is to transplant five of this healthy young man’s 
organs (against his will) into the bodies of the other five patients. If you do this, the young 
man will die, but the other five patients will live. Would you perform this transplant in order 
to save five of your patients? 
 
Your plane has crashed in the mountains. The only survivors are yourself, another man, and 
a young boy. The three of you travel for days, battling extreme cold and wind. Your only 
chance at survival is to find your way to a small village on the other side of the mountain, 
several days away. The boy has a broken leg and cannot move very quickly. He basically has 
zero chance of surviving the journey. Without food, you and the other man will probably die 
as well. The other man suggests that you kill the boy and eat his remains over the next few 
days. Would you kill this boy so that you and the other man might survive your journey to 
safety? 
 
A5.4. Personal high-conflict moral dilemmas  
You are the leader of a small group of soldiers. You are deep in enemy territory when one of 
your men steps in a trap that has been set by the enemy and is badly injured. The trap is 
connected to a radio device that by now has alerted the enemy to your presence. They will 
soon be on their way. If the enemy finds your injured man they will torture him and kill him.  
He begs you not to leave him behind, but if you try to take him with you your entire group 
will be captured. The only way to prevent this injured soldier from being tortured is to shoot 
him yourself. Would you shoot this soldier in order to prevent him from being tortured by the 
enemy? 
 
You are part of a group of ecologists who live in a remote stretch of jungle. The entire group, 
which includes eight children, has been taken hostage by a group of terrorists. One of the 
terrorists takes a liking to you. He tells you that his leader plans to kill you and the rest of the 
hostages the next morning. He is willing to help you and the children escape, but as an act of 
good faith he wants you to kill one of your fellow hostages whom he does not like. If you 
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refuse his offer all the hostages including the children and yourself will die. If you accept his 
offer then the others will die in the morning but you and the eight children will escape. Would 
you kill one of your fellow hostages in order to escape from the terrorists and save the lives 
of the eight children? 
 
You are on a cruise ship when there is a fire on board, and the ship has to be abandoned. The 
lifeboats are carrying many more people than they were designed to carry. The lifeboat you’re 
in is sitting dangerously low in the water—a few inches lower and it will sink. The seas start 
to get rough, and the boat begins to fill with water. If nothing is done it will sink before the 
rescue boats arrive and everyone on board will die.  However, there is an injured person who 
will not survive in any case. If you throw that person overboard the boat will stay afloat and 
the remaining passengers will be saved. Would you throw this person overboard in order to 
save the lives of the remaining passengers? 
 
You are negotiating with a powerful and determined terrorist who is about to set off a bomb 
in a crowded area. However, you have his teen-age son in your custody. There is only one 
thing that you can do to stop him from detonating his bomb, which will kill thousands of 
people. To stop him, you must contact him over the satellite hook-up and, in front of the 
camera, break one of his son’s arms and then threaten to break the other one if he does not 
give himself up. Would you break the terrorist’s son’s arm in order to prevent the terrorist 
from killing thousands of people with his bomb? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
